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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis investigates the security of cryptographic algorithms’ physical imple-
mentations. In particular, we focus on evaluating the resistance of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC), Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) implementations to Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. The
thesis does not attempt to design a cryptographically secure cipher or design new
SCA countermeasures, but rather focuses on attacking and evaluating side-channel
resistance of existing protected implementations that claim security against SCA.
This chapter is organized as follows. We provide historical background in Sec-
tion 1.1 and we present the motivation in Section 1.2. Subsequently, in Section 1.3
we present the research questions that are addressed in this thesis. Section 1.4
presents organization of the rest of the thesis and contributions of its author.
1.1 Historical Background
The word cryptography comes from the Greek words κρυpiτό (kryptós which means
“hidden” or “secret”) and γράφειν (grafein, which means to write). In general,
cryptography deals with constructing and analyzing protocols that prevent un-
intended parties from reading secret messages. Modern cryptographic protocols
are usually based on computationally hard to solve problems, and provide vari-
ous properties of information security such as: data confidentiality, data integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation.
The earliest known use of cryptography can be traced back to the Old Kingdom
of Egypt (circa 1900 BCE), where the non-standard hieroglyphs were carved into
the wall of a tomb most likely to obfuscate information 1.
1http://www.cypher.com.au/crypto_history.htm
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
Cryptanalysis, from the Greek kryptós, “hidden”, and analýein, “to loosen” or
“to untie”, is a discipline that analyzes and investigates cryptographic systems in
order to breach their security and gain access to either the contents of encrypted
messages or the keys. Usually it is assumed that the attacker has access to either
only outputs or both inputs and outputs of the encryption scheme. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the general algorithm under attack is known; this is Shannon’s
maxim “the enemy knows the system”, which is equivalent to the Kerckhoffs’
principle [172]. This thesis does not concern cryptanalysis directly, but some of
the presented attacks employ techniques related to cryptanalysis.
One of the most important questions related to cryptography is: can a security
of a cryptographic scheme be breached, for example, whether a message can be
decrypted without knowledge of the secret key? While cryptographic algorithms
are theoretically secure due to reliance on the hard to solve problems, their imple-
mentations could be broken by, for example, exploiting logical flaws. An example
of that is a padding attack on RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 for encryption [29], which uses
the padding validation of a cryptographic message to decrypt the ciphertext. In
general, cryptographic devices might leak information about its secrets in some
way. In this thesis we will investigate this kind of leakages.
1.1.1 Side-Channel Analysis
This thesis mainly addresses side-channel analysis. The first official information
on SCA attacks dates back to 1965. Peter Wright, a former officer and Assistant
Director of MI52, reported in [190] that MI5 was attempting to perform crypt-
analysis of a cipher device used by the Egyptian Embassy in London. The first
attempt was failing due to the lack of computational power. Wright suggested
placing a microphone near the rotor-cipher device to spy on the click-sound the
machine produced. By listening to the clicks of the rotors as cipher operators
reset them each morning, MI5 cryptologists reverse engineered the core position
of 2 or 3 of the machine’s rotors. This information reduced the computation effort
sufficiently to allow MI5 to breach the security of the cipher and to spy on the
embassy’s communication for a number of years.
In general, a side channel is an unintended interface for monitoring or operating
a device, resulting from its physical implementation. In the example above the
side channel was sound.
In the second half of nineties, Paul Kocher et al. presented the first research
publications about practical side-channel attacks [115,116]. They realized that the
security of cryptographic algorithms does not only depend on the mathematical
properties, but also on implementation details, regardless whether the implemen-
tation is hardware or software. By monitoring the side channels of DES and RSA
2MI5 stands for the British intelligence agency.
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implementations using a low-cost oscilloscope, more specifically the power con-
sumption [116] and the execution time [115], Kocher et al. were able to discover
the side-channel leakages corresponding to the private key usage. Therefore, they
were able to recover the private key with little effort and low cost. The methods
presented by Kocher et al. in [116] are called Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and
Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
SPA involves visually interpreting power consumption traces over time in order
to recover the key. Variations in power consumption occur particularly strongly
as the device performs different operations. If the sequence of such operations
depends on the key, then using a standard digital oscilloscope the attacker would
learn information about the key. Additionally, the attacker might further use fre-
quency filters and oscilloscope’s averaging functions to improve the signal quality.
DPA relies on performing a statistical analysis between intermediate values
of cryptographic computations and the corresponding side-channel traces. The
method exploits differences in power consumption while performing operations
depending on the secret key. The statical method has an error correction property
that allows to extract secrets from measurements which contain too much noise to
be analyzed using SPA.
The aforementioned publications spurred a wide-spread research on side-channel
attacks. Various statistical methods have become powerful tools in this new line of
research and many different types of side-channels have been employed, including:
electromagnetic emanations (EM) [160], temperature [93], acoustic and photonic
emissions [8, 170], cache timings [113], and data remanence [81]. The improved
DPA-like method, called Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), was introduced in
2004 by Brier et al. [32]. Both DPA and CPA are possibly the most dangerous
threats against the security of cryptographic devices known currently.
Template Attack [40] (TA) is another notable SCA technique. It combines sta-
tistical modeling with SPA and DPA, and consists of two phases, called profiling
and matching. An attacker first creates a “profile” of a sensitive device, which
is under their full control, and then matches this profile to measurements from
victim’s device to quickly find the victim’s secret key. All attacks that require
a fully control device are called either profiled or supervised. Many SCA meth-
ods, like DPA, do not require profiling and they are called either non-profiled or
unsupervised.
Another emerging form of SCA is called either horizontal or single-trace
SCA [182]. This form is especially relevant for public key implementations that
rely on exponentiation or scalar multiplication, because it allows recovering the
key bits through the analysis of individual traces. Therefore, even if an attacker
targets only single trace, they might be able to recover significant information
about the key. This makes horizontal attacks particularly powerful even against
implementations protected against SCA.
3
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Besides attack techniques, another highly relevant topic to both academic re-
searchers and industry practitioners is leakage detection. In this case, the goal
is not to attack a device and recover the secret, but to establish whether the
device is susceptible to SCA at all. The most widespread such method is Test
Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) [76]. TVLA is a testing methodology for
SCA resistance validation that uses statistical hypothesis testing to detect if one
of a number of sensitive intermediates during the computation of a cryptographic
algorithm significantly influences the measurements. Another widely-used leak-
age detection method relies on using profiles created during template attacks to
determine leakage presence [40].
Additionally, attacks which insert faults with the aim of abruptly halting the
normal functionality of a cryptographic algorithm were proposed in [30]. Those
are active attacks and not side-channel attacks, as they insert signals instead of
observing them; these attacks are known as Fault Injection (FI) attacks.
1.2 Motivation
Nowadays physical and especially side-channel security of an efficient crypto-
graphic implementation is often harder to achieve than pure algorithmic security.
Practical importance of implementation issues, including physical ones, has led in
the recent decades to the development of:
• cryptographic engineering, a distinct discipline concerned particularly with
security and efficiency of cryptographic implementations, and
• standards for computer security certification, including most notably:
– The common criteria for information technology security evaluation (re-
ferred to as Common Criteria or CC)3; currently it is in version 3.1
revision 5 and is recognized as international standard ISO/IEC 15408;
– EMVCo Security Evaluation Process requirements and procedures for
smartcard products of American Express, Discover, JCB, MasterCard,
UnionPay, or Visa [69].
Through the aforementioned developments it has become clearer that designers
of cryptographic devices need to implement the algorithms not only efficiently,
but more importantly they also need to ensure that information leaking through
potential side-channels of the device during the execution of an algorithm, cannot
be exploited by an attacker.
A number of countermeasures have been developed to counteract SCA attacks.
These countermeasures fall into the following two main categories.
3https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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• The first cathegory aims at reducing the leakage of exploitable information
in side-channels. The goal is to weaken the link between the data computed
by the device and the power consumed by the computations; this is often
called “hiding”. Such countermeasures are usually implemented in hardware.
• The second approach is to eliminate the relationship between the leaked in-
formation and the secret data. The goal is to make the leakage unrelated to
the secret data usually through randomization of the cryptographic process
without changing its functionality (i.e., input-output behavior). Such coun-
termeasures are often referred to as “masking” and are usually implemented
in both hardware and software.
Typically different countermeasures are implemented either in hardware or soft-
ware on different implementation abstraction levels, mainly: protocol level, algo-
rithm level, code level, CPU architecture level, and logic styles.
Since the first countermeasures were proposed, several attacks circumventing
them were also introduced. Subsequently, new countermeasures and new attacks
against them have been invented; this process goes on till this day.
In theory, a developer might want to implement all possible countermeasures
against SCA, but then the resulting implementation would be too slow and too ex-
pensive for all practical purposes. Therefore, budget and hardware limitations (in
terms of speed, for example) encourage the developers to limit usage of the coun-
termeasures. The solution to the above problem, employed usually in for example
CC evaluations, is as follows: first a developer considers necessary countermea-
sures during the design. Then, the SCA resilience of the resulting implementation
is evaluated. If the evaluation shows exploitable leakage, then either the counter-
measures are implemented improperly or additional ones should be added. Subse-
quently, the improved implementation should be evaluated again and the process
should be continued until the implementation shows no exploitable leakage. This
evaluation process should be constantly improved by considering emerging attack
techniques in order to keep it adequate and up-to-date.
In this thesis we mainly target RSA and ECC implementations protected with
SCA countermeasures. RSA-based cryptosystems [164] are frequently used in
credit card applications. Embedded systems that implement RSA are common
target of side-channel attacks. In particular, several attacks on RSA aim to re-
cover the private exponent, a part of the private key, which is sufficient to recover
the rest of the private key and is directly employed in the modular exponentiation
– the main RSA operation. Furthermore, RSA is often assessed in the CC and
EMVCo evaluations.
Embedded devices are heavily constrained in terms of resources, in particular:
computing power, energy, and memory. Therefore, asymmetric cryptographic im-
plementations on such devices are typically based on ECC [114, 131] because of
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the relatively low resource and power consumption compared to other public-key
systems. The main goal of such SCA attack is to recover the private key, in this
case, scalar, which is directly used in the scalar multiplication phase – the main
ECC operation. Moreover, ECC is often assessed in CC evaluations.
We will now give an ECC example of how countermeasures and attacks co-
exist. An unprotected ECC implementation is vulnerable to DPA and potentially
even SPA. An initial SCA countermeasure that was proposed to counteract them
was scalar blinding. This countermeasure essentially randomizes the private key
without affecting correctness of the output. However, several attacks were pro-
posed to overcome protection provided by this countermeasure, one of them is
proposed in this thesis in Chapter 3. If the scalar blinding is combined with other
countermeasures, namely coordinate randomization4, then this attack would no
longer work.
In turn there is a class of single trace attacks that would overcome combi-
nation of these countermeasures. Two of them are presented in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 6. There exist more complex countermeasures to counteract this class
of attacks. Therefore, it would be tempting to use all possible known counter-
measures. Unfortunately, the efficiency penalty even of a single countermeasure
is high. Therefore a developer needs to consider carefully which countermeasures
to include in the design. In particular, the developer should analyze the context
in which the device works and consider various attack scenarios to find out which
cryptographic operation might leak and how to prevent that.
1.3 Research Questions
The main research question of this thesis is “How to evaluate and attack public
key cryptosystems’ implementations that are protected with multiple side-channel
countermeasures?”. This general question depends on many aspects that need to
be analyzed to provide a complete answer. This motivates us to ask the following,
more precise, subquestions:
1. Are secured modern public key implementations resistant against novel and
constantly improving SCA attacks?
There is a constant need for improving secure implementations. Algorithms
and their implementations need to be continuously updated since new attacks
are being developed. The computation power of adversaries also increases in
time. For this reason, CC evaluations need to be redone every 3 years, even
if the security of a product is not breached.
4The coordinate randomization countermeasure essentially randomizes the input of the ECC
algorithm without affecting the output.
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2. How to evaluate the leakage of implementations of public key cryptosystems?
Protected implementations are usually much harder to attack and evaluate
than unprotected ones. In particular, it is hard to precisely quantify how
secure a device against SCA is and when the device is secure enough.
3. How to use supervised (i.e., profiled) and unsupervised (i.e., non-profiled)
techniques to evaluate and attack SCA resistance of public key implementa-
tions?
Traditionally supervised techniques have been used to attack and evaluate
public key implementations. However, it is often not clear how to exactly
apply them to protected implementations. Furthermore, sometimes an at-
tacker is not able to obtain a fully controlled device on which she can learn
the characteristics of attacked device. In such case, an unsupervised one
needs to be applied. It is not clear how to attack and evaluate public key
implementations in an unsupervised way.
1.4 Organization of The Thesis and Contribu-
tions of the Author
This thesis presents the results of the work conducted to answer the aforementioned
research questions. More precisely, the content of this thesis is organized in the
following way:
Chapter 2 gives a necessary background for the rest of this thesis. First we pro-
vide an introduction to both symmetric and public key cryptography. In
particular we describe how encryption and signature schemes work. Sec-
ondly, we present an overview of AES, RSA, and ECC. Finally, we give an
introduction to side-channel analysis.
Chapter 3 explores a novel and efficient side-channel attack called Online Tem-
plate Attacks (OTA). OTA is a new technique, at the time of writing, that
resides between horizontal and template attacks. This chapter introduces
OTA theoretically and shows application of the attack to different scalar-
multiplication algorithms by giving specific examples. Then OTA is prac-
tically executed against double-and-add-always scalar multiplication on an
ATMega card. Finally, a discussion on efficient countermeasures against
OTA and future work concludes the chapter.
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Contribution of the author: The author contributed to the the-
oretical foundations of the attack; in particular, developed the tech-
nique on which the practical experiments are based and made the at-
tack applicable for various input types to the scalar multiplication (for
example, for the compressed input point). The practical experiments
were also executed by the author. This research work has resulted
in two papers, namely "Online Template Attacks" in INDOCRYPT
2014 [12] and an extended version in the Journal of Cryptographic
Engineering [13]. The impact of the attack is verified by the Ger-
man Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) including OTA
in “ECC-guide: Minimal Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel
attack resistance of Elliptic Curve Implementations” [71].
Chapter 4 presents a novel and efficient single-trace template attack against a
ECC implementation that is protected with several countermeasures, in-
cluding coordinate re-randomization and scalar blinding. The attack targets
directly a conditional move (cmov) – a frequently used operation in scalar-
multiplication implementations. This operation can either be implemented
through arithmetic operations on registers or through various approaches
that all boil down to loading from or storing to a secret address. We demon-
strate that this attack is practically possible for ECC software running on
AVR ATmega microcontrollers, targeting a protected version of the popular
µNaCl library as an example. We note that all publicly available ECC AVR
implementations, to the best of our knowledge, use one of the two cmov
approaches and therefore are in principle vulnerable to our attack.
Contribution of the author: The author contributed to the the-
oretical foundations of this single trace temple attack, especially to
the method of selecting points of interest for the attack. Addition-
ally, the author contributed by generalizing the method from [77] to
tolerate a certain number of incorrectly recovered scalar bits without
relying on an exhaustive search. This research work has resulted in
a paper “Attacking embedded ECC implementations through cmov
side channels” [141] that has been presented at the 23rd Conference
on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2016).
Chapter 5 proposes a side-channel attack framework that combines unsupervised
learning, horizontal attacks, maximum likelihood estimation and template
attacks in order to recover RSA private key. To improve the success rate
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in attacking implementations protected with both message blinding and ex-
ponent blinding, this framework uses multiple traces for points of interest
selection (this approach reduces the noise) while targeting single traces to
recover randomized exponents. This is a first unsupervised attack that ob-
tains such property. To demonstrate the power of the attack framework we
practically attack the private exponent of the 1024-bit Square and Multiply
RSA-CRT implementation that is protected by 32-bit message blinding and
64-bit exponent blinding countermeasures, and runs on a 32-bit STM32F4
ARM Cortex-M4F microcontroller.
Contribution of the author: The author contributed to the design
of the framework and the practical execution of the attack. This re-
search work has resulted in a paper “A Semi-Parametric Approach for
Side-Channel Attacks on Protected RSA Implementations” [154] that
has been presented at the 14th International Conference on Smart
Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2015).
Chapter 6 introduces unsupervised horizontal clustering attacks on two pro-
tected implementations of the Montgomery Ladder on Curve25519 available
in the µNaCl library protected with regularity, point re-randomization, and
scalar randomization. The first implementation performs the conditional
swap (cswap) through arithmetic of field elements (cswap-arith), while the
second does so by swapping the pointers (cswap-pointer). The implementa-
tions run on a 32-bit STM32F4 ARM Cortex-M4F microcontroller that we
attack using electromagnetic emanations. The attack presented in this chap-
ter extends the framework from Chapter 5 to ECC and multi-dimensional
clustering. The results show that even strongly protected ECC implemen-
tations are vulnerable to this attack; a small number of scalar bits are not
correctly recovered, but a subsequent brute-force can fix them efficiently.
Contribution of the author: The author contributed both to the
improvements in the design of the framework and to the practical
execution of the attack. Additionally, the author contributed by de-
signing a method to tolerate a certain number of incorrectly recovered
scalar bits that is more efficient than an exhaustive search. This re-
search resulted in the following publication: “Applying Horizontal
Clustering Side-Channel Attacks on Embedded ECC Implementa-
tions” [140] that was presented at the 16th International Conference
on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2017).
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Chapter 7 applies and adjusts leakage detection methods, mainly TVLA, to two
novel implementations of cryptosystems: ECC and AES 5. First we eval-
uate side-channel resistance of a new implementation of the recent com-
plete addition formulae for prime order elliptic curves of Renes, Costello and
Batina [163] on an FPGA platform. The following three different versions
are evaluated: an unprotected implementation, an implementation protected
through coordinate randomization and an implementation with both coor-
dinate randomization and scalar splitting in place. The results confirm that
applying an increasing level of countermeasures leads to an increasing resis-
tance against side-channel attacks. This research is the first work looking
into side-channel security issues of hardware implementations of the com-
plete formulae. Second we evaluate a novel, at the time of writing, AES im-
plementation that provides protection against power analysis attacks while
allowing for a very compact structure with a potentially negligible area and
performance impact. The proposed design is based on a low entropy mask-
ing scheme, where half of the time the true value and half of the time the
complemented value are processed to mask the power consumption. We em-
ploy TVLA and classical CPA during the evaluation. The evaluation shows
that the proposed design significantly improves the side-channel resistance
in comparison to an unprotected AES.
Contribution of the author: This chapter collects the results from
the following two published papers:
• “Completing the Complete ECC Formulae with Countermea-
sures” [48] published in “’Journal of Low Power Electronics and
Applications” in 2017 and
• “SCA-Resistance for AES: How Cheap Can We Go?” [41] pre-
sented at the 10th International Conference on Cryptology
(AFRICACRYPT 2018).
The main contribution of the author is the practical evaluations of
the designs from both papers using the Test Vector Leakage Assess-
ment methodology and the Correlation Power Analysis adapted to
the specific implementation and platforms.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by summarizing the most important results and
proposing research directions and future work that stem out of this thesis.
5We are aware that AES is not a public key algorithm, but we believe that an evaluation of
a protected AES FPGA implementation fits well to this chapter.
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All implementations that are experimentally attacked in this thesis are summarized
in the conclusions chapter (Chapter 8) in Table 8.1.
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Chapter 2
Background
As mentioned in the previous chapter, cryptography deals with constructing and
analyzing protocols that realize security-related goals (for example, prevent unin-
tended parties from reading secret messages). A cryptographic protocol applies
cryptographic methods to realize these goals. Usually cryptographic protocols
address one of the following goals: key establishment, entity authentication, con-
fidentiality and message authentication, data transport, and non-repudiation.
In this chapter we describe in Section 2.1 how symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography works, especially with respect to encryption and signature schemes.
Section 2.2 introduces cryptographic mechanisms that we consider in this thesis.
Subsequently, we describe background of side-channel attacks in Section 2.3.
2.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography is usually used to provide confidentiality or in-
tegrity of transported messages. This form of cryptography investigates cryptosys-
tems that typically use the same cryptographic keys for cryptographic transforma-
tions: encryption and decryption in the case of confidentiality. In this thesis we
focus on the block cipher primitive that is often the main component of symmetric
key cryptosystems.
Another form of cryptography is called asymmetric. The asymmetric cryp-
tography, also called public key cryptography, investigates cryptosystems that use
pairs of keys: public keys which could be published freely, and private keys, which
are only known to the owners of the keys. This division lets public key cryptosys-
tems to provide authentication, where the public key verifies that a holder of the
private key sent the message. Public key cryptography can also be used for key
13
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distribution, where only the private key holder can decrypt the symmetric key en-
crypted with the public key. The symmetric key can be then used for encryption,
for example. After a certain amount of time, called session, the symmetric key
usually expires and a new key needs to be distributed.
In this thesis we consider side-channel attacks on a symmetric cryptography
primitive – a block cipher. A block cipher operates on a groups of bits of fixed
length, called blocks. During encryption, a block cipher algorithm takes, an n-
bit block of plaintext and a k-bit secret key as input, and applies an encryption
transformation that results in an n-bit block of ciphertext1. The exact behavior
of the encryption transformation is controlled by the secret key. Decryption is
similar: the decryption algorithm takes, an n-bit block of ciphertext together with
the k-bit secret key, and outputs the original n-bit block of plaintext.
We do not formally define a block cipher security, but intuitively speaking a
block cipher is secure if an attacker cannot distinguish with practical effort between
the block cipher (equipped with a random key) and a random permutation. Such
a secure block cipher is called a pseudo-random permutation (PRP).
Observe that a secure block cipher is suitable only for the encryption of a single
block under a fixed key. Many modes of operation have been designed to allow
repeated use of a block cipher in a secure way. In this thesis we do not focus on
the block cipher’s modes and security, because these aspects are not relevant for
side-channel attacks.
AES [56], which is described in Section 2.2, is an example of a family of block
ciphers each with a block size of n = 128 bits, but three different possible key
lengths k: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
With respect to asymmetric cryptography, this thesis focuses on SCA attacks
on on: digital signature and key encapsulation mechanism.
A digital signature is a cryptographic protocol for verifying the authenticity
of digital messages. It includes algorithms for key and signature generation, and
signature verification. The key generation algorithm generates public and private
keys, such that a message signed with the private key can be successfully verified
with the corresponding public key.
We do not provide a formal security definition of the digital signature scheme,
but informally we characterize it as follows: it should be computationally infeasible
to generate a valid signature for a party without knowing that party’s private key.
In this thesis we focus on SCA of the signature generation, as this operation
directly employs the private key.
A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is an encryption technique designed
to secure symmetric cryptographic key material for transmission using asymmet-
ric algorithms. Then symmetric key encryption can be used to efficiently secure
1Sometimes the lengths of plaintext and ciphertext vary but usually they are the same
14
2.2. Attacked Implementations: AES, RSA, ECC
and transmit large amount of data. A KEM scheme includes three algorithms:
key generation, encapsulation and decapsulation. The key generation algorithm
generates public and private key pairs, such that encapsulation with the public
key and decapsulation with the private key produce the same shared secret (i.e.,
the symmetric key), when the encapsulated ciphertext is given as an input to the
decapsulation function. Encapsulation can be seen as encryption of the symmetric
session key and decapsulation as the decryption of the session key.
Informally we describe the security of KEM as follows: it should be compu-
tationally infeasible to learn any information about the shared secret. As usually
the symmetric key is short and the messages for public key algorithms are long,
padding is required for full security. In particular we focus on SCA of the decap-
sulation algorithm, as this operation directly involves the private key.
2.2 Attacked Implementations: AES, RSA, ECC
In this section we introduce three cryptographic primitives, which implemen-
tations are evaluated in the rest of this thesis.
2.2.1 AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [56] is a subset of Rijndael, a family of
block ciphers, that was developed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. AES is
described in a specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)2.
Rijndael is a family of ciphers with different key and block sizes; they may be
any multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 and a maximum of 256 bits. For
AES, NIST selected three members of the Rijndael family, each with a block size
of 128 bits, and three different key lengths: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
AES construction allows efficient implementations in both software and hard-
ware. It operates on a 4 by 4 array of bytes, called the state, and the AES
calculations are performed in binary extension field GF(28). Several AES building
blocks operate on either 4-bytes rows or columns of the state.
The size of the key used by AES specifies the number of rounds that convert
the plaintext block into the ciphertext block: it is 10 for 128-bit keys, 12 for 192-bit
keys, and 14 for 256-bit keys. In this thesis we consider only 128-bit keys. Each
round consists of several processing steps, including one that depends on the key
2https://www.nist.gov/publications/advanced-encryption-standard-aes
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itself. The corresponding reverse rounds are applied to transform ciphertext block
back into the original plaintext (using the same key).
A high-level block diagram of AES for 128-bit key is presented in Figure 2.1.
First KeyExpansion derives round keys from the key using the Rijndael’s key sched-
ule. Second the initial round key addition is performed: AddRoundKey combines
each byte of the state with a block of the round key using bitwise xor. Subse-
quently, 9 rounds are executed as follows:
1. SubBytes - a non-linear substitution step where each byte is replaced with
another one;
2. ShiftRows - a transposition step where the last three rows of the state are
shifted cyclically a certain number of steps;
3. MixColumns - a linear mixing operation which operates on the columns of
the state, combining the four bytes in each column;
4. AddRoundKey.
Finally, the 10th round is executed; it is similar to the previous 9 rounds but the
MixColumns operations is not performed.
Figure 2.1: AES high-level block diagram.
For more details about AES we refer the reader to [56].
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2.2.2 RSA
RSA [164] is a public key cryptographic primitive that is frequently used in
payment schemes. In particular it can be used for key encapsulation and digital
signature, among others.
RSA is based on a hard mathematical problem of integer factorization and it
is commonly considered to be secure if combined with appropriate padding, like:
OAEP, PSS, and PKCS #1 v1.5 [135]. Below we describe a textbook RSA without
describing the padding mechanisms since we do not perform SCA on padding.
The RSA public key (n, e) consist of n, a modulus for both public and private
key, and e – public key exponent. Number of bits in n is the key length (usually, it
is 1024, 2048, or 4096). The public exponent e is often of short length for efficient
encryption; usually it is not random and it is set to 216 + 1 = 65537.
The private key consists of (n, d), where d denotes the private exponent and
n is the same as for the public key. Decapsulation and signature generation is
performed in the following way: m = cd mod n, where m denotes the plaintext or
the part of the signature, and c denotes ciphertext or message to be signed. The
resulting signature is (m, c) while the resulting encryption is c.
Encapsulation and signature verification is performed as follows: c′ = me
mod n. In the encapsulation case c′ denotes the ciphertext andm denotes the sym-
metric key. The result of signature verification is determined by comparing c′ to c.
Now we list a bit more details about RSA internals. Modulus n equals pq, where
p and q are random prime numbers, that have similar bit length. In practice p
and q have length half of that of n.
As mentioned before, the public exponent is usually set to a short constant.
Additionally, n needs to be chosen in a way that e and n satisfy 1 < e < φ(n)
and e and φ(n) are co-prime (i.e., gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1) and φ(n) is Euler’s totient
function (namely, φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1)). The private exponent d is chosen to be
the multiplicative inverse of e modulo lcm(p − 1, q − 1); it means that d satisfies
the following equation:
de = 1 mod (lcm(p− 1, q − 1)) = 1 mod φ(n),
which is equivalent to d = e−1 mod φ(n). Since p, and q are used to compute
private d, these primes need to be secret too.
Exponentiation, for example m = cd mod n, can be performed by multiple
algorithms. The simplest algorithm, i.e., square-and-multiply, is shown in Al-
gorithm 1. An analysis of a protected version of this algorithm is presented in
Chapter 5.
Above we have described the straightforward RSA that computes the expo-
nentiation cd mod n directly. For efficiency reasons many popular cryptographic
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Algorithm 1: The left-to-right square-and-multiply algorithm
Input: m, d = (dx−1, dx−2, . . . , d0)2
Output: c = md mod n
r ← 1 ;
for i← x− 2 down to 0 do
r ← r2 ;
if di = 1 then
r ← r ∗m ;
end
end
return r
libraries, like OpenSSL 3, use an optimization based on the Chinese Remainder
Theorem. This optimization is often referred to as RSA-CRT.
The following values are precomputed and stored as part of the private key:
• p and q (the primes from the key generation);
• dp = d mod (p− 1);
• dq = d mod (q − 1);
• qinv = q−1 mod p.
These precomputed values allow to compute the exponentiation m = cd mod n
more efficiently. Usually it is performed in the following way:
• mp = cdp mod p;
• mq = cdq mod q;
• h = qinv(m1 −m2) mod p;
• m = m2 + hq.
RSA-CRT is significantly more efficient than straightforward RSA even though
two modular exponentiations need to be computed. The reason is that these two
modular exponentiations both use a smaller exponent and a smaller modulus.
3https://www.openssl.org/
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2.2.3 ECC
Elliptic curves are mathematical structures with interesting algebraic and ge-
ometric properties. Among the most fascinating applications of elliptic curves is
public key cryptography.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was introduced in 1985 independently by
Miller [131] and Koblitz [114]. It is broadly used for implementing asymmetric
cryptographic protocols in embedded devices due to the small key length and
memory requirements compared to RSA. The security of elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems relies on the difficulty of solving the Discrete Logarithm problem on elliptic
curve defined over finite fields of large characteristic or binary fields.
ECC schemes are based on scalar multiplication and they include: the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [103] for digital signatures, Elliptic
Curve ElGamal [68] as an encryption/decryption scheme, and Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) [11] as a key exchange scheme.
Elliptic curve arithmetic is performed in terms of the underlying field opera-
tions. For ECC, the curves are defined over prime or binary fields, but in this
thesis we only consider prime fields. A prime field Fp, where p is a prime, consists
of all the integers {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} with the addition and multiplication operations
performed modulo p. Addition, multiplication and inversion of field elements are
performed modulo p.
An elliptic curve over Fp, denoted as EFp , can be defined as a set of solutions
(x, y) to one of the elliptic curves equations; we present one of them later on. The
pairs that verify these equations represent the affine coordinates of a point over the
curve EFp . From the addition rules on an elliptic curve, the necessary operations
are addition, multiplication and inversion over Fp. Inversion is the most expensive
operation and can be avoided by using other types of coordinate systems for the
points P = (x, y), for example, projective coordinates. In this case each affine point
P = (x, y) is represented by three coordinates (X,Y, Z), where x = XZ , y =
Y
Z .
There exist other coordinate systems with various similar properties, in particular,
Jacobian coordinates and López-Dahab coordinates.
There are several forms of elliptic curve equations. The most common in
cryptography is the Weierstrass equation. For Fp, if p > 3 then the Weierstrass is
expressed in the following form:
EFp : y2 = x3 + αx+ β. (2.1)
Together with the point at infinity O, the set (EFp ∪O,+) forms an abelian group
with the neutral element O. Adding of the points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2)
results in a third point on the curve, namely P +Q = (x3, y3) according to the
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following formulas:
x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2,
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1,
with λ = y1 − y2
x1 − x2 if P 6= ±Q and λ =
3x21 + α
2y1
otherwise. The point addition on
an elliptic curve is visualized in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Point addition on an elliptic curve.
Since the above addition formulas on the affine coordinates involve division
(and therefore inversion), they are relatively costly. However, there exist addition
formulas that do not involve division, for example, on the projective coordinates.
Other notable forms of elliptic curves used in cryptography, besides Weierstrass
curves, are Edwards curves, Montgomery curves, and Hessian curves.
The base operation of most of ECC protocols is scalar multiplication. It takes
as input a point P in affine or projective coordinates and the scalar k. The result
is the point [k]P on the curve. During the execution of the algorithm, usually
non-affine coordinates are used to speed up the additions.
Computing scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve can be done in a similar
way as exponentiation in RSA: doublings need to be used instead of squares and
additions instead of multiplications. Let us consider Algorithm 1. For ECC the
algorithm scans the bits of the scalar from the most significant bit to the least
significant one and performs a point doubling only if the current bit is 0 or a
doubling and an addition if the bit is 1.
Similarly to RSA exponentiation, the ECC scalar multiplication is a target of
SCA attack that aim to recover the scalar that is usually the private key. For
a comprehensive study of ECC, the interested reader is referred to the book of
Hankerson, Menezes and Vanstone [82].
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2.3 Side-Channel Attacks
In this section we present an introduction to side-channel analysis. In particular
we discuss: SPA, CPA, TVLA, and TA.
2.3.1 Simple Power Analysis
Let us consider Algorithm 1, which performs RSA exponentiation and let us as-
sume that the employed square algorithm is faster than the multiplication algo-
rithm. In this case an attacker can follow the attack path shown in [116] as follows:
based on the power or EM traces, the attacker identifies a full sequence of squares
(S) and multiplies (M). This sequence is equivalent to the private key and, for
example, “...SMSSSMSS...” translates to ...10010.. for Algorithm 1. The above
process is presented in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: SPA on RSA: a private key (top), the sequence of square of multiplies
(middle), and the power trace (bottom).
Note that the attack can be strengthened by an adversary averaging several
traces of RSA exponentiation. On the other hand this can attack could be stop by
various side-channel countermeasure, even very simple one, for example, by using
the multiplication algorithm for squaring.
The SPA on ECC looks almost the same: the attacker would only to recognized
doublings and additions instead of squares and multiplications, respectively.
2.3.2 Correlation Power Analysis
Let us assume that Algorithm 1 is protected with regularity, namely, that the
exponentiation operations are always protected in the same order, regardless the
private key. An example of such algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2 for RSA;
this algorithm works the same as Algorithm 1, but if the exponent is 0 then it
perform a dummy multiplication (so the algorithm is regular).
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Algorithm 2: The left-to-right square-and-multiply always algorithm
Input: m, d = (dx−1, dx−2, . . . , d0)2
Output: c = md mod n
r ← 1 ;
for i← x− 2 down to 0 do
r ← r2 ;
if di = 1 then
r ← r ∗m ;
end
else
tmp← r ∗m ;
end
end
return r
In this case the SPA attack cannot be applied. However, CPA [32] or DPA [116]
can be applied in the following way. First the attacker would collect n traces with
random inputs m. Then they would guess a small number of most significant bits
of d, for example 8 of them. Let us denote the guess dˆ 4. Based on the dˆ they
can compute the target state r of RSA after 8 bits are processed. We denote this
guessed state as rˆi, which depends on the random input mi and dˆ. A vector of all
rˆ0, . . . , rˆn is denoted rˆ. This process is presented in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: DPA on RSA: targeting 8 bits.
Now the attacker needs to determine how the value of the intermediate state
4Observe that in this example since the attacker guesses 8 bits then there are 28 = 256
possibilities for the attacked state. Note that the attacker can guess any number of bits as long
as they can enumerate through all possibilities.
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is affecting the power consumption. This modeling is called selection function f
that takes as the input rˆ and produces the modeled value. This function can be:
• Hamming weight of the state; observe that if rˆi is large then it might be
stored in several registers and then the hamming weight of the separate, for
example 8-bit registers, needs to be considered;
• Hamming distance between current and previous state;
• Identity model (the value of a register storing rˆi).
To give a few examples, f can be defined as follows:
f(x) = HW (x) or f(x) =
{
1 if HW (x) ≤ 4
0 otherwise.
The most common definition of f is simply the hamming weight.
After the attacker chooses the selection function, they need to apply it to rˆ re-
sulting in f(rˆ) = f(rˆ0), . . . , f(rˆn). Now the attacker needs to perform a statistical
analysis between f(rˆ) and the traces for each possible guess dˆ. For of the guesses
the statistic will imply the highest matching – this indicates the most likely guess
of the first 8 bits of d. Subsequently, the attacker can continue to recover the next
8 bits in the same way; they continues until the whole d is recovered.
Before we discuss the statistical analysis further let us introduce traces no-
tation. For 0 ≤ i < n, we denote a single measurement trace ti to be a vector
ti = (ti0, ..., tik−1), where k is a number of samples in traces and each tij is a sample
value, for example, a float value. All n traces form a traceset and we denote it as
t = (t0, . . . , tn−1).
Now we describe how to use the side-channel leakage from the traces to build
a distinguisher for the 8-bit chunks of d. For CPA, Pearson’s correlation is used
as a distinguisher. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient, ρ(X,Y ) which measures
the linear relationship between two variables X and Y and is defined as follows:
ρ(X,Y ) = cov(X,Y )√
var(X) · var(Y ) ,
where var denotes variance and cov denotes covariance5.
For each guess dˆ of d the attacker computes
max
j∈{0,...,k−1}
ρ
(
(t0j , . . . , tn−1j ), f(rˆ)
)
and the greatest value determines which guess is correct.
5Covariance is defined as: cov(X,Y ) = E[(X −E[X]) · (Y −E[Y ])], where E denotes expected
value.
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In the case of DPA the statistics works slightly differently. Essentially per index
j DPA averages all the samples corresponding to a particular value of f(rˆ); for
example, for 8-bit hamming weight state there are 9 possible values. The statistic
is the difference between this averages and the rest of the attack looks the same
as for CPA. However, DPA is considered to be less stable than CPA if for example
the mean of the whole traces changes in time, for example, due to environment
changes. Therefore, CPA gained much more popularity. To the point that even
the name DPA is used with CPA interchangeably and it means CPA; we also follow
this convention in this thesis.
The attack on ECC works the same as for RSA with the difference that not the
exponentiation state, but the scalar multiplication state is targeted. The attack
on AES works also similarly but usually instead of the exponentiation state, the
output of SubBytes in the first round is targeted; observe that a single SubBytes
output depends only on 8 bits of the key in the first round.
2.3.3 Test Vector Leakage Assessment
We evaluate the SPA and DPA leakage of various cryptographic implementations
using the Test Vector Leakage Assessment methodology (TVLA) [76, 100, 179].
TVLA uses statistical hypothesis testing to detect if one of a number of sensitive
intermediates significantly influences the measurement data.
TVLA consists of the following two phases.
The measurement phase is based on the collection of side-channel traces when
standardized test vectors are provided as input to the algorithm being tested;
The analysis phase is based on Welch’s t-test, which can detect different types
of leakages and allows the analyst to identify points in time that deserve
further investigation.
The resulting measurements trace set usually compromises of two partitions:
• Group A that contains traces collected with a fixed key and random input;
• Group B that contains traces collected with the same fixed key and input
data on which some constraints are placed; the goal is to fixed sensitive
intermediate data to have particular property (e.g., low hamming height).
Above we describe partitioning for so-called non-specific TVLA but there also
exist different partitioning methods that target leakage of particular intermediate
values [21,179].
The t-test statistic is computed using the following formula:
|µA − µB |√
σ2
A
NB
+ σ
2
A
NA
,
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where µx, σx, and Nx denote respectively: the average of all the traces, the stan-
dard deviation, and the number of traces in the partition x. Note that this statistic
needs to be computed separately for each sample index in the trace set.
Traditionally, following [76] the threshold 4.5 needs to be exceeded by t-test
for any of the samples to detect a leakage.
The TVLA methodology has so far been applied to AES [76], RSA [100, 179],
and ECC [142, 179]. Subsequently, research has been performed on how to set a
threshold for the Welch’s t-test used in TVLA in [60] and [153].
2.3.4 Template Attacks
The approaches like CPA or DPA are limited by the necessity of a leakage model
and a selection function. They are also univariate nature: each time sample is
being attacked independently. Therefore, these univariate attacks might be not
sufficient if the assumed leakage model and selection function are too far from
reality or a leakage is exploitable only if several time samples are combined to-
gether. In these cases so-called template attacks might be successful since they
do not relay on the choice of a leakage model or a selection function and they are
multi-variate (i.e., they can combine multiple samples for the same leakage). In
general, the template attack methodology aims to answer the following question:
“when possessing a device, which is under a full control of the attacker, how to
make the best use of it to attack another device for which the key is unknown?”.
The assumption is that both devices differ only in the keys that they use. Besides
that they are identical with respect to hardware and software.
As mentioned earlier, every template attacks [40] consist two phases. The first
phase requires a profiling device, which is under full control of the attacker, on
which they can model leakage of the device creating so-called templates. In the
second phase the attacker matches the templates to the leakage coming from the
attacked device (which stores an unknown secret). The template can be seen as
a piece of information that represents a class of population. It can for example
correspond to power consumption of processing data byte 0xA4. The templates
together distinguish one class apart from another.
RSA and ECC are also threatened by template attacks. The attacker needs to
be able to provide the input, the private and the public keys of their choice the con-
trolled device. They might also need to be able to turn off some countermeasures
in some scenarios.
The profiling phase is usually contains acquisition of n side-channel traces. A
basic procedure is to truncate, from the trace representing the exponentiation,
the interval of samples regarding the operation in which the template is being
constructed; namely, a time interval of a squaring or a multiplication for RSA and
doubling and add for ECC. Another approach consists in selecting the points with
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the strongest signal; in this case, the points are not necessarily adjacent.
This set of traces can be viewed as a matrix T consisting of vector traces
ti = ti0, ..., tik−1) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, where k represents the number of samples for each
trace. These samples, or points of interest (POIs), are selected according to the
features of the target implementation. Usually, these points of interest are selected
by a difference of means or by the location of the t-test peak. Another possibility
is to apply the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The covariance matrix is
constructed by firstly computing the mean vector µ from the set of n traces:
µ = 1
n
n−1∑
i=0
ti.
Then the mean vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µk) is subtracted from each trace vector giving:
T =

t0 − µ
t1 − µ
. . .
tN−1 − µ
 =

t00 − µ0 t01 − µ1 . . . t0k−1 − µk−1
t10 − µ0 t11 − µ1 . . . t1k−1 − µk−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
tn−10 − µ0 tn−11 − µ1 . . . tn−1k−1 − µk−1
 .
Let us denote ′ a notation or matrix transposition. Considering T ′ as the transpose
matrix of T , the covariance matrix is computed as follows:
Σ = 1
n− 1T
′ × T.
In the modular RSA exponentiation, the templates are often created for an
operation of squaring or multiplication. Therefore, a template (µS ,ΣS) can be
constructed for squaring and a template (µM ,ΣM ) can be constructed for multi-
plication. After having the templates, the attacker needs to acquire the traces to
be attacked from an uncontrolled device. Then they need to classify the newly
acquired trace ta with respect to the generated template by applying the Maha-
lanobis distance:
P (µ,Σ; ta) =
1√
(2pi)k|Σ|e
−1
2 (ta−µ)′Σ−1(ta−µ),
where |Σ| is the determinant of the covariance matrix and Σ−1 is its inverse. The
value P (µ,Σ; ta) expresses the maximum-likelihood estimation for the multivariate
normal distribution regarding the class of the operation. Then, the trace ta can
be employed for both constructed templates and can be verified if it is drawn from
the distribution of a squaring N (µS ,ΣS) or multiplication N (µM ,ΣM ), where N
denotes normal distribution.
The authors of [84] proposed to use the Bayesian classifier to a set of acquired
traces, which leads to the minimization of errors of classification.
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Online Template Attacks
Template attacks are a special kind of side-channel attacks that work in two stages.
In a first stage, called template building, the attacker builds up a database of
template traces collected from a device which is identical to the attacked device,
but under the attacker’s control1. In the second stage, traces from the target
device are compared to the template traces to recover the secret key; the second
stage is called template matching.
In the context of attacking elliptic-curve scalar multiplication with template
attacks, one can interleave template building and template matching and reduce
the amount of template traces. This chapter enhances the power of this technique
by defining and applying the concept of online template attacks, a general attack
technique with minimal assumptions for an attacker, who has very limited control
over the template device. We show that online template attacks need only one
power-consumption trace of a scalar multiplication on the target device; they are
thus suitable not only against ECDSA and static elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman
(ECDH), but also against elliptic-curve scalar multiplication in ephemeral ECDH.
In addition, online template attacks need only one template trace per scalar bit
and they can be applied to a broad variety of scalar-multiplication algorithms.
To demonstrate the power of online template attacks we recover scalar bits
of a scalar multiplication using the double-and-add-always algorithm [106] on a
twisted Edwards curve running on a smartcard with an ATmega163 CPU.
This chapter is based on [13] that has been published in “Journal of Crypto-
graphic Engineering” in 2017 and has been presented at the 15th International
Conference on Cryptology (INDOCRYPT 2014) [12].
1Note that in the case of public key cryptography, the attacker can even use the same device
if the public key operation is implemented using the same algorithm as the private key operation.
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3.1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks exploit various physical leakages of secret information or in-
structions from cryptographic devices and they constitute a constant threat for
cryptographic implementations. We focus on power-analysis attacks that exploit
the power-consumption leakage from a device running some cryptographic al-
gorithm. Attacking elliptic-curve cryptosystems (ECC) with natural protection
against side-channel attacks, e.g. implementations using Edwards curves, is quite
challenging. This form of elliptic curves, proposed by Edwards in 2007 [67] and
promoted for cryptographic applications by Bernstein and Lange [23], has sev-
eral advantages compared to elliptic curves in Weierstrass form. For instance, the
fast and complete formulas for addition and doubling make these types of curves
more appealing for memory-constrained devices and at the same time resistant
to classical simple power analysis (SPA) techniques. Although considered a very
serious threat against ECC implementations, differential power analysis (DPA), as
proposed in [53, 116], cannot be applied directly to ECDSA or ephemeral elliptic
curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) because the secret scalar is used only once. This
is incompatible with the requirement of DPA to see large number of power traces
of computations on the same secret data. In order to attack various asymmetric
cryptosystems, new techniques that reside between SPA and DPA were developed;
most notably collision [18,74,91,171,182,192] and template attacks [128,136,165].
The efficiency of most of those collision-based attacks is shown only on simu-
lated traces; no practical experiments on real ECC implementations have verified
these results. To the best of our knowledge, only two practical collision-based
attacks on exponentiation algorithms are published, each of which relies on very
specific assumptions and deals with very special cases. Hanley et al. exploit
collisions between input and output operations of the same trace [83]. Wenger
et al. in [184] performed a hardware-specific attack on consecutive rounds of a
Montgomery ladder implementation. However, both attacks are very restrictive in
terms of applicability to various ECC implementations as they imply some special
implementation options, such as the use of López-Dahab coordinates, where field
multiplications use the same key-dependent coordinate as input to two consecu-
tive rounds. In contrast, our attack is much more generic as it applies to arbitrary
choices of curves and coordinates, and many scalar multiplication algorithms.
3.1.1 Related work
Collision attacks exploit leakages by comparing two portions of the same or dif-
ferent traces to discover when values are reused. The Big Mac attack [182] is the
first theoretical attack on public key cryptosystems, in which only a single trace
is required to observe key dependencies and collisions during an RSA exponenti-
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ation. Witteman et al. in [188] performed a similar attack on the RSA modular
exponentiation in the presence of blinded messages. Clavier et al. introduced
in [51] horizontal correlation analysis, as a type of attack where a single power
trace is enough to recover the private key. They also extended the Big Mac attack
by using different distinguishers. Horizontal correlation analysis was performed on
RSA using the Pearson correlation coefficient in [51] and triangular trace analysis
of the exponent in [50].
The first horizontal technique relevant to ECC is the doubling attack, presented
by Fouque and Valette in [74]. Homma et al. in [91] proposed a generalization of
this attack to binary right-to-left, m-ary, and sliding-window methods. An attack
proposed by Bauer et al. in [18], is a type of horizontal collision correlation attack
on ECC, which combines atomicity and randomization techniques. A recent attack
on ECC is horizontal cross-correlation [83]; the approach is similar to [188] but
uses only a single trace. Heyszl et al [88] apply multi-dimensional K-Means [73,122]
clustering to successfully attack an FPGA-based ECC implementation; this attack
is further improved in [174] by using Expectation-Maximization clustering [59],
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [104] and multiple EM probes. Another
recent horizontal clustering attack targeting a software ECC implementation with
precomputed points (for example, an m-ary implementation) is presented in [101].
The presented attacks target a single trace and employ clustering and correlation
to recover scalar bits.
Template attacks are a combination of statistical modeling and power-analysis
attacks consisting of two phases, as follows. The first phase is the profiling or
template-building phase, where the attacker builds templates to characterize the
device by executing a sequence of instructions on fixed data. The second phase is
the matching phase, in which the attacker matches the templates to actual traces
of the device. The attacker is assumed to possess a device which behaves the same
as the target device, in order to build template traces while running the same im-
plementation as the target. Medwed and Oswald demonstrated in [128] a practical
template attack on ECDSA. However, their attack required an oﬄine DPA attack
on the EC scalar-multiplication operation during the template-building phase, in
order to select the points of interest. They also need 33 template traces per key-bit.
Furthermore, attacks against ECDSA and other elliptic-curve signature algorithms
only need to recover a few bits of the ephemeral scalar for multiple scalar multipli-
cations with different ephemeral scalars and can then employ lattice techniques to
recover the long-term secret key [22, 136, 165]. This is not possible in the context
of ephemeral ECDH: an attacker gets only a single trace and needs to recover
sufficiently many bits of this ephemeral scalar from side-channel information to be
able to compute the remaining bits through, for example, Kangaroo techniques.
Another template attack on ECC is presented in [89]. This attack exploits
register location based leakage using a high-resolution inductive EM probe; there-
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fore, the attack is considerably expensive to execute. A template attack on a
wNAF ECC algorithm is presented in [194]. However, this attack is applied to an
implementation that is not protected with either, scalar randomization or base-
point randomization. Template attacks against protected ECC implementations
are presented in [141]. Contrary to our approach, all of the above attacks require
multiple traces to construct a template. Furthermore, our method does not require
knlowledge of the scalar bits to label the templates.
This chapter is based on an extended version (i.e., [13]) of the original paper on
Online Template Attacks (OTA) [12]. In the meantime, from the original paper on
OTA until the extended version was written, two related works are published that
verify the applicability of OTA on different curves. The first work from Dugardin
et.al [63] performed OTA on Weierstrass (Brainpool and NIST) curves using EM
emanations. A follow-up work from Özgen et. al [152] verified that OTA can
successfully give the correct prediction on the scalar bit, by using distinguishers
from machine learning (classification methods).
3.1.2 Our contributions
In this chapter we introduce an adaptive template-attack technique, which we
call Online Template Attacks (OTA). This technique is able to recover a complete
scalar from only one power trace of a scalar multiplication using this scalar. The
attack is characterized as online, because we create the templates after the ac-
quisition of the target trace. While we use the same terminology, our attack is
not a typical template attack; i.e. no preprocessing template-building phase is
necessary. Our attack functions by acquiring one target trace from the device
under attack and comparing patterns of certain operations from this trace with
templates obtained from the attacker’s device that runs the same implementa-
tion. Pattern matching is performed at suitable points in the algorithm, where
key-bit related assignments take place by using an automated module based on
the Pearson correlation coefficient.
The attacker needs only very limited control over the device used to gener-
ate the online template traces. The main assumption is that the attacker can
choose the input point to a scalar multiplication, an assumption that trivially
holds even without any modification to the template device in the context of
ephemeral ECDH. It also holds in the context of ECDSA, if the attacker can mod-
ify the implementation on the template device or can modify internal values of
the computation. This is no different than for previous template attacks against
ECDSA.
Our methodology offers a generic attack framework, which is applicable to
various forms of curves (Weierstrass, Edwards and Montgomery curves, to name
but a few) and implementations. We attack the doubling operation in the double-
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and-add-always algorithm. Contrary to the doubling attack [74], our attack can be
launched against right-to-left algorithms and Montgomery ladder [133]. We further
note that Medwed and Oswald [128] perform a very special template attack based
on a set of assumptions: DPA performed in advance to find intermediate points for
templates, implementation with Hamming-weight leakage and applicability only
to ECDSA. Online template attacks do not have these restrictions, they need only
a single target trace, and only a single template trace per key-bit. The advantages
of our attack over previously proposed attacks are as follows:
• It does not require any cumbersome preprocessing template-building phase,
but a rather simple post-processing phase.
• It does not assume any previous knowledge of the leakage model.
• It does not require full control of the device under attack.
• It works against SPA-protected and to some extent DPA-protected imple-
mentations with unified formulas for addition and doubling.
• Countermeasures such as scalar randomization and changing point repre-
sentation from affine to (deterministic) projective representation inside the
implementation do not prevent our attack.
• It is applicable to the Montgomery ladder and to constant-time (left-to-right
and right-to-left) exponentiation algorithms.
• It is experimentally confirmed on an implementation of double-and-add-
always scalar multiplication on the twisted Edwards curve used in the Ed25519
signature scheme.
• Our attack is a chosen input attack - it means that the adversary needs to
control the input of a scalar multiplication (but not the scalar). Most ECC
implementations use inputs in affine (or compressed affine) coordinates and
internally convert to projective representation. In this chapter we show how
to apply the attack if an attacker controls either the projective coordinates
input, or affine input (even if it is compressed).
• Our attack works when the target trace and the template traces are ac-
quired from the same device and also when the target trace is acquired from
a different device than the template traces, as shown in our experimental re-
sults. Note that using the same device for both templates and target traces,
would actually make the attack easier, because there would be no vertical or
horizontal misalignment in the traces.
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Online template attacks require only one target trace and one online template
trace per key-bit. We therefore claim that our technique is the most efficient
practical side-channel attack applicable to ephemeral-scalar ECC. When applied
to ECDSA, the proposed attack can be used in combination with lattice techniques
similar to [22, 165], in order to derive the whole private key from a few bits of
multiple ephemeral keys.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, this chapter is an extended version
of the original paper on Online Template Attacks [12]. We present the theoretic
primitives of the attack and verify our theory with new experiments with different
types of input; namely with 256-bit projective input, with the reduced 255-bit
projective coordinates, and finally with affine coordinates. These experiments
verify the applicability of OTA and provide a complete practical setting for this
type of side-channel attack.
3.1.3 Organization of the chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. We introduce and explain OTA in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 gives specific examples of how the attack applies to different scalar-
multiplication algorithms. Section 3.4 presents our practical OTA on double-and-
add-always scalar multiplication. A discussion of how the proposed attack can
be applied to implementations that include countermeasures that randomize the
algorithm or operands is given in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes our
contribution and concludes the chapter.
3.2 Online Template Attacks
We define an online template attack as a side-channel attack with the following
conditions:
1. The attacker obtains only one power trace of the cryptographic algorithm
involving the targeted secret data. This trace is called the target trace. We
call the device from which the target trace is obtained the target device.
This property makes it possible to attack scalar multiplication algorithms
with ephemeral scalar and with randomized scalar.
2. The attacker is generating template traces after having obtained the target
trace. These traces are called (online) template traces.
3. The attacker obtains the template traces on the target device or a similar
device2 with very limited control over it, i.e. access to the device to run
2By similar device we mean the same type of microcontroller running the same algorithm.
Observe that the target device may be the same as the target one.
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several executions with chosen public inputs. The attacker does not rely on
the assumption that the secret data is the same for all template traces.
4. At least one assignment in the exponentiation algorithm is made depending
on the value of particular scalar bit(s), but there are no branches with key-
dependent computations. Since we are attacking the doubling operation,
this key-dependent assignment should be during doubling. As a counterex-
ample, we note that the binary right-to-left add-always algorithm for Lucas
recurrences [106] is resistant to the proposed attack, because the result of
the doubling is stored in a non-key-dependent variable.
In the following we show that online template attacks are feasible and can be
applied against implementations of various scalar-multiplication algorithms. In
fact, we show that we need only a single template trace per scalar bit. Transfer
of the approach to the corresponding exponentiation algorithms (for example in
RSA or DSA) is straight-forward. Transfer to other cryptographic algorithms is
clearly not trivial; we consider online template attacks as a specialized means to
attack scalar multiplication and exponentiation algorithms.
3.2.1 Attack Description
Template attacks consist of two phases, template building for characterizing the de-
vice and template matching, where the characterization of the device together with
a power trace from the device under attack are used to determine the secret [125].
Therefore, the first condition of our proposed attack is typically fulfilled by all
attacks of this kind.
It is well known that template attacks against scalar multiplication can gener-
ate templates “on-the-fly”, i.e., interleaving the template building and matching
phases. See, for example, Section 5.3 in [128]. We take this idea further by build-
ing templates after the target trace has been obtained (condition 2). The attacker,
being able to do things in this order, needs only limited control over the target
device. Moreover, the attacker is not affected by randomization of the secret data
during different executions of the algorithm, since he always has to compare his
template traces with the same target trace.
The basic idea consists of comparing the target trace and an online template
trace while executing scalar multiplication and then finding similar patterns be-
tween them, based on a hypothesis on a bit for a given operation. The target trace
is obtained only once with input P . For every bit of the scalar, we need to obtain
an online template trace with input kP , k ∈ Z, where k is chosen as a function
of our hypothesis on this bit. The attack requires to send a different point to the
device, thus generating a template trace for each of these points. Each template
trace should be then compared with the part of the target trace that corresponds
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to the manipulated bit. However, due to jitter, for example, it may be not easy
to determine that part. Therefore we compare the template trace with the target
trace at each sample offset.
We performed pattern matching for our traces using an automated module
based on the Pearson correlation coefficient, ρ(X,Y ), which measures the linear
relationship between two variables X and Y . For power traces, the correlation
coefficient shows the relationship between two points of the trace, which indicates
the leakage of key-dependent assignments during the execution of a cryptographic
algorithm. The leakage can be due to differences in Hamming-weight or Hamming-
distance of the variables, but the exact leakage model does not affect online tem-
plate attacks in any way. Extensions to other leakage models and distinguishers
are straightforward. Our pattern matching corresponds to a list of the correlation
coefficients that show the relationship between all samples from the template trace
to the same consecutive amount of samples in the target trace. If our hypothesis
on the given key-bit is correct, then the pattern match between our traces at the
targeted operation will be high (in our experiments it reached 99%).
In this way we can recover the first i bits of the key. Knowledge of the first
i bits provides us with complete knowledge of the internal state of the algorithm
just before the (i+ 1)th bit is processed. Since at least one operation in the loop
depends on this bit, we can make a hypothesis about the (i+ 1)th bit, compute an
online template trace based on this hypothesis, and correlate this trace with the
target trace at the relevant predetermined point of the algorithm.
A separate question is how many templates need to be created per attacked bit.
In this chapter we show that only a single template trace per key-bit is sufficient if
a correct template can be safely recognized from any incorrect template, see Sec-
tion 3.4 for examples. Essentially, for each experiment we establish a correlation
threshold to recognize correct templates from incorrect ones; then we can create
one template (for bit 0, for example) and depending on the template correlation
and the threshold we can recover the scalar bit. If the difference between the cor-
relation for correct and incorrect templates is sufficiently large then the threshold
can be either learned through profiling or by computing two templates (for 0 and
1) in the first few iterations.
Furthermore, note that if a bit is incorrectly identified then all subsequent
templates would not match with the target trace. In case this happens, then it is
possible to backtrack to the last successful matching and re-start the attack.
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3.3 Applying the attack to scalar-multiplication
algorithms
In this section we show how to apply the attack outline in the previous section to
different scalar multiplication algorithms.
3.3.1 Attacking the left-to-right double-and-add-always al-
gorithm
The core idea and feasibility of the attack is demonstrated by considering the
example of the double-and-add-always algorithm described in Algorithm 3. We
note that the first execution of the loop always starts by doubling the input point
P , for all values of k. We assume that kx−1 = 1. Depending on the second-most
significant key bit kx−2, the output of the first iteration of the algorithm will
be either 2P or 3P . For any point P we can, therefore, get a power trace for
the operation 2P , i.e. we let the algorithm execute the first two double-and-add
iterations. In our setup, we can zoom into the level of one doubling, which will be
our template trace. Then we perform the same procedure with 2P as the input
point to obtain the online template trace that we want to compare with the target
trace. If we assume that the second-most significant bit of k is 0, then we compare
the 2P template with the output of the doubling at first iteration. Otherwise, we
compare it with the online template trace for 3P .
Algorithm 3: The left-to-right double-and-add-always algorithm
Input: P , k = (kx−1, kx−2, . . . , k0)2
Output: Q = k ·P
R0 ← P ;
for i← x− 2 down to 0 do
R0 ← 2R0 ;
R1 ← R0 +P ;
R0 ← Rki ;
end
return R0
Assuming that the first (i−1) bits of k are known, we can derive the ith bit by
computing the two possible states of R0 after this bit has been treated and recover
the key iteratively. Note that only the assignment in the ith iteration depends on
the key bit ki, but none of the computations do, so we need to compare the trace
of the doubling operation in the (i+ 1)th iteration with our original target trace.
To decide whether the ith bit of k is zero or one, we compare the trace that the
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doubling operation in the (i+1)th iteration would give for ki+1 = 0 with the target
trace. For completeness, we can compare the target trace with a trace obtained
for ki+1 = 1 and verify that it has lower pattern match percentage; in this case,
the performed attack needs two online template traces per key bit. However, if
during the acquisition phase the noise level is low and the signal is of good quality,
we can perform an efficient attack with only our target trace and a single trace for
the hypothetical value of Rki+1 .
Note that the method above assumes that one template trace is acquired to
recover a single bit. It is possible to acquire multiple template traces to recover
multiple bits at the same time, for example, three template traces can be produced
to recover 2 bits at once. However, attacking single bits is more efficient in terms
of storage of template traces and oﬄine precomputation than attacking a group
of bits. This is an advantage of building online templates compared to the usual
template attacks. In particular, sequentially attacking 2 bits requires 2 template
traces; if a template is similar to the target trace then the bit is guessed correctly,
otherwise the bit is incorrect. Attacking both bits at once, requires 3 template
traces (the fourth choice can be implied if none of the 3 templates matches the
attacked trace). In general, attacking n bits simultaneously requires an oﬄine
computation of (2n − 1) template traces.
3.3.2 Attacking the right-to-left double-and-add-always al-
gorithm
In this section we examine the binary right-to-left add-always algorithm of [107],
below as Algorithm 4. Contrary to Algorithm 3, the computations in the main
loop of the above algorithm clearly depend on the key.
Algorithm 4: Binary right-to-left double-and-add-always algorithm
Input: P , k = (kx−1, kx−2, . . . , k0)2
Output: Q = k ·P
R0 ← O;
R1 ← P ;
for i← 0 up to x-1 do
b← 1− ki ;
Rb ← 2Rb ;
Rb ← Rb +Rki ;
end
return R0
Attacking the right-to-left double-and-add-always algorithm of [107] is a type
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of key-dependent assignment OTA. We target the doubling operation and note
that the input point will be doubled either in the first (if k0 = 0) or in the second
iteration of the loop (if k0 = 1). If k is fixed we can easily decide between the two
by inputting different points, since if k0 = 1 we will see the common operation
2O. If the k is not fixed, we simply measure the first two iterations and again
use the operation 2O if the template generator should use the first or second
iteration. Once we are able to obtain clear traces, the attack itself follows the
general description of Sect. 3.2. If we assume that the first i bits of k are known
and we wish to derive the (i+ 1)th bit, this means that we know the values of R0
and R1 at the start of the (i+1)th iteration. By making a hypothesis on the value
of the (i+ 1)th key bit, we can decide according to the matching percentage if R0
or R1 was used.
3.3.3 Attacking the Montgomery ladder
The Montgomery Ladder, initially presented by Montgomery in [133] as a way to
speed up scalar multiplication on elliptic curves, and later used as the primary
secure and efficient choice for resource-constrained devices, is one of the most
challenging algorithms for simple side-channel analysis due to its natural regularity
of operations. A comprehensive security analysis of the Montgomery ladder given
by Joye and Yen in [110] showed that the regularity of the algorithm makes it
intrinsically protected against a large variety of implementation attacks (SPA,
some fault attacks, etc.). For a specific choice of projective coordinates for the
Montgomery ladder, as described in Algorithm 5, one can do computations with
only X and Z coordinates, which makes this option more memory efficient than
other algorithms.
Algorithm 5: The Montgomery Ladder
Input: P , k = (kx−1, kx−2, . . . , k0)2
Output: Q = k ·P
R0 ← P ;
R1 ← 2P ;
for i← x− 2 down to 0 do
b← 1− ki ;
Rb ← R0 +R1 ;
Rki ← 2 ·Rki ;
end
return R0
The main observation that makes our attack applicable to the Montgomery
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ladder is that at least one of the computations, namely the doubling in the main
loop, directly depends on the key-bit ki. For example, if we assume that the first
three bits of the key are 100, then the output of the first iteration will be R0 = 2P .
If we assume that the first bits are 110, then the output of the first iteration will be
R0 = 3P . Therefore, if we compare the pattern of the output of the first iteration
of Algorithm 5 with scalar k = 100, we will observe higher correlation with the
pattern of R0 = 2P than with the pattern of R0 = 3P . This is demonstrated in
the following working example.
k = 100 k = 110
R0 = P ,R1 = 2P R0 = P ,R1 = 2P
b = 1 : R1 = 3P ,R0 = 2P b = 0 : R0 = 3P ,R1 = 4P
b = 1 : R1 = 5P ,R0 = 4P b = 1 : R1 = 7P ,R0 = 6P
3.3.4 Attacking Side-Channel Atomicity
Side-channel atomicity is a countermeasure proposed by Chevallier-Mames et al. [44],
in which individual operations are implemented in such a way that they have an
identical side-channel profile (e.g. for any branch and any key-bit related sub-
routine). In short, it is suggested in [44] that the point doubling and addition
operations are implemented such that the same code is executed for both opera-
tions. This renders the operations indistinguishable by simply inspecting a suitable
side-channel. One could, therefore, implement an exponentiation as described in
Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6: Side-Channel Atomic double-and-add algorithm
Input: P , k = (kx−1, kx−2, . . . , k0)2
Output: Q = k ·P
R0 ← O; R1 ← P ; i← x− 1 ;
n← 0 ;
while i ≥ 0 do
R0 ← R0 +Rn ;
n← n⊕ ki ;
i← i− ¬n ;
end
return R0
There are certain choices of coordinates and curves where this approach can be
deployed by using unified or complete addition formulas for the group operations.
For example, the Jacobi form [120] and Hessian [108] curves come with a unified
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group law and Edwards curves [25, 27] even have a complete group law. For
Weierstrass curves, Brier and Joye suggest an approach for unified addition in [33].
Simple atomic algorithms do not offer any protection against online template
attacks, because the regularity of point operations does not prevent mounting this
sort of attack. The point 2P , as output of the third iteration of Algorithm 6, will
produce a power trace with very similar pattern to the trace that would have the
point 2P as input. Therefore, the attack will be the similar as the one described
in Sect. 3.3.1; the only difference is that instead of the output of the second
iteration of the algorithm, we have to focus on the pattern of the third iteration.
In general, when an attacker forms a hypothesis about a certain number of bits of
k, the hypothesis will include the point in time whereR0 will contain the predicted
value. This will mean that an attacker would have to acquire a larger target trace
to allow all hypotheses to be tested.
3.4 Experimental Results
This section presents our experimental results. Firstly, in Sect. 3.4.1 we describe
the attacked implementation and the measurement setup that we use to perform
attacks. Then, we present experimental results of an OTA with extended projective
coordinates of 256-bit in Section 3.4.2; this is the usual input value for our smart
card. In Section 3.4.3 we present OTA on extended projective coordinates with
reduced 255-bit input. Finally, Sect. 3.4.4 presents an OTA applied to input
points with affine compressed coordinates. All the attacks target are performed
iteratively bit-by-bit and they five most significant bits of the scalar.
3.4.1 Target Implementation and Experimental Setup
To validate feasibility and efficiency of our proposed method, we attack an elliptic-
curve scalar-multiplication implementation running on an “ATmega card”, i.e., an
ATmega163 microcontroller [54] in a smart card. To illustrate that our attack also
works if the template device is not the same as the target device, we used two
different smart cards: one to obtain the target trace and one to obtain the online
template traces.
Our measurement setup uses a Picoscope 52033 with sampling rate of 125M
samples per second for both target trace and online template traces. This oscillo-
scope has limited acquisition memory buffer to 32M samples. Since 5 iterations of
the scalar-multiplication algorithm take around 235 ms, it means that with sam-
pling rate of 125M samples per second we can record a trace of approximately
29.4M samples.
3http://www.picotech.com/discontinued/PicoScope5203.html
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The scalar-multiplication algorithm is based on the curve arithmetic of the
Ed25519 implementation presented in [94], which is available online4. The elliptic
curve used in Ed25519 is the twisted Edwards curve E : −x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
with d = −(121665/121666) and base point
P = (1511222134953540077250115140958853151145
4012693041857206046113283949847762202,
4631683569492647816942839400347516
3141307993866256225615783033603165251855960).
For more details on Ed25519 and this specific curve, see [24].
We modified the software to perform a double-and-add-always scalar-multiplication
(see Algorithm 3). The whole underlying field and curve arithmetic is the same as
in [94]. This means in particular that points are internally represented in extended
coordinates as proposed in [90]. In this coordinate system a point P = (x, y) is
represented as (X : Y : Z : T ) with x = X/Z, y = Y/Z, and x · y = T/Z.
3.4.2 Online Template Attack with 256-bit Projective In-
put
In this subsection we describe how to apply an OTA if the input supplied to the
scalar-multiplication is in extended projective coordinates, i.e, if the attacker has
full control over all coordinates of the starting point. This is a realistic assumption
if a protocol avoids inversions entirely and protects against leakage of projective
coordinates by randomization as proposed in [137, Sec. 6]. Recall that for extended
coordinates, T is fully determined byX,Y and Z; they are an extension of standard
projective coordinates.
The attack targets the output of the doubling operation. We performed pat-
tern matching for our traces as described in Section 3.2.1. In this way, we could
determine the leakage of key-dependent assignments during the execution of the
algorithm.
We first demonstrate how to attack a single bit and then we present our results
from recovering the five most significant unknown bits of the scalar (recall that
the highest bit is always set to one; see Algorithm 3). The remaining bits can be
attacked iteratively in the same way as described in Section 3.2.1; as stated above
we were not able to do so due to technical limitations of our measurement setup.
The first observation from our experiments is that when we execute the same
algorithm with the same input point on two different cards, there is a constant
4http://cryptojedi.org/crypto/#avrnacl
40
3.4. Experimental Results
vertical misalignment between the two obtained traces, but the patterns look al-
most identical. This fact validates our choice of the correlation coefficient as our
pattern-matching metric, since this metric does not depend on the difference in ab-
solute values and therefore the constant misalignment does not affect the results.
Figure 3.1 shows this vertical misalignment between the brown trace obtained
from the target and the blue trace obtained from the template device for the same
instance of the algorithm.
Figure 3.1: Similarity between 2P on the target card with 2P on the templates’ card.
For our target trace, we compute a multiple of a point P with coordinates
P x = 0x6218E309D40065FCC338B3127F468371
82324BD01CE6F3CF81AB44E62959C82A,
P y = 0x5501492265E073D874D9E5B81E7F8784
8A826E80CCE2869072AC60C3004356E5,
P z = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000001,
P t = 0x3FC17C25A0F70F2B3113A05A48E6CD8B
CD341E229CB10E4833B819EA5D3A8762.
We know that the most significant bit of the scalar is 1, so after the first
iteration of the double-and-add-always loop the value of R0 is either 2P (if the
second bit of k is zero) or 3P (if the second bit of k is one). We furthermore know
from the addition formulas used by the implementation, thatR0 = 2P orR0 = 3P
have the following specific representation in extended coordinates:
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2Px = 0xB83008EEB749E519BA5C05E63EDAABA1
E2BA0C92037A02796B1D92A636A49746,
2Py = 0x910B931F833256DB68C1D2597194A774
97C4A9FAD63D042535C511840C51A692,
2Pz = 0xD098E5677B2A9CCA678238279BFC55B6
0A4B5F377438DF015EC2BFCC83B2B922,
2Pt = 0x180C2E1536BACE17B096A0EE222B0299
AAF2CBEE868CEB1D2D74800E735F48D4;
3Px = 0xEAB3BE0B61DEEB0B915B228B3E00376A
CB7C487114BCB34CD90A1275BA586422,
3Py = 0x2342D54933AFB7E1CA079AE79EC1B9DF
DD45D0CB96DE25DF0C4C474C524B6EEC,
3Pz = 0xA9C7590B5B803C2EAB6BADE97EA9C331
1AE83BC98D659AE13A9D4D0AD6F93D2A,
3Pt = 0x4A9D4C7F687A53B21CFD06DB1400B1EA
7AA4434DE904EF2624D001F49B491434.
To determine the second bit of the secret scalar k, we generate template traces
by inputting exactly those representations of 2P and 3P and computing the cor-
relation of the first iteration of the template trace with the second iteration of the
target trace. At this point we use that inputs are given in projective representation.
In fact, we will see that the correlation between the correct template trace and
the target trace is so much higher than between the wrong template trace and the
target trace, that just one of the two template traces is sufficient to determine the
second bit of k. This is depicted in Figures 3.2 and 3.3; all figures are taken with
the six most significant bits of k set to 100110. Figure 3.2 shows power traces of
the second iteration of the target trace (brown) and the first iteration of the 2P
template trace, i.e., the matching template trace. Figure 3.3 shows power traces
of the second iteration of the target trace (brown) and the first iteration of the 3P
template trace, i.e., the non-matching template trace.
For validation of our results, we conducted several experiments with differ-
ent input points from the target card and the template card, and computed the
correlation in the obtained power traces. Figure 3.4 shows the correlation of the
template trace (iteration 1) for 2P to the target trace (iteration 2) in blue and
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Figure 3.2: Difference between P (target trace, brown) at second iteration and 2P
(matching template trace, blue) at first iteration. For illustration, both
traces are obtained from the same card to avoid vertical misalignment.
Figure 3.3: Difference between P (target trace, brown) at second iteration and 3P
(non-matching template trace, blue) at first iteration. For illustration, both
traces are obtained from the same card to avoid vertical misalignment.
the correlation of the template trace (iteration 1) for 3P to the same target trace
(iteration 2) in brown. We notice that the trace obtained from the point 2P is
almost identical to the pattern obtained from the target trace; as expected the cor-
relation is at least 97% for all our experiments. On the other hand, the correlation
of the target trace with the template trace for 3P is at most 83%. To determine
the value of one bit, we can thus simply compute only one template trace, and
decide the value of the targeted bit depending on whether the correlation is above
or below a certain threshold set somewhere between 83% and 97%.
The results presented so far are obtained while attacking one single bit of
the exponent. When we attack five bits with one acquisition, we observe lower
numbers for pattern matching for both the correct and the wrong scalar guess. The
correlation results for pattern matching are not so high, mainly due to the noise
that is occurring in our setup during longer acquisitions. This follows from the fact
that our power supply is not perfectly stable during acquisitions that are longer
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Figure 3.4: Pattern Matching 2P to P (blue) and 3P to P (brown); the target and
template traces are obtained from different cards.
than 200 ms. However, the difference between correct and wrong assumptions
is still remarkable as depicted in Figures 3.5 to 3.9, showing the OTA on five
scalar bits k = 100110 at once5. The templates are always acquired during the
first iteration and the target trace contains all five iterations; note that the input
points for the templates depend on the already recovered exponent bits.
Figure 3.5: Pattern Matching 2P to P (blue) and 3P to P with P (brown) obtained for
the 2nd most significant scalar bit.
Correct bit assumptions have 84−88% matching patterns, while the correlation
for the wrong assumptions drops to 50 − 72%. Therefore, we can set a threshold
for recognizing a bit to be at 80%.
Note that the attack with projective inputs does not make any assumptions on
formulas used for elliptic-curve addition and doubling. In fact, we carried out the
attack for specialized doubling and for doubling that use the same unified addition
formulas as addition. The results were similar, all traces shown above are from the
experiments that used unified addition formulas for both addition and doubling.
5Observe that the correlation for the incorrect template in Figure 3.6 is slightly lower than
in the other figures. This can be explained not only by noise, but also by different degrees of
similarity between the incorrect inputs for the template traces and the intermediate points for the
target trace. Nonetheless, the important fact is that all correlations for the incorrect templates
are much lower than the correlations for the correct templates.
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Figure 3.6: Pattern Matching 4P to P (blue) and 5P to P with P (brown) obtained for
the 3rd most significant scalar bit.
Figure 3.7: Pattern Matching 8P to P (blue) and 9P to P with P (brown) obtained for
the 4th most significant scalar bit.
3.4.3 Online Template Attack with 255-bit Projective In-
put
In the previous section, for simplicity, we deliberately ignored the case of coor-
dinates reduction in the field, in order to make the concept of the attack clear.
The implementation that we attack, for the sake of efficiency, operates on 256−bit
coordinates and not 255−bit coordinates from the field F2255−19. The 256−bit
coordinates correspond the coordinates from F2255−19 by applying the modulo
2255 − 19 operation; by using 256 bits the implementation can save time by not
performing some modulo operations.
So far we assumed that we can send to the card the optimized 256−bit co-
ordinates. It is interesting to examine a more complex attack scenario in which
we can only input the 255−bit coordinates. In this section, we show that OTA is
successful in this scenario too; a fact that makes OTA a powerful attack technique
independent of the prime p of the field used. Fast modular reduction is imple-
mented in [94] by using simple shifts and additions, which are relatively cheap on
AVRs.
Our idea is not to attack a whole doubling operation but just a single squaring.
More precisely, we show how to perform OTA on the squaring operation of the
Z coordinate. First, let us consider the old 256−bit templates. There are two
distinct attack cases, namely:
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Figure 3.8: Pattern Matching 18P to P (blue) and 19P to P with P (brown) obtained
for the 5th most significant scalar bit.
Figure 3.9: Pattern Matching 38P to P (blue) and 39P to P with P (brown) obtained
for the 6th most significant scalar bit.
• MSB = 0 for the Z projective coordinate (the remaining coordinates can
have the most signification bit equal to 1), therefore the Z coordinate after
reduction remains the same.
In this case, OTA can be applied in a similar way as in section 3.4.2. We take
the old template coordinates and perform a reduction of all the coordinates
modulo our prime number 2255−19; then we send those coordinates as input
to the card to obtain the new templates.
• The Z coordinate has MSB = 1 and therefore, there is a 9 bits difference
from the corresponding 256− bit coordinate.
In this case, the reduced point differs from its 256 − bit equivalent in the
MSB and in the least significant byte due to the pseudomersenne prime
that we use (i.e., 2255 − 19). This case is the most interesting and we will
analyze in the remaining part of this section.
We focus on Step D: the computation of Z2 (see Figure 3.11 for the details
about the doubling formula that we use); we choose a new Z ′, such thatMSBZ′ =
0 and the rest of the bits are the same as the Z coordinate of the old template.
So our new point has only 1 bit difference with the original target trace. For
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this Z ′, we recalculate X ′, Y ′ and T ′ using the following equations:
X ′ = X · Z ′,
Y ′ = Y · Z ′,
T ′ = T/Z ′,
where X, Y , Z, and T denote the coordinates of the old template.
Figure 3.10 presents the pattern match between a template trace during com-
putation of D ← Z2 with template with 1 bit difference, 9 bit difference, or wrong
template (iteration 1) to the target trace (iteration 2). As expected, the highest
peak corresponds to the template with only 1 bit difference, the slightly smaller
peak correspond to the 9 bits difference, and the lowest peak corresponds to a
wrong template. The results obtained from this attack are similar to the previous
section and therefore, we do not present the correlation figures for all 5 bits.
The results above suggest that the templates with 9 bits difference are suffi-
cient for a successful attack although the correlation values are slightly affected.
However, for a more noisy setup, 9 incorrect bits may lower the correlation too
much. Therefore, we concentrate on an attack that allows only a single bit to be
incorrect.
Figure 3.10: Pattern Matching during computation of D of a template with 1 bit differ-
ence (cyan), a template with 9 bit difference (blue), and a wrong template
to the target trace for area of computing D (brown).
Successful key guesses (for the templates that have at most 1 bit difference) give
correlation values between 81% and 86%, while unsuccessful ones are below 76%.
The success and unsuccessful rates are different than in section 3.4.2 because now
we concentrate on a single squaring and not the whole doubling. Furthermore, we
used different cards for this attack, because one of the cards used for experiments
reported in section 3.4.2 got broken.
3.4.4 Online Template Attack with Affine Input
The attack as explained in the previous sections makes the assumption that the
attacker has a full control over the input in projective coordinates. Most imple-
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mentations of ECC use inputs in affine (or compressed affine) coordinates and
internally convert to projective representation. The input is now given as (x, y)
and at the beginning of the computation converted to (x : y : 1 : xy). We observe
that the points P , 2P and 3P do not have any coordinates in common with the
projective representations used internally. Already after the first iteration of the
double-and-add-always loop, Z = 1 does not hold anymore. Those attacks are
more elaborate, since the internal point representation changes at every step of
the algorithm.
First we consider an attack on the second most significant bit (which is again
set to zero) and the input point P of the target trace with coordinates
P x =0x6218E309D40065FCC338B3127F468371
82324BD01CE6F3CF81AB44E62959C82A,
P y =0x5501492265E073D874D9E5B81E7F8784
8A826E80CCE2869072AC60C3004356E5.
Choosing the affine versions of 2P and 3P to generate template traces does
not help us now because they do not have any coordinates in common with the
projective representations used internally6. To successfully perform the attack we
need to modify our approach and take a closer look at the formulas used for point
doubling. We illustrate the approach with the unified doubling formula from [90]7
These formulas contain the operations listed in Figure 3.11.
The main idea of the attack is to focus on the first multiplication (Y1−X1)(Y2−
X2), where in case of a doubling would be (Y − X)2. We give now a detailed
description on how to generate the necessary templates for (Y −X)2.
Let us assume that the target trace with the point P is already acquired and
that we attack bit bi, where 0 ≤ i < x. Firstly, depending on already recovered
bits of scalar bx, . . . bi+1 (at the beginning we only know that the most significant
bit bx is 1), the coordinates of P , and the bit guess bi ∈ {0, 1}, we can compute
the intermediate value λ = Y −X that is squared in Step 1 (Figure 3.11) during
acquisition of the target trace. Secondly, we search for a new point P i = (x′, y′)
such that Y ′−X ′ = λ 8. Such a point P i cannot always be found on the curve, but
we can flip the least significant bit of λ and check whether this point belongs to
the curve. If this fails, we flip the bit back and then flip the second least significant
6This property follows from the fact that the Z coordinate of 2P during the conversion to
extended coordinates is always set to 0x01 while the Z coordinate of the point P after being
squared in the first iteration of the exponentiation loop does not equal 0x01 with overwhelming
probability
7For details, see: http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-twisted-extended-1.
html#addition-madd-2008-hwcd-3.
8Note that we cannot use P (X,Y, Z) “freely”, because now Z 6= 1.
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1 : A← (Y1 −X1)(Y2 −X2)
2 : B ← (Y1 +X1)(Y2 +X2)
3 : C ← kT1T2
4 : D ← 2Z1Z2
5 : E ← B −A
6 : F ← D − C
7 : G← D + C
8 : H ← B +A
9 : X3← EF
10 : Y 3← GH
11 : T3← EH
12 : Z3← FG
Figure 3.11: Unified addition/doubling formula from [90]
bit of λ; we continue this way with subsequent least significant bits until we find
a point on the curve. From our experiments, we succeed in finding a point on the
curve in a maximum of five trials. Such a point will differ from λ on at most 1 bit
(in least significant byte of the coordinate).
Using the method described above we compute two points P [kx−2 = 0] and
P [kx−2 = 1], where kx−2 indicates the second most significant bit.
P [kx−2 = 0]x = 0x2B1FDBA73C0BB44A21D59EE599B66E5B
470EA5ADB62777A55254E646F0ADE032,
P [kx−2 = 0]y = 0x03FB65D807F4260BD03B6B58CC706A2D
FC19431688EA79511CFC6524C65AEF7C,
P [kx−2 = 1]x = 0x340C1C83C144EA9C5B707C5081FD770C
F6C2C95FC044604B45ABAEF3F4F3EDAE,
P [kx−2 = 1]y = 0x6D9B33C19315B772941CF4ACE2BEF982
088C51BA4265D2DD78EDE3CA8CE6F852.
Let us assume that, the same as in Section 3.4.2, the six most significant bits
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of for the scalar k are set to 100110 (recall that the most significant bit is always
set to 1). When we compare the trace for P as input at the second iteration to the
trace for P [kx−2 = 0] at the first iteration during the second squaring operation
(computing A) then we can observe that the two traces are almost identical, see
Figure 3.12 for details.
Figure 3.12: Comparison between P at the second iteration (blue) to P [kx−2 = 0] at
first iteration (brown); the area of computing A is marked.
Figure 3.13 shows the pattern match between a template trace during computa-
tion of A← (Y −X)2 with input point P [kx−1 = 0] (iteration 1) to the target trace
for P (iteration 2) and the pattern match between the template trace (iteration
1) for P [kx−1 = 1] to the target trace (iteration 2).
Figure 3.13: Pattern Matching during the A computation of P [kx−2 = 0] to P (blue)
andP [kx−2 = 1] toP (brown) withP obtained for the 2nd most significant
scalar bit.
We notice that since the trace obtained from the point P [kx−2 = 0] is almost
identical to the pattern obtained from the target trace; as expected, the correlation
is 86% for the correct key-guess and under 73% for the incorrect one.
Since we know the two most significant we can continue the attack for next
bits. We repeat the attack for the 5 most significant bit (in total we will know 6
most significant bits since the most significant is always 1).
Using the same method as for computing the pointsP [kx−2 = 0] andP [kx−2 = 1],
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we compute the point for the 8 subsequent template points. We list them below.
P [kx−3 = 0]x = 0xDDBDB790FD617CFBEA18EEFAC3D7E9B5
E8C7E0AAD45BA08B63B0B8E99E005747,
P [kx−3 = 0]y = 0x0EE63580391125F3438EBB6E384AEE09
8B8F8333A3A800CF1D76D35513FF595E,
P [kx−3 = 1]x = 0xF31755BF0F9F1328EB2E54E207DD4E36
907B902AD596D95AA2E5D3138D9E0488,
P [kx−3 = 1]y = 0x2B4A5C2C075C5230AD0AD93B793FF8FE
8F365F0C3C50A2F7C20F9C0BEDD17B28,
P [kx−4 = 0]x = 0x23547DC40EF3F2D370930784C3ACB402
F3BEF1CB01A4DD6C5E44AD5CE017BF14,
P [kx−4 = 0]y = 0x22D06B73034E069C20F285AE1E67BEF4
ACB69B6DCEE39D6A33DE3222C7BDBB84,
P [kx−4 = 1]x = 0x507A558593D15CDD3134476723F4E85C
FBE11738016C03080284C708E270FC90,
P [kx−4 = 1]y = 0x667B8A91051E6551E076114DA2E868C8
E15A256663F9D063D4AC42F92DA8A7D6,
P [kx−5 = 0]x = 0xF666568414BA6E418A05082EB5901CFA
A361C0103DA239A92F1299AA246BAFE6,
P [kx−5 = 0]y = 0x1D9931D9308201FB42F54CBC96AC59A7
77DC17A3A80418E991C8C44CD9169C6C,
P [kx−5 = 1]x = 0xF816DE1164F0617FA7A98B03F0804972
B66398938A6EDF92DF5A2366B4C3ECF0,
P [kx−5 = 1]y = 0x513BCB7EB92B614727BCDCE104A2B5A4
3F0CC9572999B5035F34743D5FC7BE63,
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P [kx−6 = 0]x = 0xD5FB7999C3E03EC0CFA16E6E4A2EADE0
E8E9E4DDD5439BF7080E60C07EE8045E,
P [kx−6 = 0]y = 0x7476658D00EB04256A8265757A6F90D2
38E5904B9BE42B8DDFB941D9C4050109,
P [kx−6 = 1]x = 0x64F1BB3CF1E751164D909F628A58373E
647749E70A254D5B1282C0434B3EA80A,
P [kx−6 = 1]y = 0x307C54240DC1A35827B597FFED49EE91
9A9707108779E744C600AF11A1344864.
The pattern match results for the templates are presented in Figure 3.14, Fig-
ure 3.15, Figure 3.16, and Figure 3.17.
Figure 3.14: Pattern Matching during computation of A of P [kx−3 = 0] to P (blue) and
P [kx−3 = 1] to P (brown) with P obtained for the 3rd most significant
scalar bit.
Figure 3.15: Pattern Matching during computation of A of P [kx−4 = 0] to P (blue) and
P [kx−4 = 1] to P (brown) with P obtained for the 4th most significant
scalar bit.
The correlation is 84− 87% for the correct key guesses. For the non-matching
template point the correlation value of the matching patterns is at most 73%.
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Figure 3.16: Pattern Matching during computation of A of P [kx−5 = 0] to P (blue) and
P [kx−5 = 1] to P (brown) with P obtained for the 5th most significant
scalar bit.
Figure 3.17: Pattern Matching during computation of A of P [kx−6 = 0] to P (blue) and
P [kx−6 = 1] to P (brown) with P obtained for the 6th most significant
scalar bit.
3.5 Countermeasures and Future Work
Coron’s first and second DPA countermeasures result in scalar or point being
blinded to counteract the statistical analysis of DPA attacks [53]. Given that an
attacker needs to predict the intermediate state of an algorithm at a given point
in time, we can assume that the countermeasures that are used to prevent DPA
will also have an effect on the OTA. All proposed countermeasures rely on some
kind of randomization, which can be of either a scalar, a point or the algorithm
itself. However, if we assume that the attacker has no technical limitations, i.e.,
an oscilloscope with enough memory to acquire the power consumption during an
entire scalar-multiplication, it would be possible to derive the entire scalar being
used from just one acquisition. Therefore, if one depends on scalar blinding [53,
115], this method provides no protection against our attack, as the attacker could
derive a value equivalent to the exponent.
There are methods for changing the representation of a point, which can pre-
vent OTA and make the result unpredictable to the attacker. Most notably those
countermeasures are randomizing the projective coordinates, as proposed in [137,
Sec. 6] and randomizing the coordinates through a random field isomorphism as
described in [105]. However, inserting a point in affine coordinates and changing
to (deterministic) projective coordinates during the execution of the scalar multi-
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plication (compressing and decompressing of a point), does not affect our attack.
We aim exclusively at the doubling operation in the execution of each algo-
rithm. Since most of the blinding techniques are based on the cyclic property of
the elliptic curve groups, attacking the addition operation in practice would be an
interesting future research topic.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented a new side-channel attack technique, which can be
used to recover the private key during a scalar-multiplication on ECC with only
one target trace and one online template trace per bit. Our attack succeeds against
a protected target implementation with unified formulas for doubling and adding
and against implementations where the point is given in affine coordinates and
changes to projective coordinates representation. By performing our attack on two
physically different devices, we showed that key-dependent assignments leak, even
when there are no branches in the cryptographic algorithm. This fact enhances the
feasibility of OTA and validates our initial claim that one target trace is enough
to recover the secret scalar.
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Side-channel attacks against implementations of elliptic-curve cryptography have
been extensively studied in the literature and a large tool-set of countermeasures
is available to thwart different attacks in different contexts. The current state
of the art in attacks and countermeasures is nicely summarized in multiple sur-
vey papers, the most recent one by Danger et al [57]. However, any combination
of those countermeasures is ineffective against attacks that require only a single
trace and directly target a conditional move (cmov) – a basic procedure that is
frequently used in scalar-multiplication implementations. This algorithmic pro-
cedure can either be implemented through arithmetic operations on registers or
through various different approaches that all boil down to loading from or storing
to a secret address. In this chapter we demonstrate that such an attack is in-
deed possible for ECC software running on AVR ATmega microcontrollers, using
a protected version of the popular µNaCl library as an example1. For the targeted
implementations, we are able to recover 99.6% of the key bits for the arithmetic
approach and 95.3% of the key bits for the approach based on secret addresses,
with confidence levels 76.1% and 78.8%, respectively. All publicly available ECC
software for the AVR that we are aware of uses one of the two approaches and is
thus in principle vulnerable to our attack.
This chapter is based on [141] that has been presented at the 23rd Conference
on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2016).
1On AVR the cmov procedure is implemented as a sequence instructions, but in some other
architectures, like x86, it is implemented as a single instruction.
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4.1 Introduction
For many years, efficient software implementations of cryptographic algorithms
for constrained embedded processors were mainly restricted to symmetric ciphers.
However, in recent years, various libraries for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
have been published that offer acceptable runtime and code size also on microcon-
trollers with very limited computational resources, e.g., the 8-bit AVR ATmega
series of processors. Notable examples for these ECC implementations are sum-
marized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Overview of ECC implementations for embedded AVR processors.
Name Description SCA countermeasures
micro-ecc [124] 8/32/64-bit C implemen-
tation for NIST curves
not documented; appar-
ently randomized projec-
tive coordinates
nano-ecc [95] Derivate of micro-ecc same as micro-ecc
µNaCl [64,94,142] Curve25519 for 8/16/32-
bit processors
constant-time
AVR-Crypto-Lib [151] ECDSA with NIST P-192 none
FLECC_IN_C [185] 8/16/32/64-bit C im-
plementation for various
curves
constant time, random-
ized projective coordi-
nates
RELIC [5] Various curves and fields
supported
constant-time
WM-ECC [183] Implementation for sen-
sor networks
none
TinyECC [121] Implementation for sen-
sor networks
none
MIRACL [38] Library supporting multi-
ple curves
none
WolfSSL [189] Support for AVR unclear none
Wiselib [3] Library for distributed
systems
none
CRS ECC [173] Commercial implementa-
tion, closed source
none
Due to the fact that an adversary often has physical access to an embedded
device performing ECC operations, implementation attacks and in particular side-
channel analysis (SCA) are severe threats in this scenario. Consequently, several
libraries comprise countermeasures against SCA, for example, by performing com-
putations in constant-time, or by using randomized projective coordinates. The
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protected implementations are further detailed in Table 4.1.
Many common SCA countermeasures assume that the adversary needs access
to multiple traces (with identical scalar) to recover the secret key, which inher-
ently protects protocols with ephemeral scalars. In this chapter, we challenge this
assumption and target fundamental building blocks of any ECC implementation,
namely conditional moves and loads/stores from/to secret memory addresses. We
show that template attacks allow to recover most of the secret scalar with a single
trace of elliptic-curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) in both cases, which in turn
renders all currently published ECC implementations for the AVR (and likely
other, similar architectures) insecure.
Note that although this chapter focuses on implementations of ECC, our at-
tacks also apply to exponentiation algorithms as used in, e.g., RSA, classical Diffie-
Hellman, DSA, or ElGamal. We actually expect the attacks to work even better
there, because group elements are larger and thus require more loads (or condi-
tional moves). We leave this investigation for future work.
4.1.1 Related work
Carefully combining countermeasures like uniformity of modular operations,
(re-)randomization of the projective representation of points, scalar blinding, point
blinding, and random field (or curve) isomorphisms prevent classical side-channel
attacks like timing [115], SPA [55], DPA [116], CPA [32] or collision attacks [74,92].
These attacks require a fixed scalar for multiple measured power or electromagnetic
traces. The main protection relies on the full randomization of intermediate data,
including input point, scalar and group, during the execution of an ECSM [9,53,65].
In this work we consider implementations based on the Montgomery ladder algo-
rithm, protected by scalar randomization (SR) and projective-coordinate random-
ization2.
To overcome the aforementioned countermeasures two kinds of attacks have
emerged: template and horizontal attacks. Although in general template at-
tacks [40] can be used to attack multiple traces that share the same scalar, we
need to attack ECSM traces independently, because of the SR. Template attacks
combine statistical modeling and power-analysis, and consist of two phases. In the
first phase, called profiling, the attacker builds templates by executing a sequence
of instructions using a fixed scalar (with SR turned off). The second phase is called
matching, in which the attacker matches the templates to attacked single traces
(with SR turned on). The assumption is that the attacker possesses a profiling
device, in order to build templates, that behaves the same as the target device,
2The implementations actually attacked apply only projective coordinates randomization,
however, our attack also works on an implementation with SR enabled, because we do not make
any assumption about the secret scalar, i.e., it may be different from one execution to another.
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and runs the same implementation.
Template attacks on ECC trace back to an attack on ECDSA demonstrated
by Medwed and Oswald [128]. However, this attack requires an oﬄine DPA on
the ECSM during profiling, in order to select the points of interest. Moreover,
since the attack exploits data-dependent leakage it requires profiling with multiple
templates (i.e., 33) while for our attacks two templates are enough. Furthermore,
the attack only needs to recover a few bits of the multiple ephemeral scalars and
can then employ ECDSA-specific lattice techniques to recover the long-term secret
key [22]. This is not possible in the context of our work, since we do not target
ECDSA: an attacker has only a single trace to recover sufficiently many bits of the
randomized scalar using SCA to be able to compute the remaining bits.
Another template attack on ECC is presented in [89]. This attack follows a
similar approach to our attack, but instead of exploiting address-dependent leak-
age, it exploits register location based leakage using a high-resolution inductive
EM probe. As a result the attack is considerably expensive to execute. A template
attack on a wNAF ECC algorithm is presented in [194]. However, this attack is
applied to an implementation that is not protected with either, scalar random-
ization or base-point randomization. Another approach to attack ECC are the so
called online template attacks [12, 63]. These attacks work if SR is enabled, but
not when point randomization is enabled.
The template attack from [49] targets load instructions. However, multiple
traces are required in the attack phase. Therefore, this attack does not work
against implementations protected by SR. The template attack from [87] aims to
extract a random multiplicative mask (base-blinding) out of a single measurement
exploiting data leakage; then it is possible to unmask all intermediate values and
run DPA.
Horizontal attacks on RSA [17,19,20,43,50,51,154,156,182] and ECC [18,83,
88,140,174] are emerging forms of side-channel attacks on exponentiation-based or
scalar-multiplication-based algorithms. Their methodology allows recovering the
exponent bits through the analysis of individual traces. Therefore, these attacks
are efficient against SR even when combined with point and group randomization.
The attacks employ different common distinguishers: SPA, horizontal correlation
analysis [51], Euclidean distance [182], horizontal collision-correlation [17–19, 50],
horizontal cross-correlation [83], or clustering [88,140,156,174].
An interesting horizontal address-based DPA attack on Montgomery multipli-
cations is presented in [43]. The approach is similar to ours, but this attack exploits
Hamming weight leakage of addresses. Furthermore, the analysis in [43] lacks the
results for a full modular exponentiation (only a few iterations are attacked) and
success rates.
The main issue of horizontal attacks is that extracting leakage from a single
unlabeled trace is usually heavily limited by noise. Therefore, we have decided
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to attack our state-of-the art implementations, that contains scalar and point
randomizations, using a more powerful attack paradigm, from the point of view of
the attacker setting, namely, template attacks.
4.1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are threefold:
1. First, by the example of a protected version of µNaCl, we show that the
single-trace leakage of conditional moves within the Montgomery ladder can
be exploited to recover the scalar.
2. Second, we show that a similar attack applies to loads and stores from/to
secret-dependent addresses. In doing so, we show that even implementa-
tions on embedded devices without cache cannot tolerate secret-dependent
memory accesses.
3. Finally, we generalize the method from [77] to tolerate a certain number of
incorrectly recovered scalar bits without relying on normal or side-channel-
enhanced exhaustive search. Furthermore, we present experimental results
for our algorithm.
4.1.3 Organization of the chapter
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in Section 4.2, we review the
use of conditional moves in scalar multiplication algorithms, together with possible
countermeasures against side-channel analysis. Then, in Section 4.3, we describe
the measurement setup, target implementation, trace pre-processing, frequency
filtering and alignement. Subsequently, Section 4.4 deals with template attacks on
the (arithmetic) conditional swap within the Montgomery ladder. Then Section 4.5
applies similar methods to recover the scalar by exploiting the leakage of secret load
addresses. Section 4.6 discusses how to tolerate a certain number of incorrectly
recovered scalar bits more efficiently than by simple exhaustive search. Finally,
we conclude in Section 4.7 with directions for future work, in particular regarding
countermeasures.
4.2 Scalar multiplication and conditional moves
The most basic scalar-multiplication algorithm is the double-and-add algorithm,
which scans through the bits of the scalar and performs a double operation for
each zero bit and a double-and-add operation for each one bit. This algorithm is
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well known to be vulnerable to all kind of side-channel attacks, including power
analysis and timing attacks.
The first step to side-channel protection is to always perform the same sequence
of finite-field operations, independent of the scalar. The most common approaches
to achieve such a structure are either to use (fixed-window) double-and-add-always
scalar multiplication or ladder-based approaches (typically the Montgomery lad-
der [133] or, for general Weierstrass curves, the Brier-Joye ladder [34]). Another
layer of side-channel protection then adds randomization of the scalar (through one
of various blinding methods), and the internal representation of points (for exam-
ple through projective randomization, field isomorphisms, or curve isomorphisms).
By re-randomizing before or after each ECSM loop iteration, most horizontal col-
lision or cross-correlation attacks are thwarted.
Interestingly, even with all those countermeasures in place, scalar-multipli-
cation algorithms contain operations that choose one out of two (or more) curve
points depending on bit(s) of the scalar. An attacker who learns all of these choices
from side-channel information from just one trace, learns all of the scalar bits used
in this scalar multiplication and thus obtains the secret key. On microcontrollers
with restricted register space, there are essentially two ways to implement this con-
ditional move (cmov) procedure: either by loading from (or storing to) addresses
that depend on the secret scalar, or by using arithmetic operations to perform a
conditional register-to-register move. The latter approach is very common on large
processors with cache, where the former approach leaks through cache-timing in-
formation. The main idea is to replace a computation of the form R← P [s], where
s is a secret scalar bit, by a computation of the form R ← sP [1] + (1 − s)P [0].
Note that this approach does not require actual multiplications; it is much easier
to expand s to a bit mask of all ones or all zeros and use bit-logical instructions.
Most implementations of ECSM contain considerably more than just one secretly-
indexed load, store, or conditional move. Sometimes this is a choice made by the
implementors to improve performance (by avoiding otherwise unnecessary loads
and stores); sometimes it is an inherent property of the ECSM algorithm. For
example, the Montgomery ladder needs a conditional swap (cswap) of two points
instead of a conditional move, which requires significantly more operations that
involve the secret scalar bit than a simple cmov (for details, see Section 4.4).
The side-channel attacks described in the remainder of this chapter attack
both implementations that make use of secretly indexed memory accesses (in Sec-
tion 4.5) and implementations that use the arithmetic cmov procedure (or more
specifically, the cswap procedure) in Section 4.4. The idea of attacking loads from
secret positions through side-channel information is not new: it is not only used
in various cache-timing attacks (that do not apply to simple architectures such as
the AVR), but it is also the underlying principle of address-bit-DPA [96]. What is
novel is the fact that we need only a single trace. This renders countermeasures
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such as scalar blinding and address randomization [97,98] ineffective.
4.3 Attack setup
In this section, we describe the targeted implementations, the utilized micro-
controller, our measurement setup, trace pre-processing, frequency filtering and
alignement.
4.3.1 Target implementations
We target two protected ECSM implementations based on [142]. Both employ the
Montgomery ladder, with the pseudocode given in Algorithm 7. The main dif-
ference between the two variants is the realization of the cmov (i.e., the function
cswap_coords). The first implementation, described in more detail in Sec-
tion 4.4.1, consists of applying an arithmetic conditional swap of the respective
coordinates values of the working points P1 = (X1 : Z1) and P2 = (X2 : Z2).
The second, described in Section 4.5.1, replaces the arithmetic conditional swap
by a conditional swap of pointers to the coordinate values. Both implementations
utilize projective-coordinate re-randomization as the main side-channel counter-
measure. A randomly generated λ ∈ Fp is multiplied with the coordinates of
P1 = (X1 : Z1) and P2 = (X2 : Z2) at the beginning of every ECSM iteration. We
make publicly available the source code for both implementations [139].
Algorithm 7: Montgomery ladder with arithmetic cswap and randomized
projective coordinates.
// ... initialization omitted ...
for i = 254 . . . 0 do
re_randomize_coords(work);
b← bit i of scalar;
s← b⊕ bprev;
bprev ← b;
cswap_coords(work, s);
ladderstep(work);
end
4.3.2 Target device and measurement setup
We carried out our experiments with an ATmega328P 8-bit microcontroller placed
on the target board of the ChipWhisperer [148] side-channel evaluation platform.
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While the ChipWhisperer also provides the possibility to capture analog signals
(e.g., power consumption or electro-magnetic emanation), we used a separate os-
cilloscope (Picoscope 5203) due to the limited bandwidth, memory, and sample
rate of the ChipWhisperer.
The targeted ATmega328P has a 32KB of Flash, 2KB of SRAM, and 1KB
of EEPROM. The register file contains 32 registers (R0–R31), among which 6
serve as pointers for indirect 16-bit addressing and have the following aliases: X
(R27:R26), Y (R29:R28) and Z (R31:R30). Arithmetic instructions take 1 cycle,
with the exception of multiplication instructions, which take 2 cycles. Loads and
stores from/to SRAM take 2 cycles. Loads from Flash take 3 cycles.
Target Details
The microcontroller was clocked at fdev = 7.3728MHz in our setup, i.e., the
duration of one cycle is 135.63 ns. We placed a 49.9Ohm resistor into the ground
path of the microcontroller to measure the current consumption of the device
using the Picoscope 5203 at a sample rate fsample = 500MHz. Note that due to
limitations on the size of the scope’s memory, it is not possible to capture a single
trace of a full scalar multiplication, which has a duration of approximately 2 s.
Hence, we chose to capture only the interesting parts of each ECSM iteration, by
using the segmented memory feature of the oscilloscope, partitioning the memory
into small segments and triggering at each ECSM iteration. Note that in a real
application, the adversary would likely not have a trigger signal for each ECSM
iteration, but could easily overcome this problem with a pattern-based trigger
generator or using an oscilloscope with larger memory.
4.3.3 Trace Pre-processing
Since the sample rate fsample is not a multiple of the device clock frequency fdev,
we first re-sampled the recorded traces to fresample = 493.978MHz (i.e., one cycle
is composed of 67 sample points) to facilitate subsequent processing steps, in
particular the cutting into single clock cycles, cf. Section Section 4.3.3. For re-
sampling, we used libsamplerate3.
Filtering
We digitally bandpass-filtered the traces using a Butterworth filter with a lower
cutoff frequency fl = 300 kHz and an upper cutoff frequency of fu = 2 · fdev =
14.75MHz. These frequencies were determined experimentally, by testing various
choices and selecting the parameters that yield the highest success rate (cf. Sec-
tion 4.4.3 and Section 4.5.5).
3http://www.mega-nerd.com/SRC/
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Alignment and cutting
To align the recorded traces, we employed a standard pattern-based approach:
we selected a part of the first trace as the reference, and computed the euclidean
distance or correlation for each offset within a chosen range for each following
trace. We then shifted each trace by the respective offset that minimized the
distance measure.
Finally, the filtered and aligned traces were cut into parts based on a cycle-
accurate execution trace of the test implementation generated using an AVR sim-
ulator. This enabled us to generate templates for a specific instruction or an
instruction sequence with cycle accuracy.
4.4 Attacking arithmetic cswaps
In this section, we describe a template attack on conditional swaps (cswaps) in the
Montgomery ladder step. In our case, the cswap is implemented using Boolean
and arithmetic operations in constant time.
4.4.1 Target implementation
In the Montgomery ladder (Algorithm 7), the function cswap_coords imple-
ments the cswap (based on input bit s) by first creating a mask m, which is either
0x00 or 0xFF for s = 0 and s = 1, respectively, by setting m = −s (assuming m,
s are 8-bit values). Then, a (conditional) XOR swap is executed as follows:
Listing 4.1: Conditional XOR swap.
1 ld xx , X ; X register points to first value
2 ld yy , Z ; Z register points to second value
3 mov tt, xx
4 eor tt, yy
5 and tt, m ; tt = (xx XOR yy) AND m
6 eor xx, tt ; xx = xx XOR tt
7 eor yy, tt ; yy = yy XOR tt
8 st X+, xx ; Store first value
9 st Z+, yy ; Store second value
In other words, if m = 0x00 (s = 0), tt = 0 and the XORs xx = xx ⊕ tt and
yy = yy⊕tt leave the values unchanged. Otherwise, if m = 0xFF (s = 1), we have
a standard XOR swap, i.e., xx = xx ⊕ xx ⊕ yy = yy (equivalent for yy).
4.4.2 Template generation and matching
We generated templates for the and instruction (line 5 of Listing 4.1), grouping
the traces in the profiling set into two sets V0 and V1. Traces in V0 represent
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those where m = 0 (i.e., an AND with 0x00), while V1 are traces where m = 0xFF.
Note that the traces were cut to only contain the clock cycle for the targeted and
instruction, i.e., each trace is 64 · 67 = 4288 samples long (see Section 4.3.3). For
Vi, i = 0, 1, we subsequently computed templates consisting of the pointwise mean
vector µ(i) and the covariance matrix Σ(i) [40]. Note that the two possible leakages
0x00 (all bits zero) and 0xFF (all bits one) can be expected to be maximally (or at
least to a large degree) different, which should facilitate template attacks in this
particular case.
We matched the templates to the traces in the test set with the standard ap-
proach, i.e., computing the respective probabilities using the multivariate normal
distribution pdf and identifying the template with the highest probability to re-
cover the respective bit of the scalar. The respective success rates wrt the size of
the profiling set are given in Section 4.4.3.
Classification
For each template we computed the Euclidean distance between the sample vector
and the template mean vector. The template (T0 or T1) that results in the smallest
distance is considered the best match for the sample vector. In this attack, the
index of the closest template (0 or 1) corresponds to the swap bit.
Confidence score and confidence level
For the first classification method we derived a simple confidence score on the
recovered bit value based on the distances (d0 and d1) to each template. It varies
linearly for a particular d0 + d1 value, ranging from 0 (no confidence) and 1 (full
confidence):
conf_score = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣0.5− min(d0, d1)d0 + d1
∣∣∣∣ (4.1)
We furthermore define the confidence level of a given trace (in the test set) as
follows: Let us call a recovered bit suspicious if its confidence level is less than
the greatest confidence score of any falsely identified bit (whereas this threshold
is determined experimentally in the profiling phase). Then, the confidence level
is the percentage of bits that are not suspicious, i.e., that can be unambiguously
recovered. Note that the average confidence level (over all number of traces in
the test set) is always less than or equal to the average success rate, since an
incorrectly recovered bit is always suspicious.
4.4.3 Attack results
Figure 4.1 shows the average and best case success rates (computed over all
255 scalar bits), together with the respective confidence levels over the number of
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traces used for template generation and matching. Note that each full trace com-
prises 255 ECSM iterations, which were all used for generating the templates – in
other words, each full trace contributes 255 “effective” traces to the profiling set.
The traces used for template generation and matching were taken from different
trace sets (coming from different capture sessions). The same number of traces was
used for profiling and testing, i.e., a given value on the horizontal axis of Figure 4.1
is the same for profiling and testing.
Figure 4.1: Success rates for the template attack on cswap for different number of full
traces.
As evident in Figure 4.1, already for 10 full traces (i.e., about 2,550 effective
traces), the average success rate reaches 96.71%, i.e., we can recover most of the
bits of the scalar. Furthermore, the best success rate reaches 99.6% with the
confidence level 76.1%. By increasing the number of traces, both success rate and
confidence level change only minimally; due to the strong leakage of the targeted
device, most information can be already extracted with a low trace count.
4.5 Attacking secret-dependent memory accesses
In general, ECC (and in particular NaCl-derived) implementations avoid loads
from secret-dependent addresses altogether due to the possibility of cache-timing
attacks. However, for embedded implementations without caches, secret load ad-
dresses are sometimes deemed acceptable. In this section, we show that template
attacks can be employed to exploit this leakage.
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Figure 4.2: Results for the template attack on loads/stores for different number of full
traces.
4.5.1 Target implementation
The targeted implementation replaces the cswap of the (X1 : Z1) and (X2 : Z2)
coordinates values used in the targeted implementation in Algorithm 7 by working
with pointers to those coordinates, and conditionally swapping these pointers.
Besides being slightly faster, this implementation also potentially exhibits less
leakage, because it uses the secret-dependent mask m in an AND operation only
twice for each pointer cswap4, rather than 32 times as in the ECSM implementation
based on arithmetic cswap (cf. Section 4.4.1).
However, in implementations of finite-field operations both input and output
operands are pointers. The values of these pointers are addresses to the memory
holding the actual field element value, and those addresses directly depend on
whether the swap occurred or not, which in turn depends on the value of the
secret mask bit.
AVR memory access instructions internals
Memory access instructions (loads and stores) on an AVR take 2 clock cycles to
execute. According to the ATmega328 datasheet [6], the effective address for such
instructions is computed in the first cycle, while during the second cycle, the data
word is read (load) or written (store) if the effective address is valid. Our proposed
4For the AVR architecture, pointers are 16 bit wide and one AND with the secret-dependent
bit is required to cswap a byte. Thus a pointer cswap requires two ANDs.
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attack focuses on the address leakage of memory access instructions, and thus any
data-dependency may negatively impact the attack success rate if not detected
and mitigated. Therefore, we take advantage of this architectural feature by using
only the samples from the first clock period of such instructions.
Targeted loads and stores
During each iteration of the Montgomery ladder, the actual field arithmetic occurs
in the so-called ladderstep function (cf. Algorithm 7). We target the loads and
stores addresses in the first three field operations in ladderstep, i.e., addition,
subtraction, and addition. Each of these operations has two Fp inputs (a and b)
and one output r.
Finite-field addition and subtraction are implemented with reduction modulo
2256−38. The reduction step also execute loads and stores, of which the samples are
also used for template creation and matching. Listing 4.2 shows a small segment
of the execution trace containing the loads of the first operands bytes and the store
of the first byte of the result (before reduction):
Listing 4.2: Segment of the execution trace for a field addition.
1 0x171a: fp_add +0x5 LD R20 , X+ ; first byte of a
2 0x171a: fp_add +0x5 CPU -waitstate
3 0x171c: fp_add +0x6 LD R21 , Y+ ; first byte of b
4 0x171c: fp_add +0x6 CPU -waitstate
5 0x171e: fp_add +0x7 ADD R20 , R21
6 0x1720: fp_add +0x8 ST Z+, R20 ; first byte of r
7 0x1720: fp_add +0x8 CPU -waitstate
Our oscilloscope’s memory is divided into 255 segments, each of which is
65 kSample in length. A memory segment holds the samples captured from a
single ECSM iteration. Due to the 65 kSample limit for each ECSM iteration, we
were able to capture the samples from all the loads and stores from the first field
addition and the first field subtraction, but only half of the loads and stores from
the arithmetic part of the second field addition. Note that the memory limitation
is due to the relatively low-cost oscilloscope we used—high-end equipment would
further facilitate the presented attack.
Table 4.2 shows the number of executed instructions of each type that are used
in the attack. We used a total of 372 instructions, which are concatenated into
a single sample vector. After trace preprocessing, 67 power samples are available
per clock cycle, and as only the first clock period of a memory access instruction
is used, the sample vector per ECSM iteration has nv = 24, 924 samples.
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Table 4.2: Number of executed instructions of each type that are used in the attack.
Type 1st fp_add fp_sub 2nd fp_add Total
LD R20, X+ 32 32 16 80
LD R21, Y+ 32 32 16 80
LD R20, Z+0 33 33 0 66
ST Z+, R20 65 65 16 146
4.5.2 Template generation
Each load or store instruction accesses at most two possible addresses. If it always
accesses the same address, then it does not provide useful leakage relevant for the
attack. Considering only those loads and stores that may access two addresses,
during any execution of the ladderstep, only two distinct sequences of addresses
can be accessed: Anoswap, containing the addresses accessed before the first point-
ers swap has taken place5, i.e., an even state (noswap state); and Aswap containing
the addresses accessed in an odd state (swap state).
First, we grouped the sample vectors into two sets. The first set, V0, consists
of the load/store sample vectors for addresses in the set Anoswap, while the second
set, V1, contains those originating from addresses in set Aswap. Then, we com-
puted various statistics for each sample index of Vi, i = 0, 1: mean µ(i), standard
deviation σ(i), median md(i), as well as lower l(i) and upper u(i) percentiles (the
actual percentiles used are discussed in 4.5.3). The collection of these statistics
for V0 and V1, called T0 and T1, are the two possible templates.
4.5.3 Point-of-interest (POI) selection
The POI selection consists of using the lower and upper percentile vectors l(i)
and u(i) (i=0,1) to compute the intersection of the pair of intervals [l(0)j , u
(0)
j ] and
[l(1)j , u
(1)
j ] for each sample index j = 1, . . . , nv. The sample indices where the
intersection is empty are the considered POIs.
Intuitively, the sample indices with an empty intersection are those that are
good distinguishers for the two templates, because in these points the samples
tend to be clustered around the median (and also typically around the mean) of
one template, rather than being scattered.
Different values for the lower and upper percentiles may give a different number
of POIs, and that directly affects the success rate and confidence level of the
attack. Thus, we tested the attack for different pairs of values for these parameters,
5These addresses are the same as those accessed after the 2nd but before the 3rd swap, or
after the 4th but before the 5th swap, and so on.
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ranging from wider and more selective percentiles (12.5, 87.5)6 to narrow, less
selective (40, 60).We emphasize that the POI selection is completely based on the
samples of the traces used for the generation—it does not depend on the samples
of the trace being attacked (i.e., the sample vector to classify). In fact, the POIs
are represented as a Boolean vector used during template matching to select the
samples from the target trace vector to be classified.
POI selection refinements
To improve the confidence level of the attack, we tested two POI selection re-
finements, as explained above. First, we noticed that when using more selective
percentile parameters, the current selection method returned sample indices that
were clustered in a few instructions, while most of the remaining instructions were
not covered by any sample, although they should in theory contribute some leak-
age. To make the POIs more evenly distributed and exploit leakage from all useful
instructions, we forced a minimum of one sample index per instruction to be in-
cluded in the POI vector. If there was no sample index for a given instruction
in the current POI vector, one was randomly selected. Second, also due to the
clustering of the POIs in a few instructions, we limit the number of samples per
instruction to one. In the case that sample indices had to be removed, we selected
those randomly as well.
4.5.4 Template matching
At first, without using any POI selection, we tried to use the standard multivariate
Gaussian model, taking advantage of both the mean vector and covariance matrix
computed from V0 and V1 (also known as complete templates) similar to the ap-
proach of Section 4.4. However, in contrast to Section 4.4, the sample vectors to
be classified and the mean template vectors are relatively long (24, 924 samples)
and relatively similar to each other (i.e., their Euclidean distance is very small),
numerical instability issues due to almost singular matrices arose during the com-
putation of the probability density function. For those reasons, we decided to use
reduced templates instead, which uses only the mean vectors.
After applying POI selection, the matched sample vectors are much smaller,
and thus full templates could then in principle be applied, as the covariance ma-
trices would not lead to numerical instability. However, due to the high success
rates achieved using the reduced templates, we decided to not use full templates
to avoid increasing storage and computational requirements.
We also evaluated the effect on the attack success rate and confidence level
of compressing the sample vector using normal and absolute sum for different
6I.e., the lower is the 12.5-percentile and the upper is the 87.5-percentile.
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window lengths. In addition, we applied a straightforward outlier detection to
remove samples that have likely been subject to larger distortions: In the matching
phase, we discarded all samples that have a distance of more than a multiple of
standard deviations to the mean trace at the respective point in time. Using
reduced templates, template matching boils down to computing the (squared)
Euclidean distance between the sample vector to match and the template mean
vectors. The lower that distance is, the stronger is the match. In this case, other
distinguishers can be used in a straightforward way, and thus we also tested the
attack using the Pearson correlation coefficient.
Classification methods and confidence score
As a first classification method to test, we selected the template closer to the
sample vector (cf. Section 4.4.2). We also tested majority voting classification,
where each sample is individually classified, also based on its distance to the
corresponding element in the templates mean vectors, and the majority vote wins.
In both cases, as each template directly corresponds to a scalar bit value, the
classification output is the recovered bit value. The confidence score was computed
in the same way as in Section 4.4.2.
4.5.5 Attack results
Figure 4.2 depicts average and best case success rates for the template attack
on secret-dependent memory accesses for the best and average cases. Again, as
in Section 4.4.3, the trace sets used for template generation and matching were
recorded in different capture sessions, and the same number of traces was used for
each set. Again, only a limited number of profiling traces was sufficient to reach
success rates exceeding 90%; the best success rate reaches 95.3% (there are only
12 errors) with the confidence level 78.8% (the 12 errors are included in the 54
suspicious bits).
Attack Parameters Investigation
To investigate the effect of various pre-processing steps and attack parameters,
using 10 traces we investigated the average success rate and confidence level de-
pending on various attack parameters. In particular, we investigated various signal
frequency filtering options, POI selection methods, classification and compression
methods, outlier filtering, and distinguishers. Table 4.3 gives the average success
rate and confidence level for a range of choices. We selected the parameter and
method combination that yields the highest overall confidence level to perform the
main attack described in this section (i.e., see Figure 4.2).
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4.6 Error detection and correction
Due to noise, data leakage (note that we are aiming at exploiting the address leak-
age only), and other aspects that interfere with the side-channel analysis (misalign-
ment, clock jitter, etc), the derivation of the final scalar for a single trace likely
contains errors. If the amount of wrong bits is sufficiently small, then a brute-
force attack may still be feasible. However, first the attacker needs a metric to
indicate the location of the possible wrong bits in the recovered scalar. The notion
of suspicious bits (cf. Section 4.4.2) can be used as a reference for the scalar bits
selection with respect to a brute-force attack.
Let us consider the trace with smallest amount of suspicious bits from the
experiment from Section 4.5; for this trace there are 54 suspicious bits that com-
prise all falsely identified bits. Unfortunately, to recover a full randomized scalar,
even in this case, the attacker needs 254 operations, which is generally impractical.
Note, that we consider only the worst-case complexity and not the average case.
To improve upon the brute-force search complexity, there are two options. The
first approach is to try to exploit the distribution of suspicious bits for incorrectly
(red) and correctly (blue) recovered bits (Figure 4.3). While there is a clear trend
for incorrect bits to have lower confidence score, the intersection between correct
and incorrect bits is large. Still, it may possible to exploit the trend with an
informed brute force attack [118], prioritizing bits with the lowest confidence score.
Unfortunately this attack works well if the bits containing errors are adjacent to
each other and that is not the case in our setting.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of confidence scores over all traces for suspicious bits. Red:
incorrectly recovered bits, blue: correctly recovered but suspicious bits.
Alternatively (or combined with the informed brute-force search), we apply the
second algorithm from [77], which is originally designed for square-and-multiply
chains, to the Montgomery ladder. We describe how the algorithm works using
the aforementioned example trace, which contains s = 54 suspicious bits, as an
example. Let us represent the indices of these bits as a list sorted in descending
order: is, . . . i1, where each ij ∈ {0, . . . 254} and s ≥ j ≥ 1; note that there are
255 bits in total. Let x denote the bit index ib∗c s2+1 (namely, i28 for the example
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trace). Let a be the number represented by the bit string corresponding to the
left part of the scalar from x (including ix) and let b be the number corresponding
to the bit string of the (least significant) right part. Furthermore, we know that
R = [k]P , where R is the resulting point, k the scalar to be recovered, and P the
input point. Then, clearly R = [k]P = [a · 2ix + b]P = [a]([2ix ]P ) + [b]P . If we
denote [2ix ]P by H, then the above equation reduces to
R− [b]P = [a]H (4.2)
We can use Equation 4.2 to check correctness of our guess. Now, following [77],
we use a time-memory trade-off technique to speed up an exhaustive search: Con-
sider all different possible guesses for a. For each guess, we compute [a]H and
store all pairs (a, [a]H). We then sort all pairs based on the value of [a]H and
store them in an ordered table.
Next, we make a guess for b and compute z = R − [b]P . If our guess for b is
correct, then z is present in the second column of some row in the table we built—
the first column is the corresponding a. Finding such a pair can be done using
binary search, as the table is sorted as per the second column. If z is present, we
are done since we have determined the scalar. Otherwise, we make a new, different
guess for b and continue. Since there are approximately 2 s2 guesses for a and b, the
time complexity is O(2 s2 ) operations. As there are 2 s2 guesses for a, the table has
that many entries and the space complexity is O(2 s2 ) points. This way, we limit
the time complexity to O(2 s2 ) (cf. [77] for a detailed complexity analysis), which
is 227 for the example trace.
We do not know which trace contains the smallest number of suspicious bits
since we do not know the maximum confidence score of a falsely identified bit.
However, to use the above algorithm we assume that we know the number of sus-
picious bits to be bruteforced to recover the correct scalar. This can be determined
by using templates to attack some traces, for which we know the randomized key.
Furthermore, note that if the attack fails, we can extend the execution to the
second most likely suspicious bit and reuse the previously obtained data. Based
on our experiments, we determined that the number 54 of suspicious bits should
cover all falsely identified bits for at least one trace. Our complete attack works
as follows: we run the above algorithm sequentially for each of the n traces. We
stop the attack as soon as the time-memory trade-off technique succeeds for one
trace.
Since we are running the attack n times, the complexity of the complete attack
is multiplied by n. It totals to O(n ·2 s2 ) operations and O(n ·2 s2 ) points in memory.
For the attack from the previous section, this corresponds to 100 · 227 = 232 oper-
ations. Therefore, we conclude that the scalar can be recovered successfully and
efficiently even in the presence of multiple errors and uncertain bits (for experi-
mental results see section 4.6.1). Furthermore, we believe that the above technique
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may be of independent interest since it can be applied to a commonly used ECSM
algorithm, i.e., Montgomery ladder, even if errors are randomly spread across the
scalar recovered by the SCA attack.
4.6.1 Algorithm implementation and experimental results
The first challenge we faced is how to compute the point subtraction in Equa-
tion 2. Curve25519 is a curve in the Montgomery form, and as such, there is an
efficient formula for differential point addition using XZ coordinates, but no effi-
cient formula to compute a standard point addition, as far as we know. For that
reason, we decided to do the point addition in affine coordinates, which costs a
field inversion and a few multiplications. However, to use them we need to know
the y-coordinates y(R) and y([b]P ). The attack assumes that x(R) (the ECSM
output) is known, but y(R) is not, and thus has to be computed. To do so, we
use the curve formula directly to compute the two possible values for y(R), at the
cost of a field square root, an expensive operation, but it has to be done only once
for each value of R. In the case of y([b]P ), an efficient algorithm by Okeya and
Sakurai [149] costs one field inversion.
To generate the table of precomputed points A = [a]H and to compute B =
[b]P in equation (4.2), the naive approach is to compute a full ECSM for each value
of a and b. A more efficient method is to apply Gray coding to the suspicious bits
in scalars a and b. One property of such a code is that consecutive code words
differ in just a single bit, which means that, in our context, we can generate
[k′]P from [k]P using a single point addition (if the bit changed from 0 to 1)
or point subtraction (if the change is from 1 to 0), where k and k′ are scalars
whose unknown bits are represented as Gray code words, and the code word in
k′ is the successor of the respective code word in k. To compute the sequence of
points [ki]P (i = 0, 1...), we first construct the scalar k0, by setting the unknown
bits to zero and the (assumed correct) recovered bits from the output of the SCA
attack to their respective values. Then, we apply the full ECSM algorithm to
compute [k0]P , and from there we use the aforementioned method to generate
the sequence of points [k1]P, [k2]P . . . , which costs essentially a point addition per
each computed point.
We implemented the key recovery algorithm with the aforementioned arith-
metic-level optimizations as a single-threaded program. We tested our implemen-
tation in a smaller scale, to recover 40 suspicious bits of a scalar on a PC with
8GB of RAM total, but only 5GB available for the program, a i7-3740QM CPU,
running at 2.7GHz. It took 1h23 to recover the correct scalar, where about 1.5ms
is spent to add a single entry to the table and about 3ms to test a possible value
of b. By using these time values as a reference, we estimate that the time for the
recovery of a scalar with 60 suspicious bits using the current implementation is
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around 18 days. The source code of the key recovery implementation is publicly
available [138].
4.7 Conclusions and Possible Countermeasures
In this chapter we show that the single-trace data leakage of conditional moves
can be exploited to recover the scalar using a template attack. We also show
that a similar attack applies to address leakage due to loads and stores from/to
secret-dependent addresses. Furthermore, we generalize the method from [77] to
tolerate a certain number of incorrectly recovered scalar bits without relying on
normal exhaustive search.
Now we discuss possible countermeasures against our attack. We consider
evaluating or improving our attack to work against these countermeasures as fu-
ture work. First of all, note that any countermeasure based on modifying the
base point before or during the scalar multiplication does not protect against our
attacks, since they aim at exploiting address-dependent and the cswap leakage.
Similarly, scalar blinding or splitting does not affect the attack, since we require
only one trace and could hence recover the blinded or split scalar. The knowledge
of the randomized scalar (or the split scalars) is sufficient to either recover the
original scalar or to compute the correct scalar multiplication result. A potential
countermeasure against our attack is presented in [145], performing online data
randomization during the exponentiation to prevent horizontal collision-correlation
attacks. The main idea is to the split scalar to two parts and to randomly inter-
leave two scalar multiplications. However, we believe that our attack might still be
mounted if four templates are used to recognize which bit is processed and during
which ECSM.
The idea behind Itoh et al [96] memory-address countermeasure is to store
sensitive variables at different memory addresses, but with the same Hamming
weight. We believe that although this would cause our attack to be less effective,
the addresses leakage may still be identified by template matching. Randomization
of memory addresses of the coordinates used in the Montgomery ladder before
the ECSM might lead to our attack being less effective, since the templates are
prepared assuming fixed addresses. The above countermeasure can be improved
by randomizing not only the addresses but also the memory accesses [97–99].
The countermeasure of [89] protects against localized EM template attacks on
the ECC Montgomery ladder. The main idea is to randomly swap the ladder
registers at the end of a ladder iteration; the addressing of the registers within
the loop is inverted according to whether the registers have been swapped. The
countermeasure is uniform in its operation sequence, and hence, our template
attacks would be infeasible in principle. In addition, several randomization tech-
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niques protecting the Montgomery ladder are presented in [119]. Similarly to the
countermeasure of [89], these techniques generate operation sequences independent
from the scalar. Thus we assume that our attack would be less effective or ineffec-
tive against them. We therefore regard as future work evaluating and improving
our attacks with respect to the three latter countermeasures.
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Table 4.3: Results from the Load attack with templates generated from a set of 10
traces and tested on a set of 10 traces from a different capture session. Only
the first 15 ECSM iterations were targeted. Success Rate and Confidence
Level values are averaged.
Class Method / Param. Name Param. Value SR (%) CL (%)
No filtering - 57.3 -
Upper cutoff freq. 2.5 * fdev 92.9 -
" 2.3 *fdev 93.6 -
Filtering " 2.1 * fdev 93.6 -
" 2.0 * fdev 94.3 -
" 1.7 * fdev 92.9 -
" 1.5 * fdev 90.7 -
" 1.3 * fdev 90.0 -
Upper cutoff freq. fsample/1.9 94.3 -
(pLow, pHigh); nPOI (12.5, 87.5); 23 58.5 32.4
" (25, 75); 71 76.4 33.9
" (35, 65); 324 94.3 36.8
" (37.5, 62.5); 686 69.8 33.4
POI Selection (pLow, pHigh); nPOI (40, 60); 1500 64.1 31.6
Force ≥ 1 Sa per instr. (35, 65); 669 92.1 68.6
Force ≥ 1 Sa per instr. (40, 60); 1724 90.0 71.1
Limit 1 Sa per instr. (35, 65); 134 85.7 8.6
Limit 1 Sa per instr. (40, 60); 723 78.6 28.6
Classification Sum of distances + POI (35, 65); 324 94.3 33.9
Majority voting + POI (35, 65); 324 57.0 9.8
Normal sum + POI 1; (35, 65) 94.3 38.6
" 10; (35, 65) 92.8 36.4
Win. compression Normal sum + POI 67; (35, 65) 79.3 20.7
Absolute sum + POI 1; (35, 65) 94.3 23.1
" 10; (35, 65) 92.1 27.6
Absolute sum + POI 67; (35, 65) 77.1 18.3
Multiple of stdev 2.0 92.1 40.7
Outlier removal " 1.7 90.0 40.7
Multiple of stdev 1.4 88.6 36.4
Distinguisher Euclidean Distance - 92.1 57.1
Pearson Correlation - 93.6 61.4
Combinations EuclDst. + ≥ 1 Sa per instr. (35, 65); 669 92.1 79.3
Corr. + ≥ 1 Sa per instr. (35, 65); 669 93.6 65.0
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A Semi-Parametric
Approach for Side-Channel
Attacks on Protected RSA
Implementations
Side-channel attacks on RSA aim at recovering the secret exponent by processing
multiple power or electromagnetic traces. The exponent blinding is the main coun-
termeasure which avoids the application of classical forms of side-channel attacks,
like SPA, DPA, CPA and template attacks. Horizontal attacks overcome RSA
countermeasures by attacking single traces. However, the processing of a single
trace is limited by the amount of information and the leakage assessment using
labeled samples is not possible due to the exponent blinding countermeasure. In
order to overcome these drawbacks, we propose a side-channel attack framework
based on a semi-parametric approach that combines the concepts of unsupervised
learning, horizontal attacks, maximum likelihood estimation and template attacks
in order to recover the exponent bits. Our method is divided in two main parts:
learning and attacking phases. The learning phase consists of identifying the class
parameters contained in the power traces representing the loop of the exponentia-
tion. We propose a leakage assessment based on unsupervised learning to identify
points of interest in a blinded exponentiation. The attacking phase executes a
horizontal attack based on clustering algorithms to provide labeled information.
Furthermore, it computes confidence probabilities for all exponent bits. These
probabilities indicate how much our semi-parametric approach is able to learn
about the class parameters from the side-channel information.
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To demonstrate the power of our framework we attack the private exponent dp
of the 1024-bit RSA-CRT implementation protected by the SPA, 32-bit message
blinding, and 64-bit exponent blinding countermeasures; the implementation runs
on a 32-bit STM32F4 microcontroller.
This chapter is based on [154] that has been presented at the 14th International
Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2015).
5.1 Introduction
RSA [164]-based cryptosystems are frequently used in credit cards and e-commerce
applications. The main goal of attacks on RSA is to recover the private key, the
exponent, which is directly employed in the modular exponentiation . Counter-
measures like uniformity of modular operations execution as well as message and
exponent blinding render classical side-channel attacks (SPA [115] [55], DPA [116],
CPA [32], collision [74] [92], template [40]) unfeasible against RSA implementa-
tions. These attacks require a fixed exponent for all measured power (or electro-
magnetic) traces. The main protection relies on the full randomization of interme-
diate data, including input message, exponent and modulus, during the execution
of an exponentiation [53] [9] [65].
Horizontal attacks [17–20,50,51,88,156,182] are emerging forms of side-channel
attacks on exponentiation-based algorithms. Their methodology allows recovering
the exponent bits through the analysis of individual traces. Therefore, horizontal
attacks are efficient against exponent blinding even when combined with message
and modulus blinding1. A basic requirement of horizontal attacks is the knowledge
of the modular exponentiation algorithm. Afterwards, the attacker may choose
between different common distinguishers: SPA, horizontal correlation analysis [51],
or clustering [88,156], among others.
Most forms of horizontal attacks require advanced trace preprocessings, char-
acterization and leakage assessment before the application of distinguishers. The
main problem of the horizontal attacks is: extracting the leakage from a single trace
is limited by noise and unlabeled information. In particular, common leakage as-
sessments, like [100] or t-test [76], require labeled samples and that is not possible
due to exponent blinding. Therefore, we decided to investigate semi-parametric
models based on unsupervised learning [1, 28,62].
The only horizontal solutions, to the aforementioned problem to the best of our
knowledge are [88, 174] and [156]. The first two papers [88, 174] apply clustering
classification to a single trace to allow labeling specific classes operations; this
1Note that message and modulus blinding affect only the exponentiation input, but not the al-
gorithm itself. Therefore, since horizontal attacks exploit the exponentiation algorithm structure,
the aforementioned countermeasures are expected to be ineffective.
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method work well for low noise measurements and both recommend using an EM
station composed of multiple probes. The authors of [156] considered a heuristic
approach based on difference-of-means for the points of interest selection, which
can have large complexity. Furthermore, the above solutions use a single trace
leakage assessment, which may be affected by a large amount of noise. We discuss
horizontal attacks with respect to RSA countermeasures in section 5.2.2.
Another approach to horizontal attacks is horizontal cross-correlation for ellip-
tic curve scalar multiplication [83]2. This approach exploits collisions in subsequent
additions of a scalar multiplication algorithm using a single trace. Identifying
points of interest is not considered in [83].
After the original paper [154] was published, a follow-up work on horizontal
attacks on protected ECC implementations was published in [140]; for details, see
Chapter 6.
Another follow-up work on horizontal attacks on RSA was presented by Jasd-
heer Singh Maan in his master thesis [123]. This approach additionally investigates
multi-dimensional clustering and template attack as the last stage of horizontal
attack.
5.1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we propose a generic framework that aims at solving the afore-
mentioned leakage assessment problem by combining multiple traces even if the
device is protected with exponent blinding. The framework assesses the leakage on
blinded RSA implementations from multiple traces without access to any labeled
information; in particular, it does not require a fully controlled device on which
we can reprogram or learn the blinded exponent. Our framework builds and im-
proves on the work from [88, 156] by employing information from multiple traces
and by implementing a wide range of leakage assessment methods and statistical
classifiers. A direct practical application of our framework is a side-channel ICC
EMVCo smart card evaluation [69] since in such an evaluation a fully controlled
device is not always available.
The framework is divided in two main parts, i.e., learning and attacking phases.
This parallel with template attacks comes from the fact that the first phase tries
to learn the class parameters from the traces using unsupervised learning and hor-
izontal attacks. During this learning phase, we propose a new leakage assessment
based on unsupervised learning which can precisely identify the leakage location
by returning the class parameters from mixture of distributions. Points of interest
are identified during the leakage assessment and used as the input for a clustering-
based horizontal attack [88,156]. The latter’s output is an approximate exponent
2Horizontal cross-correlation has not been yet successfully applied to RSA to the best of our
knowledge.
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for each single exponentiation trace. The attacking phase considers the approxi-
mate exponent results to re-compute the class parameters and horizontally applies
them to the same set of traces using parametric and multivariate attacks. This
second phase returns probabilities indicating how much the class parameters are
correctly learned from the non-profiled side-channel information.
The presented framework allows the attacker to verify if a protected RSA im-
plementations provides side-channel information even in the presence of blinding
countermeasures. The basic assumption is that the device leaks some partial SPA
information. We demonstrate that although in attacking phase the horizontal at-
tack is performed on a single trace, we can use clustering algorithms in the learning
phase to process multiple traces (which represent randomized exponentiations) to
precisely identify the leakage location.
We present the effectiveness of our framework by attacking the private expo-
nent dp of 1024-bit RSA-CRT implementation protected by SPA countermeasures
(like regularity between squares and multiplications), message blinding and expo-
nent blinding. For the sake of simplicity we implement the square-and-multiply
exponentiation3. The implementation is run on a 32-bit STM32F4 microcon-
troller. We apply both parts of our framework consecutively and we achieve error
rate of 1.27%; it means that for a 512-bit dp, randomized with a 64-bit value, our
framework commits approximately 11 errors.
The above result (11 errors) implies that a brute-force attack is feasible to
recover the correct exponent assuming that an attacker can determining the loca-
tions of possible errors. Our frameworks outputs not only the recovered exponent
bits but also confidence probabilities of the correct guesses (where 0.5 denotes a
random guess, for example). These probabilities can be used as a reference for the
exponent bits selection with respect to a brute-force attack. In our experiment
there are less than 20 bit with the probabilities between 0.45 and 0.55. A known-
key analysis, for this specific case, confirmed these 20 bits contain all 11 errors.
Furthermore, brute-forcing 20 bits of the RSA key is practical since it can take up
to a few hours on a modern PC. The details of the error correction are presented
in section 5.4.2.
5.1.2 Organization of the chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. We briefly describe preliminaries, in particular
we introduce horizontal attacks on exponentiations and unsupervised learning in
side-channel attacks, in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the device under test
and our measurement setup. Subsequently, the attack framework is presented in
3Observe that our framework can be also used to attack another exponentiation algorithms,
square-and-multiply always [53], for instance. In this case, however, the framework needs to be
applied to the whole exponentiation iteration at once and not to single modular multiplications.
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section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5 summarizes our contribution, presents future work,
and concludes the chapter.
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present preliminaries. First we elaborate on the used notations,
trace characterization, and statistical model. Secondly, we introduce horizontal
side-channel attacks on exponentiations and unsupervised learning in side-channel
attacks.
5.2.1 Foundations
Notations
Let x be the realization of a random variable X. A sample from X is denoted
by xi. The term p(X) defines the probability mass function when X is discrete
and p(X|Y ) is the conditional probability of X given Y . Given a set of class
parameters θ defining a univariate normal distribution N (µ, σ2) with mean µ and
variance σ2. Here, g(x|θ) is the function of x defined up to the parameters θ. The
term L(θ|X) is the likelihood of parameters θ on the sample X.
Trace Characterization
The n-th measured side-channel trace, which represents the power consumption
(or electromagnetic emanation - EM) of a cryptographic device over the time
domain, is denoted by the uni-dimensional (1×aL) vector tn = {On1 , On2 , ..., OnaL}.
Here, we consider a trace tn as being the side-channel information of a modular
exponentiation composed by a fixed number aL of modular operations. The factor
a depends on the exponentiation algorithm and L is the bit-length of the RSA
private key. The trace tn can be described by a set of `-sized sub-vectors:
tn = {On1 , On2 , ..., Ona.L} =
{
(tn1,1, ..., tn1,`), (tn2,1, ..., tn2,`), ..., (tna.L,1, ..., tna.L,`)
}
(5.1)
where tni,j is the j-th element of each sub-vector Oni . The element tni,j can also be
viewed as a sample in the time domain from the side-channel trace tn. The set
{tni,j}, i = 1..aL, refers to a set of samples where each element tni,j is extracted
from one modular operation Oni for a fixed j (e.g., {tni,10} contains aL samples,
each element tni,10 is selected from the 10th sample of each sub-trace Oi).
Statistical Model
Let us consider a set of side-channel traces T. It represents the power consumption
of N modular exponentiation executions. We assume a modular exponentiation
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trace tn as a data set composed by k classes or sets of parameters θk. Each
class is statistically defined by a univariate normal distribution N (µk, σ2k) and the
set of aL samples
{
tn1:aL,j
}
(for a fixed j) is drawn from a multivariate normal
distribution, or a mixture of Gaussians, Nd(µ,Σ). Because the statistical model
is built from RSA implementations, the classes can be understood as squares and
multiplications or even exponent bits zeros or ones.
5.2.2 Horizontal Side-Channel Attacks on Exponentiations
Exponent blinding [53,116] is the main RSA countermeasure against side-channel
attacks. During decryption or singing, this countermeasure changes the sequence
of exponent bits for every execution of the algorithm. Therefore, power (or elec-
tromagnetic emanation) traces cannot be aligned and processed together to reduce
the noise from a set of measurements. Horizontal attacks [17–20,50,51,88,156,182]
were proposed as an alternative methodology to extract the private key bits from
a single trace.
By applying side-channel attacks in a horizontal setting, the n-th trace tn must
be split in sub-traces, Oni = {ti,1:`}, each one representing a particular iteration
from the ring of the exponentiation. The sub-trace Oni might be the set of samples
representing one modular operation or the processing of one exponent bit. This
splitting procedure is illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Modular exponentiation trace.
A basic assumption for the horizontal attacks is the knowledge of the modu-
lar exponentiation algorithm (for instance, square-and-multiply always [53], slid-
ing window exponentiation, Montgomery ladder [109], etc.). After, the attacker
may choose between different distinguishers: SPA, horizontal correlation anal-
ysis [51], Euclidean distance [182], horizontal collision-correlation [17–19, 50] or
clustering [88, 156]. The encryption or verification with a public-key can be per-
formed with the same set of instructions used for decryption and signing. In this
case, the classes parameters could be learned using the public key and applied
as templates on single traces using the private key [20]. However, in this work
we assume that this scenario is not possible. Therefore, we decided to investigate
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semi-parametric models based on unsupervised learning [1,28,62] for the horizontal
attacks.
5.2.3 Unsupervised Learning in Side-Channel Attacks
Before entering in the context of unsupervised learning methods for side-channel
attacks, it is worth to establish a parallel between supervised and unsupervised
learning when attacking exponentiations. Profiled template attacks [40] are a
classical example of supervised learning approaches. In this case, a cryptographic
device having a fixed or known key is used to learn the statistics (for instance, mean
and variance) related to the processing of known exponent bits. Other attacks
(e.g., SPA, CPA) that are efficient on non-randomized exponent devices do not
consider a learning phase and they are able of breaking the device by statistically
processing a set of measurements. Thus, noise contained in the traces can be
sufficiently eliminated, enabling the key recovering with the application of specific
distinguishers (difference-of-means [116], correlation [32], mutual information [15,
130]).
In a situation when the secret exponent is a random value for each measured
trace, and of course, in the absence of a known-key device, multiple traces cannot
be conventionally processed together. Thus, as we present in the section 5.4,
unsupervised learning is the methodology that can still provide leakage assessment
if the appropriate leakage or statistical model is defined for the set of traces.
Clustering methods allow learning the mixture parameters from unlabeled data.
Considering that a set of samples {tni,j}, where i = 1..aL and j is fixed, is
characterized by a mixture density:
p(tni,j) =
K∑
k=1
p(tni,j |µnk,j , σ2(n)k,j )N (µnk,j , σ2(n)k,j ), (5.2)
where p(tni,j |µnk,j , σ2(n)k,j ) is the probability density of tni,j with respect to the class
parameters (µnk,j , σ
2(n)
k,j ). The number of parameters K should be defined before-
hand. Given a set of samples
{
tni,j
}
extracted from a single exponentiation trace
tn, learning corresponds to estimating the component densities and proportions.
We assume the samples obey a parametric model and that we need to estimate
their parameters: the mean µnk,j and variance σ
2(n)
k,j for each class k on each sample
j.
Let us first define rni,j as a parameter defining whether a sample belongs to a
specific group or distribution N (θnk,j). Therefore, rni,j = 1 if the sample tni,j belongs
to class k and rni,j = 0 otherwise. In a supervised setting, rni,j is known and we
compute the class parameters according to:
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µnk,j =
∑aL
i=1 r
n
i,jt
n
i,j∑a.L
i=1 r
n
i,j
σ
2(n)
k,j =
∑aL
i=1 r
n
i,j(tni,j − µnk,j)(tni,j − µnk,j)T∑a.L
i=1 r
n
i,j
(5.3)
In this work, the analysis is unsupervised and the values of rni,j are unknown.
The k-means algorithm [1] can label the data sample by iteratively computing
the means for k classes using the distance between samples and means. First, the
means µnk,j are randomly initialized by receiving, at random, one element of
{
tni,j
}
.
The values of rni,j ∈ {0, 1} are them defined as being:
rni,j =
{
1 if |tni,j − µnk,j | = argminc |t
n
i,j − µnc,j |
0 otherwise
Following, new means µnk,j are computed using equation 5.3. The process continues
iteratively with the re-definition of rni,j and the respective re-computation of means
µnk,j till convergence. Usually, the convergence is verified when the current and
the previous means are equal.
Fuzzy k-means [1] [62] is an extension of k-means and compute the proba-
bility of a sample tni,j to belong to a cluster k. Now, the cluster parameter, or
probabilities, are p(tni,j |µnk,j) ∈ [0, 1]. They are initialized at random, with random
probabilities inside the interval [0, 1] such that
∑
k p(tni,j |µnk,j) = 1, ∀i, and initial
means µnk,j are computed as following:
µnk,j =
∑
tni,j .(p(tni,j |µnk,j))
2
η−1∑
(p(tni,j |µnk,j))
2
η−1
(5.4)
where η is free parameter and usually set to 2. Different choices for η depend
on the sample set features (e.g., size, noise, etc). The algorithm computes new
probabilities with the following equation:
p(tni,j |µnk,j) =
1/(|tni,j − µnk,j |
2
η−1 )∑K
c=1 1/(|tni,j − µnc,j |
2
η−1 )
(5.5)
and, respectively new means µnk,j . It continues iteratively till convergence, i.e.,
when the previous and current means remain unchanged. The fuzzy k-means has
the cluster centers, or means, and the probabilities as class parameters.
The Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [28] is a probabilistic
approach which includes the covariance in the set of parameters. Given a Gaussian
mixture, the EM algorithm can model the class parameters and maximize the
likelihood function with respect to these parameters. Firstly, the means µnk,j ,
covariances Σnk,j and mixing coefficients pink,j are initialized. The mixing coefficients
must satisfy 0 ≤ pink,j ≤ 1 together with
∑K
k=1 pi
n
k,j = 1. Following, the algorithm
alternates between E-step and M-step:
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1. E-step: evaluate the responsibilities using the current class parameter values:
λni,k =
pink,jexp(− 12 (tni,j − µnk,j)Σ−1(n)k,j (tni,j − µnk,j)T )∑K
c=1 pi
n
c,jexp(− 12 (tni,j − µnc,j)Σ−1(n)c,j (tni,j − µnc,j)T )
2. M-step: re-estimate the class parameters using the responsibilities computed
in the E-step:
µ
new(n)
k,j =
1
Lnk,j
a.L∑
i=1
λni,kt
n
i,j (5.6)
Σnew(n)k,j =
1
Lk,j
aL∑
i=1
λni,k(tni,j − µnew(n)k,j )(tni,j − µnew(n)k,j )T (5.7)
pinewk,j =
Lnk,j
aL
Lnk,j =
aL∑
i=1
λni,k (5.8)
3. Verify the convergence by verifying the log-likelihood:
L(θ|tn) =
aL∑
i=1
log
{
K∑
c=1
pi
new(n)
c,j exp(−
1
2(t
n
i,j − µnew(n)c,j )Σ−1(new)(n)c,j (tni,j − µnew(n)c,j )T )
}
(5.9)
The E and M steps are recursively repeated till a convergence criteria is satisfied.
The three aforementioned clustering methods can be used to model the class
parameters from a measured trace tn and the contained set of sampled {tni,j}.
Section 5.4 demonstrates how the unsupervised learning can be used to learn the
class parameters (µ, σ, Σ) and identify points of interest for horizontal side-channel
attacks on protected exponentiations. First, section 5.3 gives details about the
target implementation and measurement setup.
5.3 Device Under Test and Measurement Setup
The target under evaluation is a software 1024-bit RSA-CRT implementation. The
design runs on a training target for side-channel analysis and fault injection testing
– piñata board4. The board is based on a 32-bit STM32F4 microcontroller with
an ARM-based architecture.
Given the RSA private key d and the respective modulus M = pq. RSA-CRT
algorithm solves the modular exponentiation by using a set private parameters d,
p, q, dp = d mod (p − 1), dq = d mod (q − 1) and iq = q−1 mod p. This protocol
4https://www.riscure.com/security-tools/hardware/pinata
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provides a decrypted or signed value s = CRT (sp, sq) = sq + q(iq(sp− sq) mod p),
where: sp = ydp mod p sq = ydq mod q.
The modular exponentiation is computed with the left-to-right square-and-
multiply algorithm. The implementation features SPA and DPA countermeasures
like regularity between squares and multiplications and exponent/message ran-
domization. Algorithm 8 shows the exponentiation method and countermeasures
regarding the CRT exponentiation related to prime p. It returns the result sp.
The computation of sq can be done with the same method.
Algorithm 8: Protected left-to-right square-and-multiply
Data: y, p, dp = (dL−1...d1d0)2.
Result: sp = ydp mod p
yr ← y + r1p
dpr ← dp + r2(p− 1)
A← 1
for i = L− 1 to 0 do
A← A2 mod p
if dpr (i) = 1 then
A← A× yr mod p
end
end
Return A
The random numbers r1 and r2 are 32-bit and 64-bit values, respectively. The
target of the present evaluation is the exponentiation ydpr=dp+r2(p−1) mod p. Here,
the size of RSA prime p is 512 bits and the random exponent dpr is, in average,
576 bits. Therefore, we consider L as being 576 and the parameter a as being
1.5. Therefore, the average number of modular operations aL in an exponentiation
trace is 1.5×576 = 864. From this amount, we expect to have, in average, l0 = 576
squares and l1 = 288 multiplications for every execution of the exponentiation.
Once the randomized exponent dpr is recovered, the method proposed in [117] can
be adopted to recover p.
The measurement setup is composed by the STM32F4 evaluation board, a
current probe, an oscilloscope and a power computer to communicate with the
equipment and store the acquired traces. The power traces were measured at a
sampling frequency of 500MS/sec.
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5.4 Attack Framework
This section describes a new methodology for the application of side-channel at-
tacks on protected RSA implementations. The attack framework is presented in
Figure 5.2. All stages of the framework are described in the remaining part of this
section.
The framework combines the concepts of unsupervised learning, horizontal
attacks, maximum likelihood estimation and template attacks. The first phase
aims at learning the class parameters which are supposed to be protected due
to the embedded countermeasures. The second phase follows the principles of
maximum likelihood estimation and template attacks. The output is given in
terms of probabilities and provides an indicative of how much the class parameters
were learned from the protected device.
1. Learning Phase executes:
(a) Unsupervised Learning for Leakage Assessment takes as input
a set of traces {tn}, and returns points of interest;
(b) Horizontal Attack takes as input the points of interest, the set of
traces, and for each trace tn returns an approximate exponent;
(c) Optimizing the Points of Interest Selection takes as input the
set of traces, the approximate exponents, and executes:
i. Using the approximate exponents, determines refined points of
interest using T-test;
ii. Repeats the Horizontal Attack using the refined point of inter-
est and outputs improved approximate exponents.
2. Attacking Phase to recover the correct exponent executes:
(a) Computing Final Probabilities takes as input the set {tn}, the
improved approximate exponents, and returns final probabilities; for
a modular operation, its final probability is the probability of that
operation being a square;
(b) Error Detection and Correction, for a single trace, it takes as
input an improved approximate exponent and the final probabilities;
it returns a correct exponent or reports a failure.
Figure 5.2: Attack Framework
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5.4.1 Learning Phase
The first phase of our methodology concentrates its efforts in the learning of the
class parameters contained in a set of N measured power traces. The analysis
starts by assessing the contained leakage in order to identify points of interest.
In this work, a point of interest is defined as the sample index j ∈ {1, `} where
the corresponding sample set {tni,j}, for i = 1 : aL, has an observable difference
between its class parameters µk, σk, Σk, k ∈ {0, 1} (since the goal is to identify
squares and multiplications, we consider only two possible classes). Therefore,
in a single trace tn, the maximum amount of points of interest is `, which is
exactly the amount of samples in a modular operation interval. The question
here is: which are the points that leaks confidential information according to a
pre-defined leakage model? To identify the points of interest, the leakage model
is defined as the samples containing observable difference between squares and
multiplications (conditional branches, address-bit). These points of interest are
the entry for the horizontal attack that provides an approximate exponent for
each trace tn. Finally, the approximate exponents are used to refine the points
of interest selection. The horizontal attack might then be repeated to reduce the
error rate in the approximate exponents.
Unsupervised Learning for Leakage Assessment
Leakage assessment techniques determine if a cryptographic device is leaking side-
channel information according to a specific algorithm and leakage model. Welch
t-test is a statistical method which can assess the presence of leakage in crypto-
graphic devices. In the context of public-key algorithms, the document presented
in [100] shows a case study of leakage assessment from RSA implementations.
In [127], the authors demonstrate how t-test and mutual information analy-
sis identify the leakage location in time domain. The authors of [130] considered
mutual information as a tool to identify the leakage location in the frequency do-
main and, consequently, the frequency bands in RSA EM traces which contain
larger differences between squares and multiplications. Once the leakage is iden-
tified, points of interest can be selected for the application of different forms of
side-channel attacks with appropriate distinguishes.
An RSA implementation protected with exponent blinding provides random
sequences of exponent bits at every execution of the algorithm. The aforemen-
tioned application of t-test and mutual information becomes unfeasible since the
operations cannot be initially grouped in different and labeled classes. Recent pub-
lications addressed the use of unsupervised learning method to exploit the leakage
from symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms [14, 88, 156]. In [14],
the authors considered a device with a fixed key, which is not our case. The ap-
proaches presented in [88,156] do not demonstrate how to precisely identify points
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of interest. The authors of [156] considered that a heuristic approach based on
difference-of-means for the points of interest selection, which can be very complex
in some cases. [88] proposes to apply a clustering classification to a single trace
which allows labeling the operations in specific classes. The method works bet-
ter for low noise measurements and requires a EM station composed by multiple
probes.
To suppress this gap in terms of points of interest location from randomized
exponentiations, we demonstrate that we can combine multiple traces for the leak-
age assessment even if the device is protected with exponent blinding. Additional
and optional software countermeasures like message and modulus randomization
has no influence against this unsupervised leakage assessment.
As specified in section 5.3, the terms l0 and l1 refer to the amount of squares
and multiplications, respectively, in a single trace tn. The proportion l0/l1 is
approximately constant for every exponentiation. Due to the exponent blinding
countermeasure, the order of squares and multiplications varies from trace to trace.
However, the clustering algorithm classifies samples in k groups taking into account
the amplitude of these samples. The samples are discrete values represented by
an amplitude value, given in volts, and come from the oscilloscope quantization
features (resolution, sampling rate). The position of squares and multiplications
inside the exponentiation loop is irrelevant for the clustering mechanism. We make
the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: At the trace tn, the mean value for the set of samples {tni,j} (at
sample j) for squares and multiplications are, respectively, µn0,j + γn0,j and
µn1,j + γn1,j , where γnk,j is the random noise having Gaussian distribution for
the class k.
Assumption 2: The means µnk,j are constant values for all traces tn.
Let us consider the n-th trace represented as a set of samples according to
Equation 5.1. We apply a clustering algorithm to each set of samples {tni:l0+l1,j}
at a fixed sampling time j. The clustering returns two centers c0,j and c1,j and
two groups of clustered samples {g0,j} and {g1,j} containing p0,j and p1,j elements,
respectively, where p0,j + p1,j ≈ l0 + l1.
Now, for every trace tn, we have a set of parameters cn0,j , cn1,j , {gn0,j}, {gn1,j},
pn0,j and pn1,j (j ∈ {1, .., `}) that can be used for the leakage assessment. We
provide results for four different techniques: difference-of-means (DoM), sum-of-
squared differences (SOSD), sum-of-squared t-values (SOST), and mutual infor-
mation analysis (MIA). Because, we expect pn0,j ≈ l0 and pn1,j ≈ l1, we define the
following ratio parameters:
rnk,j =
{
pnk,j/lk if lk ≥ pnk,j
lk/p
n
k,j if lk ≤ pnk,j
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The ratio parameters rnk,j are considered as a multiplication factor in the equa-
tions for difference-of-means, SOSD and SOST which are given by:
δj =
(∏1
k=0 r
n
k,j
)(
1
N
∑N
n=1 |cn0,j − cn1,j |
)
(DoM) (5.10)
ςj =
(∏1
k=0 r
n
k,j
)(
1
N
∑N
n=1 |cn0,j − cn1,j |2
)
(SOSD) (5.11)
τj =
(∏1
k=0 r
n
k,j
) 1N ∑Nn=1
 |cn0,j−cn1,j |√
σ
2(n)
0,j
pn0,j
+
σ
2(n)
1,j
pn1,j

2 (SOST) (5.12)
Considering σ2(n)j as the variance for the sample set {g0,j(n)} ∪ {g1,j(n)}, the
mutual information value υj at each sample index j is computed by deriving the
differential entropy [130] for each set of samples according to:
υj =
N∑
n=1
log
√
1
pn0,j + pn1,j − 1
σ
2(n)
j +
1∑
k=0
(−1)%k(1−%)1−k log
√
1
(pn1−k,j)− 1
σ
2(n)
1−k,j
(5.13)
where % = p
n
0,j
pn0,j+pn1,j
. The values of υj can also be multiplied by the factor
∏1
k=0 r
n
k,j
in order to improve the results. Note that the four leakage assessment methods are
a sum of individual leakage assessments for each individual trace. The application
of clustering algorithms provide an estimation for the mean values µnk,j . Due to
the aforementioned assumptions on the mean values and due to the summations
from equations for SOSD, SOST, DoM and MIA, the noise γnk,j is eliminated if
the number of processed traces is sufficiently large. Figure 5.3 shows the leak-
age assessment results for the four aforementioned methods. The time interval
represented in this figure is a modular operation interval. The larger peaks in
the leakage assessment results indicate the presence of a mixture of distributions
with observable difference between its class parameters. A flat line means that the
clustered set of samples are drawn from a normal distribution.
Horizontal Attack
The horizontal attack methodology we adopted is based on unsupervised learning
approaches [88, 156]. The main goal is to create one approximate exponent for
each trace tn. We particularly adopted the method presented in [156], which is
divided in four main steps:
1. Trace preprocessings: an exponentiation trace is organized as a set of sam-
ples, following Equation 5.1.
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Figure 5.3: SOSD, SOST, DoM and MIA leakage assessments.
2. Points of interest selection: for this, we considered the proposed unsupervised
learning for leakage assessment, as detailed in the last subsection.
3. Cluster classification of set of samples: the basic idea is to consider a fixed
amount of points of interest Jpoi and apply a clustering algorithm (k-means,
fuzzy k-means or EM algorithm) over each set of samples {tni,j}, i = 1 : aL
having a fixed j ∈ {1, ..., Jpoi}. A reference point of interest is necessary
to associate clusters with classes. The output of this step are exactly Jpoi
clustered sets, grouped into squares and multiplications.
4. Final exponent estimation: the authors of [156] proposed different approaches
to provide an approximate exponent for a single trace. Step 3 returns clus-
tered data for Jpoi sets of samples. It means that Jpoi candidates for the
exponent are given for a single trace. These candidates are combined into one
final exponent λni ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1..aL, using statistical classifiers (majority
rule, likelihood estimation and Bayes’s estimator).
As described in [156], an optimized selection of points of interest is required by
this horizontal attack.
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Optimizing the Points of Interest Selection
After one approximate exponents is found for each exponentiation trace tn, we
use these outputs to develop a second leakage assessment step which allows us to
refine the points of interest selection.
Now, considering the whole set of N measured exponentiation traces and their
respective approximate exponents λni ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1..aL, new means and variances
are obtained:
µ0,j =
N∑
n=1
∑aL
i=1(1− λni )tni,j∑aL
i=1(1− λni )
µ1,j =
N∑
n=1
∑aL
i=1 λ
n
i t
n
i,j∑aL
i=1 λ
n
i
(5.14)
σ20,j =
N∑
n=1
∑aL
i=1(1− λni )(tni,j − µ0,j)2∑aL
i=1(1− λni )
σ21,j =
N∑
n=1
∑aL
i=1 λ
n
i (tni,j − µ1,j)2∑aL
i=1 λ
n
i
(5.15)
Having the class parameters (means and variances) and assuming they are
drawn from a mixture of Gaussian distributions, the analysis should infer the
difference between these distribution parameters and be able to decide whether
they lead to observable dissimilarities.
A t-test calculation is a proper solution for this case. Results presenting im-
portant peaks indicate that the classes (e.g., squares and multiplications) have
observable difference with respect to their distribution parameters. The new t-
values τnewj are obtained with the following equation:
τnewj =
|µ0,j − µ1,j |√
σ20,j
h0,j
+ σ
2
1,j
h1,j
h0,j =
N∑
n=1
aL∑
i=1
(1− λni ) h1,j =
N∑
n=1
aL∑
i=1
λni (5.16)
Figure 5.4 compares the first and second leakage assessment using t-test. This
figure highlights only the part of the modular operation that showed distinct peaks
during the first assessment. The optimization step presents more distinct peaks,
which are selected as the new points of interest.
After the refinement of points of interest selection, the horizontal attack is re-
peated and supposed to produce new set of approximate exponents λnew(n)i with
lower error rates. Table 5.1 presents examples of error rate results for the approxi-
mate exponents before and after the points of interest optimization. All the results
were obtained from the same trace set and are provided for all possible combina-
tions of clustering algorithms, leakage assessment method and statistical classifier
during the horizontal attack. All combinations of techniques provide fairly similar
results. However, the decision for specific methods and algorithms depends on the
trace and target features.
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Figure 5.4: T-test results before and after the optimized selection of points of interest.
5.4.2 Attacking Phase
The second phase, the attacking phase, aims at recovering the full correct blinded
exponent from a single trace.
Computing Final Probabilities
In this section, we create a metric to estimate how much the class parameters
(mean, variance) were correctly learned from the blind RSA implementation. The
input for the attacking phase is a set ofN traces tn labeled with approximate expo-
nent values λn. The output of this phase are so-called final probabilities; for each
modular operation Oni a final probability indicates the probability Oni is square.
Analogously, this part of the attack framework follows the same methodology of
template attacks [40].
Initially, new class parameters (µk, σ2k, Σk, k ∈ {0, 1}) are built (they can be
seen as templates) from the set of labeled traces. We acquired 10000 power traces
from the target device. Therefore, in average 10000 × 576 = 5.76M squares and
10000 × 288 = 2.88M multiplications are used to build templates. Following, we
apply parametric and multivariate attack models on the same sets of traces. We
compute the likelihood L(θk|Oni ) that each modular operation Oni belongs to a
specific class θk. The likelihoods are used to estimate the final probability for each
modular operation Oni .
A parametric model is the univariate model where the class parameters are
the mean and the variance. After the determination of the class parameters for
squares (µ0,j , σ20,j) and multiplications (µ1,j,, σ21,j) over the set of points of interest
j ∈ {1, .., Jpoi}, the log-likelihood of a set of parameters for the operation Oni is
determined by:
L(θk,j |Oni ) = L(µk,j , σ2k,j |Oni ) =
Jpoi∑
j=1
log p(tni,j |µk,j , σ2k,j) (5.17)
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Table 5.1: Error rate before and after the optimized selection of points of interest.
Clustering 1st Leakage Horizontal Attack Error rate Error rate
Algorithm Assessment (Statistical Classifier) before after
Method optimization optimization
K-MEANS
SOSD
Majority Rule 13.29% 2.35%
Log Likelihood 13.01% 2.31%
Bayes Estimation 12.96% 2.27%
SOST
Majority Rule 11.46% 2.31%
Log Likelihood 11.52% 1.91%
Bayes Estimation 12.96% 2.38%
DoM
Majority Rule 13.06% 2.34%
Log Likelihood 12.46% 2.36%
Bayes Estimation 12.90% 2.34%
MIA
Majority Rule 14.81% 2.77%
Log Likelihood 14.05% 2.68%
Bayes Estimation 14.27% 2.71%
FUZZY
K-MEANS
SOSD
Majority Rule 10.15% 1.61%
Log Likelihood 10.28% 1.48%
Bayes Estimation 11.37% 1.83%
SOST
Majority Rule 9.45% 2.11%
Log Likelihood 9.33% 1.27%
Bayes Estimation 9.35% 1.41%
DoM
Majority Rule 10.41% 2.12%
Log Likelihood 10.33% 2.31%
Bayes Estimation 10.44% 1.91%
MIA
Majority Rule 10.98% 1.65%
Log Likelihood 10.77% 1.99%
Bayes Estimation 10.40% 1.85%
EM
ALGORITHM
SOSD
Majority Rule 11.27% 2.23%
Log Likelihood 12.04% 2.27%
Bayes Estimation 11.95% 2.19%
SOST
Majority Rule 10.01% 1.75%
Log Likelihood 9.88% 1.66%
Bayes Estimation 9.97% 2.12%
DoM
Majority Rule 11.98% 2.47%
Log Likelihood 12.01% 2.43%
Bayes Estimation 12.15% 2.47%
MIA
Majority Rule 12.70% 2.33%
Log Likelihood 12.29% 2.44%
Bayes Estimation 12.34% 2.37%
94
5.4. Attack Framework
where p(tni,j |µk,j , σ2k,j) is the probability density function based on the Gaussian
normal density. The multivariate model involves the mean vector µk = {µk,j},
for j ∈ {1, .., Jpoi}, and the covariance Σk in the computation of the probability
density function. The log-likelihood is given by:
L(θk|Oni ) = L(µk,Σk,j |Oni ) =
log
(
1√
2piJpoi |Σ|exp(−
1
2(O
n
i − µk)Σ−1k (Oni − µk)T )
)
(5.18)
The final probability that an operation Oni is a square can be given by:
p(Oni |θ0) =
L(θ0|Oni )
L(θ0|Oni ) + L(θ1|Oni )
(5.19)
Error Detection and Correction
Due to noise and other aspects that interfere the side-channel analysis (misalign-
ment, clock jitter, etc), the derivation of the final exponent for a single exponenti-
ation trace may contain errors. If the amount of wrong bits is sufficiently small, a
brute-force attack is still feasible to finally recover the correct exponent. However,
the attacker needs a metric to indicate the location of the possible wrong bits in
the recovered exponent. The final probabilities can be used as a reference for the
exponent bits selection with respect to a brute-force attack.
Note that in Table 5.1, in the column “errors after optimization”, the best
result, with smallest error rate 1.27%, is achieved for fuzzy k-means, SOST, and
Log Likelihood. Furthermore, for any clustering algorithm used with SOST and
Log Likelihood, the error rates are less than 2%. We are uncertain why the combi-
nation of fuzzy k-means, SOST, and Log Likelihood provides the best result, but
we suspect the that the reason is target-specific.
Observe that the 1.27% error rate implies that only 864 · 1.27% ≈ 11 modu-
lar operations are identified incorrectly. In general brute forcing 11 bits is easy,
however, the following problem arises: which modular operations are recognized
incorrectly? The localization of wrong bits in the recovered exponent is based on
calculated likelihood using parametric or multivariate attacks; the probabilities
p(Oni |θ0) are computed for each modular operation. The obtained results indicate
less than 20 wrong bits in the exponent if the probabilities interval between 0.45
and 0.55 is considered as the ‘wrong bits’ interval. A known-key analysis, for this
specific case, confirmed that exponent bits with final probabilities between 0.45
and 0.55 contain all wrong guesses. Brute-forcing 20 bits of the RSA key is prac-
tical since it can take up to a few hours on a modern PC. Therefore, we confirm
that our attack framework recovers the exponent successfully.
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5.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented an attack framework for side-channel attacks on pro-
tected RSA implementations. The methodology combines the concepts of unsuper-
vised learning, horizontal attacks, maximum likelihood estimation and template
attacks in order to recover the exponent bits.
We proposed an unsupervised learning approach to assess the side-channel
leakage even in the presence of exponent and message blinding. We demonstrate
that the order of the modular operations inside each exponentiation trace is irrel-
evant for the leakage analysis; therefore, multiple traces can be processed together
in order to find class parameters. If the device leaks SPA-related information, a
horizontal attack is able to produce approximate exponents for each exponenti-
ation trace. We demonstrate how these approximate exponents can be used to
optimize the leakage location and, finally, refine the determination of approximate
exponents. As a final step, the attacker can recover the error bits through the
computation of final probabilities for the exponent bits.
To demonstrate the power of our approach we attacked the 1024-bit RSA-CRT
implementation protected by the SPA, message blinding, and exponent blinding
countermeasures, running on a 32-bit STM32F4 microcontroller. In our experi-
ment the error rate was 1.27%.
As a future work we consider extending our framework to ECC-based crypto-
graphic protocols [131,133]; we believe that it should be possible due to similarities
between ECC and RSA. This two future work direction is explored in Chapter 6.
Furthermore, we believe that our framework can be further improved by recovering
error bits faster than by using “brute-force”, for example, approaches from [20,86]
can be incorporated into the framework. This two future work direction is explored
in Chapters 4 and 6.
Another interesting future work is applying our framework in the frequency
domain; the goal would be to check whether it is possible to lower the error rate
by using side-channel attacks in the frequency domain instead of the time domain.
Additionally, we consider an investigation on how a horizontal clustering attack
would perform in varying signal-to-noise scenarios to be a practical future work.
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Horizontal Clustering
Side-Channel Attacks on
Embedded ECC
Implementations
Side-channel attacks are a threat to cryptographic algorithms running on em-
bedded devices. Public-key cryptosystems, including elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC), are particularly vulnerable because their private keys are usually long-
term. Well known countermeasures like regularity, projective coordinates and
scalar randomization, among others, are used to harden implementations against
common side-channel attacks like DPA.
Horizontal clustering attacks can theoretically overcome these countermeasures
by attacking individual side-channel traces. In practice horizontal attacks have
been applied to overcome protected ECC implementations on FPGAs. However,
it has not been known yet whether such attacks can be applied to protected im-
plementations working on embedded devices, especially in a non-profiled setting.
In this chapter we mount non-profiled horizontal clustering attacks on two
protected implementations of the Montgomery Ladder on Curve25519 available in
the µNaCl library targeting electromagnetic (EM) emanations. The first imple-
mentation performs the conditional swap (cswap) operation through arithmetic of
field elements (cswap-arith), while the second does so by swapping the pointers
(cswap-pointer). They run on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4F core.
Our best attack has success rates of 97.64% and 99.60% for cswap-arith and
cswap-pointer, respectively. This means that at most 6 and 2 bits are incorrectly
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recovered, and therefore, a subsequent brute-force can fix them in reasonable time.
Furthermore, our horizontal clustering framework used for the aforementioned
attacks can be applied against other protected implementations.
This chapter is based on [140] that has been presented at the 16th International
Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2017).
6.1 Introduction
Public-key cryptosystems based on ECC [114, 131] are frequently used in a wide
range of applications, such as: credit card, e-commerce and cryptocurrency. Run-
ning on embedded systems, they are a common target of side-channel attacks.
The main goal of these attacks is to recover the private key, which is typically the
scalar in a scalar multiplication – the main ECC operation in most protocols.
Horizontal attack (HA) is a methodology for side-channel attacks against ba-
sic cryptographic operations in protocols based on RSA or ECC, the modular
exponentiation and the scalar multiplication (ECSM), respectively. In theory, a
horizontal attack against ECC allows the recovery of secret scalar bits through
the analysis of individual traces, i.e., a single trace from the actual target is suf-
ficient; thus, they are effective against implementations protected by classic and
popular countermeasures such as scalar randomization (SR), coordinate random-
ization (CR), point blinding and scalar splitting. A fundamental requirement for
an attacker to apply HA is the knowledge of the scalar multiplication algorithm;
implementation details, however, are not required. In addition, HA requires to
have a good comparison tool, thereafter referred to as a distinguisher, to effi-
ciently extract parts of the keys. The following methods can be applied, among
others: correlation, collision-correlation, cross-correlation and cluster analysis.
The correlation analysis method [51] follows the same principle as correlation
power analysis (CPA) applied to a set of traces arranged vertically. The differ-
ence in the horizontal context is that a single trace is divided in several segments
and a hypothetical intermediate value is assigned to each segment, based on a
guess about the key value. The correlation between the segment samples and
hypothetical values is computed in the same way as in CPA. This method works
against implementations protected only with scalar randomization, or when co-
ordinate randomization is applied with a short random parameter. The method
of collision-correlation analysis [17, 19, 50, 182, 188] computes the correlation or
Euclidean distance between segments of a trace. The goal is to identify the occur-
rence of the same intermediate data in different parts of the trace, and by doing
so derive the secret bits. In theory, this method is feasible against the classic
countermeasures.
Many side-channel attacks do not work when a stronger version of coordinate
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randomization is used, the so-called coordinate re-randomization (CRR) [141].
This countermeasure randomizes the working points coordinates at every ECSM
iteration. Therefore, the correlation or collision-correlation attacks are prevented,
because they rely on the fact that output points of an iteration are equal to the
input points of the next iteration. On the other hand, attacks that target iterations
independently, like the attacks presented in this chapter, are not influenced by this
countermeasure. The implementations attacked in this chapter are protected with
all the aforementioned countermeasures.
Most horizontal attacks require advanced preprocessing of traces, characteri-
zation and leakage assessment before applying distinguishers. The main challenge
of the horizontal approach revolves around extracting meaningful leakage from
a single trace, which usually has strong noise. In this chapter we consider the
non-profiled scenario (also called unsupervised) in which the adversary does not
know and cannot change the private key in any test device. Moreover, she is not
allowed to turn off countermeasures1. Therefore, the second major challenge is
caused by the unavailability of labeled samples. Note that leakage assessment
methods, like TVLA [76], require labeled samples and this is not possible when
scalar randomization is enforced.
6.1.1 Related work
Unsupervised learning methods, especially those based on clustering, have been
applied to solve the aforementioned limitations and they have been shown to be
able to work in practice.
Heyszl et al [88] apply multi-dimensional K-Means [73, 122] clustering to suc-
cessfully attack an FPGA-based ECC implementation by correctly classifying the
scalar bits. Sprecht et al. [174] later improved this attack by using Expectation-
Maximization clustering [59], Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [104] and mul-
tiple EM probes. Both methods target ECC implementations for FPGAs and work
well for low noise measurements. In this chapter we do not employ dimensionality
reduction techniques such as PCA (unsupervised) or LDA [72] (supervised), but
instead we apply a points of interest selection method.
Perin et al [156], consider a heuristic approach based on unidimensional dif-
ference of means for points of interest selection. This method uses a single trace for
the leakage assessment, which is likely affected by noise. Perin and Chmielewski [154]
propose a methodology for clustering attacks to amend the aforementioned defi-
ciency by using multiple unlabeled traces for leakage assessment and improving
attack robustness in high noise scenarios. Similarly to the above works we use
1Turning off the countermeasures is not always possible in the ICC EMVCo smart card eval-
uations [69], for example.
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unidimensional clustering for points of interest selection; however, for the attack,
we evaluate various clustering methods including the multi-dimensional one.
Jarvinen et al [101] present an unsupervised clustering attack on m-ary ECSM
with precomputations2. The proposed attack is evaluated using a low noise 8-bit
AVR device. While our attacks target binary ECSM, they can be straightforwardly
extended to the m-ary case: instead of using binary clustering, the attack would
need to employ 2m clusters. Most clustering algorithms support an arbitrary
number of clusters, e.g. K-Means.
In pararel to our work, an extension to [154] was presented by Jasdheer Singh
Maan in his master thesis [123]. This approach additionally investigates multi-
dimensional clustering and template attack as the last stage of horizontal attack.
Another related work concerns error correction. In [88], to derive the error
locations the authors use a probability for cluster belonging derived from the
K-Means results. Essentially, scalar indexes with the lowest probability are brute-
forced. Similarly, the papers [154,156] use probability density function for various
clustering algorithms to perform error correction.
We have applied the approach from [154] to detect the errors in the recovered
scalar. Unfortunately, this approach does not work for our experiments because
of a presence of strong noise pulses in the EM traces. Essentially, some bit errors
occur even if their probabilities of being correct are high. Therefore, we have
abandoned this approach and applied a brute-force method sped up by the time-
memory trade-off algorithm from [141].
6.1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized below. First of all, using
EM we perform a horizontal clustering attack (HCA) against the arithmetic-based
cswap.3 Curve25519 µNaCl Montgomery Ladder running on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-
M4F. The implementation is additionally protected with projective coordinate re-
randomization and scalar randomization. We compare a wide range of leakage
assessment methods and statistical classifiers to find out the best settings and we
achieve the best success rate of 97.64%4. This means there are at most 6 erroneous
bits, which can be brute-forced in a reasonable time even without knowing error
locations.
Secondly, we attack the pointer-based cswap µNaCl Montgomery Ladder im-
plementation that is protected the same as for the first one. Our best attack on
2In an m-ary method, m bits of the scalar are processed in one iteration of ECSM while in a
standard ECSM a single bit is processed per iteration.
3Cswap means conditional swap. In a Montgomery ladder ECSM, the cswap condition value
tells whether or not to swap and it depends on the secret scalar bit. Thus, it should ideally be
constant time and not leak through other side channels.
4We use the term success rate to refer to the percentage of correctly recovered bits.
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this implementation has a success rate of 99.60%, i.e., only 2 errors.
Note that in our non-profiled approach, choosing the best settings implies run-
ning the attack for all the considered parameters. This would significantly increase
the attack time. To partially mitigate this issue, we use the same settings for both
implementations. Moreover, the attack can be easily parallelized, for example, by
using cloud computing; significantly improved results justify this.
Thirdly, we improve the unsupervised RSA HCA framework from [154]. This
framework implements the leakage assessment by combining multiple RSA traces
protected with exponent blinding. We extend that framework to ECC by attacking
a randomized scalar instead of a blinded exponent. In addition, we propose the
usage of: (i) multiple dimensions clustering; (ii) methods for outlier detection; and
(iii) intrinsic quality evaluation of clusters.
Finally, we generalize the method from [141] to tolerate a certain number of
incorrectly recovered scalar bits without relying on confidence probabilities.
Our attacks demonstrate the feasibility of scalar recovery from the µNaCl-
based ECSM. Breaking ECSM implies that an attacker can compromise the key
exchange protocols: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and its ephemeral ver-
sion (ECDHE). Examples of current publicly known applications using µNaCl on
ARM Cortex-M devices, and thus potentially vulnerable, include: [66,159,187].
6.1.3 Organization of the chapter
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, we describe
the setup of the attacks. Subsequently, Section 6.3 covers preliminaries and Sec-
tion 6.4 presents our horizontal cluster framework. The experimental results are
shown in Section 6.5. We describe how to efficiently correct errors in Section 6.7.
Finally, Section 6.8 discusses countermeasures and future work.
6.2 Attack setup
In this section, we first describe targeted software implementations and second we
discuss target device and the measurement setup.
6.2.1 Target software implementations
We target µNaCl5, a cryptographic library for ARM Cortex-M that provides im-
plementations of Curve25519, an elliptic curve at the 128-bit security level and its
associated X25519 key exchange protocol based on Diffie-Hellman. This library
provides two ECSM implementations, both based on the Montgomery ladder al-
gorithm (cf. Algorithm 9 for details). They differ on how the conditional swap
5http://munacl.cryptojedi.org/curve25519-cortexm0.shtml
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(cswap) operation, fundamental to implement it in constant time, is performed:
either by arithmetic means (cswap-arith) or pointers swapping (cswap-pointer).
Algorithm 9: Montgomery ladder for Curve25519
Input: 255-bit scalar s, x-coordinate xP of input point P.
Output: (X[s]P , Z[s]P ), such that x[s]P = X[s]P /Z[s]P .
P1← (1, 0); P2← (xP , 1).
for i = 254 . . . 0 do
if si = 1 then
P1← padd(P1, P2, xP )
P2← pdbl(P2)
else
P2← padd(P1, P2, xP )
P1← pdbl(P1)
end
end
return P1
At each algorithm iteration, the cswap condition depends on the secret scalar
bit processed at that iteration and thus its value should not leak; A high level
description of such strategy is described in Algorithm 10. We argue that in both
implementations the cswap condition value leaks. We investigate and confirm that
the leakage is strong enough to be exploited by our proposed attacks.
Algorithm 10: Montgomery ladder with cswap and coordinate re-
randomization.
// ... initialization omitted ...
bprev ← 0;
for i = 254 . . . 0 do
re_randomize_coords(work_state);
b← bit i of scalar;
s← b⊕ bprev;
bprev ← b;
cswap(work_state, s);
ladderstep(work_state);
end
// ... return ommited ...
In the cswap-arith implementation, the if/else branch is replaced by conditional
swaps of the respective coordinate values of the working points, P1 = (X1, Z1)
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Listing 6.1: Conditional swap based on arithmetic of field operands limbs.
1 void fe25519_cswap(fe25519* in1 , fe25519* in2 , int condition)
2 {
3 int32 mask = condition;
4 uint32 ctr;
5 mask = -mask;
6 for (ctr = 0; ctr < 8; ctr++)
7 {
8 uint32 val1 = in1 ->as_uint32[ctr];
9 uint32 val2 = in2 ->as_uint32[ctr];
10 uint32 temp = val1;
11 val1 ^= mask & (val2 ^ val1);
12 val2 ^= mask & (val2 ^ temp);
13 in1 ->as_uint32[ctr] = val1;
14 in2 ->as_uint32[ctr] = val2;
15 }
16 }
and P2 = (X2, Z2), to achieve constant time. For concreteness, Algorithm 6.1
shows the actual C implementation of the arithmetic conditional swap of two
field elements in µNaCl (call to CSWAP in Algorithm 10). This is an arithmetic
CSWAP implementation with XOR and AND instructions, and is known to leak the
value of mask through side-channels, e.g. on the AVR architecture [141]. Another
cswap implementation performs a conditional swap of pointers to the field elements
instead (cswap-pointer)6. Listing 6.2 shows the relevant part of the cswap-pointer
implementation that “touches”, i.e., operates on the secret-dependent condition
(bit s in Algorithm 10). In the latter implementation, during each ECSM iteration,
the mask is touched far fewer times by the AND (&) instruction (3 times) than in the
cswap-arith (16 times); thus, in theory, a weaker side-channel leakage is expected.
The ECSM implementations in µNaCl do not provide countermeasures against
power/EM analysis, besides a regular and constant-time implementation. To eval-
uate our proposed attacks against properly protected targets, we added coordinate
re-randomization to both implementations 7. The re-randomization countermea-
sure multiplies a randomly generated λ ∈ Fp with the coordinates of P1 and P2 at
the beginning of every ECSM iteration (Algorithm 10).
6.2.2 Target device and measurement setup
The target software runs on the STM32F4 microcontroller chip on the board, with
a 32-bit ARM-M4 CPU core, clocked at 168 MHz. We acquired electromagnetic
6Selected by preprocessor definition DH_SWAP_BY_POINTERS.
7Our attack also works against implementations protected with scalar randomization. We
have not implemented this countermeasure, but instead we set a random scalar for each ECSM
execution.
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Listing 6.2: Conditional swap of pointers to field operands.
1 void swapPointersConditionally (void **p1 , void **p2 , uint8 condition)
2 {
3 uintptr mask = condition;
4 uintptr val1 = (uintptr) *p1;
5 uintptr val2 = (uintptr) *p2;
6 uintptr temp = val2 ^ val1;
7
8 mask = (uintptr)( - (intptr) mask );
9 temp ^= mask & (temp ^ val1);
10 val1 ^= mask & (val1 ^ val2);
11 val2 ^= mask & (val2 ^ temp);
12
13 *p1 = (void *) val1;
14 *p2 = (void *) val2;
15 }
(EM) traces from the ECSM execution by the target device, using a single EM
probe. The setup consisted of a Lecroy Waverunner 8254M oscilloscope, a Langer
RF-U 2.5-2 H-field probe, an amplifier and analog low pass filter (250 MHz).
For the acquisition of each trace, the host PC sends to the target device a pair of
scalar (k) and input point (P ), both randomly generated. The device receives the
pair and executes the scalar multiplication, returning the output point (R = [k]P )
to the host PC. We have acquired the traces with the following settings: 2.5 GS/s
sample rate, 16 mV amplitude and 70 million samples. We have also used a low
pass BNC analog filter: BLP-250+ from Mini-Circuits. We acquired and analyzed
traces using Riscure’s Inspector software package. 8
6.3 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe preliminaries: trace characterization, clustering, and
outlier detection and handling.
6.3.1 Traces Characterization
The n-th measured side-channel trace, which represents the electromagnetic ema-
nation (EM) of a device over the time domain, is denoted by the uni-dimensional
(1× aL) vector tn = {On1 , On2 , ..., OnaL}. Here, we consider a trace tn as being the
side-channel information of an ECSM composed by a fixed number aL of itera-
tions. The factor a depends on the ECSM algorithm and L is the bit-length of the
scalar; for Montgomery Ladder on Curve25519, a = 1 and L = 255. The trace tn
8http://www.riscure.com/
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can be described by a set of `-sized sub-vectors:
tn = {On1 , On2 , ..., Ona.L} =
{
(tn1,1, ..., tn1,`), (tn2,1, ..., tn2,`), ..., (tna.L,1, ..., tna.L,`)
}
where tni,j is the j-th element of each sub-vector Oni and ` is the number of samples.
The element tni,j can be viewed as a sample in time from the side-channel trace
tn. The set {tni,j}, i = 1..aL, refers to a set of samples where each element tni,j is
extracted from one ECSM iteration Oni for a fixed j. For example, {tni,10} contains
aL samples, each element tni,10 is selected from the 10th sample of each sub-trace
Oi).
A traceset is defined as the set of trace segments of one or more ECSM runs,
and each trace segment consists of the samples from a single ECSM iteration. A
full traceset is a set of traces of multiple ECSM runs, where each trace in the
set consists of the samples from a full ECSM run, i.e., it is a contiguous trace
containing all the samples from all iterations of that ECSM run. The tracesets are
assumed to be unlabeled, except in those traces used for known-key analysis.
Note that to analyze an ECSM trace we need to cut it into pieces that represent
single ECSM iterations. Subsequently, we need to align these traces to be able to
efficiently identify and exploit the leakage. The process is done in a similar way
to [154] and consists of trace cutting and alignment, as described below.
Trace cutting
First each side-channel trace of a complete ECSM run is cut in trace segments,
one per each algorithm iteration. In the context of this work, the ECSM imple-
mentation is based on Montgomery Ladder, so each iteration i corresponds to the
processing of the swap bit (s in Algorithm 10), which depends on i-th scalar bit.
The trace cutting was done by first applying a low pass filter and then detecting
patterns that appeared repeatedly for 254 times using a threshold (i.e., for all
ECSM iterations, except the last one). The patterns were detected visually with
ease. A simple time-based trace cutting did not work in our case, despite the
constant timeness of the target implementation, due to visible time drifts in the
measured samples, probably due to clock drifting or measurement imprecisions.
The above technique is similar to the one used in [154].
Trace alignment
After the traces are cut they are not precisely aligned. To overcome this issue we
align the traces at the location shown in Figure 6.1. To align the traces exactly on
the underlined pattern we used Pearson correlation. We have selected the pattern
based on the time of a single Montgomery ladder iteration and source code analysis
of the implementation.
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Figure 6.1: Example Trace Alignment
6.3.2 Clustering
Clustering algorithms
The clustering algorithms successfully employed so far in the context of hor-
izontal attacks are K-Means (KM), Fuzzy K-Means (FKM) and Expectation-
Maximization (EM) [88, 101, 154, 156]. K-Means is a rigid clustering algorithm,
meaning that each instance (a sample in the context of HCA) is assigned (labeled)
to a single cluster. On the other hand, Fuzzy K-Means and EM are soft clustering
algorithms, because their output includes an association probability matrix, where
each instance is associated with its degree of linkage to each cluster.
Intrinsic cluster quality measure
Given a set of clustering outputs from multiple clustering algorithm runs, an intrin-
sic cluster quality measure can be applied to evaluate the best among them. Such
measures are called intrinsic or internal because they consider just the structure of
the clusters, and do not take into account any labeled information that might be
available and could be used for testing. A clustering result with the best intrinsic
cluster quality measure does not guarantee the best results for the application (in
this work, for use by cluster leakage assessment and horizontal cluster analysis).
But, it is nevertheless useful when clustering results cannot be otherwise tested.
Several intrinsic quality measures have been proposed for unsupervised clus-
tering, among them: Silhouette coefficient [112], Calinski-Harabaz index [36] and
Davies-Bouldin (DB) index [58]. We chose to use the DB index, which is based on
the ratio of within-cluster and between-cluster distances, and can be defined as:
DB = 1
k
k∑
i=1
maxj 6=i{Di,j} (6.1) Di,j = d¯i + d¯j
di,j
(6.2)
where Di,j is the within-to-between cluster distance ratio for clusters i and j; d¯c is
the mean distance between the centroid of cluster c and each point in that cluster;
and di,j is the Euclidean distance between the centroids of clusters i and j. The
smaller the DB index, the better is the clustering.
The DB index favors clusters that are compact and distant from each other.
These are exactly the properties we expect to get at points in time where the
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clusters provide a good separation of the classes (two classes, one for each possible
value of the swap bit b in Algorithm 10). We applied the Davies-Bouldin index
measure to the clustering outputs of multiple runs of the same randomized clus-
tering algorithm, each run with a different RNG seed, and selected the clustering
output with the best (i.e., smallest) index value.
6.3.3 Outlier detection and handling
According to Hawkings [85], “An outlier is an observation which deviates so much
from other observations as to arouse suspicions that it was generated by a different
mechanism.” In the HCA context, outliers can appear in the measured samples
due to, e.g., measurement errors or unknown device behavior, and have a signifi-
cant impact on clustering. Most clustering algorithms are not intrinsically robust
to outliers, so depending on how large an outlier value deviates from “normal” val-
ues, the resulting labels might be negatively influenced by the outlier. Then the
resultant clusters might be completely different, and thus wrong, from what would
be expected, leading to potentially misleading results. Hence, outlier detection is
desirable as a preprocessing step before clustering in HCA.
We implemented and tested the following outlier detection methods for HCA:
distance from mean and Tukey’s test. A simple outlier detection method, hereafter
called distance from mean, is given by considering the values that are far from the
mean as outliers, i.e., a value x is an outlier if |x − µ| ≥ βσ, for a non-negative
parameter β; µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation, respectively. We chose
β = 2.0.9 Tukey’s range test [147] is a method based on order statistics. If Q1
and Q3 are the lower and upper quartile, respectively, and IQ = Q3 − Q1 is the
interquartile, any observation outside the closed interval [Q1− k · IQ,Q3 + k · IQ]
is considered an outlier, for a non-negative parameter k. We chose k = 1.5, the
value proposed in [147].
If an outlier detector flags some samples as outliers, they must be dealt with
in some way, i.e., the outliers have to be handled. Outlier handling methods
are usually heuristic and dependent of the context where they are applied [146].
A simple outlier handling method that could be applied in the context of this
work is to simply exclude the data point from consideration. Albeit simple, the
implementation of this method is potentially inefficient in the HCA context, due
to the need of more complex data structures (e.g., dynamic lists rather than static
arrays). To keep the implementation simple and efficient, we replace outliers values
by the median of non outliers.
9Assuming that the sample values at a given index come from a normal distribution, choosing
β=2.0 implies that 95% of the values are within the interval [x− µ, x+ µ].
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Figure 6.2: figure
HCA framework.
Figure 6.3: The full key recovery process.
6.4 Horizontal Cluster Analysis Framework
The horizontal attack described in this chapter roughly follows the HCA framework
from [154], with contributed analysis methods. Figure 6.2 shows the steps in the
HCA framework. The first step is to run clustering leakage assessment (CLA).
CLA takes as input iteration traces from multiple ECSM runs and finds points in
the traces where the leakage most likely is, known as points of interest (POIs).
Next, key recovery (KR) is run, yielding an approximate scalar. Then, given the
approximate scalar, points-of-interest optimization (POI-OPT) produces a refined
list of POIs. Finally, the final KR step outputs the recovered scalar.
Figure 6.3 shows the full key recovery process in more detail, including the
inputs and outputs at each step. The inputs are a traceset to be used for leakage
assessment and the actual target traceset. The output is the correct recovered
key/scalar, if it could be found.
The “KR final” step takes as input a traceset with traces from multiple ECSM
runs and attacks the sets of segment traces of each ECSM run independently from
one another. This step is a probabilistic algorithm that consists of sequentially
running KR and error correction (Section 6.7) on each trace in the set, and recov-
ering the correct scalar for at least one of these traces, with a given probability of
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success. We call this probability the success rate of the attack.
In our HCA framework, POIs are chosen from a leakage assessment trace, be it
a CLA or t-test trace. They are selected as the time indices of the top m highest
peaks in such traces, where m is a parameter. Suitable values for m are derived
experimentally (cf. Section 6.5 and Figure 6.6).
6.4.1 Cluster Leakage Assessment (CLA)
Leakage assessment (LA) methods are used to determine whether a cryptographic
device leaks information through a side-channel and how strong such leakage is.
They are typically employed to find out the points in time (sample indices) where
the leakage is strongest, i.e., the points of interest. The sample values at those
points are used in later steps, e.g. in the key recovery phase, and they serve two
major purposes: (i) for dimensionality reduction, i.e., to use only the samples
that provide useful information and thus reduce computation time; (ii) to avoid
bringing noisy samples to the attack phase (i.e., key recovery), where they will
negatively impact the success rate and potentially turn unfeasible an otherwise
successful attack.
In the HCA and non-profiled attack contexts, leakage assessment methods
should not require knowledge of the secret key or ephemeral secret data (e.g.,
numbers randomly generated by the device). Essentially, these methods assume
that the adversary does not have control over device’s secret information. In par-
ticular, the countermeasures like SR and CRR cannot be disabled. Additionally,
it is desirable that LA methods be non-parametric and do not require leakage
models. That is because in the single-trace HCA attack context the target device
is not known a priori. Combined with the fact that real-world modern microcon-
trollers are complex devices, it means that the estimation of leakage distributions
and thus building an accurate leakage model is not trivial.
Distinguishers
Welch’s t-test is a parametric statistical test that can be employed to this end;
e.g., in methodologies like the TVLA [76]. Certain conditions have to be met
for Welch’s t-test to be used: normality of the distributions, equal variances and
independence. The Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) is a distinguisher that
does not require a leakage model. Standaert et al [175] were the first to propose the
use of MI as an statistical leakage assessment tool in the SCA context. Meynard
et al [130] applied MIA as a method to locate strong leakage in the frequency
domain and, consequently, to find the frequency bands in EM traces where the
differences between modular squares and multiplications are highest, from a device
running RSA modular exponentiation. Mather et al [127] compared the statistical
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power of t-test and the discrete and continuous versions of MIA for detecting
leakage in multiple leakage models. Following [154], we provide results for three
different methods for leakage detection: sum-of-squared differences (SOSD), sum-
of-squared t-values (SOST) and MIA. Details about these techniques are described
below.
Let us consider the n-th trace represented as a set of samples. We apply a
clustering algorithm to each set of samples {tni:l0+l1,j} at a fixed sampling time
j. The clustering returns two centers c0,j and c1,j and two groups of clustered
samples {g0,j} and {g1,j} containing p0,j and p1,j elements, respectively.
For every trace tn, we have a set of parameters cn0,j , cn1,j , {gn0,j}, {gn1,j}, pn0,j and
pn1,j (j ∈ {1, .., `}) that can be used for the leakage assessment. We provide results
for four different techniques: sum-of-squared differences (SOSD), sum-of-squared
t-values (SOST) and mutual information analysis (MIA).
The equations for SOSD and SOST are given by:
ςj = 1N
∑N
n=1 |cn0,j − cn1,j |2 (SOSD) (6.3)
τj = 1N
∑N
n=1
((
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(SOST) (6.4)
Considering σ2(n)j as the variance for the sample set {g0,j(n)} ∪ {g1,j(n)}, and
% = pn0,j/(pn0,j + pn1,j), the mutual information value υj at each sample index j is
computed by:
υj =
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n=1
log
√
1
pn0,j + pn1,j − 1
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+
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1
(pn1−k,j)− 1
σ
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CLA
The LA method proposed in [154] shows how multiple traces can be combined
utilizing clustering, an unsupervised learning method, and demonstrate it through
an attack on a RSA software implementation. That method, hereafter called
clustering-based leakage assessment (CLA), in principle works even if the device
applies any combination of the classic countermeasures for modular exponentia-
tion, i.e., exponent blinding, message or modulus randomization. Additionally, we
implemented a supervised LA method in our framework, so called HCA-KKA, to
be able to compare the unsupervised method results to the supervised ones. The
method is decribed below.
HCA-KKA
A known-key analysis (KKA) aims at finding the most leaking POIs given the
knowledge of the key. In essence it consists of running the clustering algorithm at
each sample index to recover the scalar bit and comparing whether the guessed
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Figure 6.4: Known-key analysis (KKA) process.
bit value is equals the known key bit. The output is a trace with the success rate
of these guesses, which is indicates the strength of the leakage. Such an analysis
is used only for illustrative purposes, we remark that our attacks are completely
unsupervised. The procedure described above results is a trace of the strength of
key-dependent leakage for all sample points (Figure 6.4).
6.4.2 Key Recovery (HCA-KR)
The key recovery methods implemented in this work can be classified into two
classes, based on the way clustering is applied: single or multi-dimensional. In
either case, the number of clusters output by a clustering algorithm is two, one
cluster for each possible key bit value.
Single-dimensional clustering method
In the first group, we run clustering on the set of samples at a given single time
index (POI), across multiple trace segments. This is the approach used by [154].
After running the clustering for every time index, a set of recovered key candidates
is obtained, which are then combined to decide the final key candidate. The
following combination methods are used for this purpose: majority rule (MJ) and
log-likelihood (LL). We refer the reader to [154] for more details.
Multi-dimensional clustering method
In the second group, clustering is run on multiple attributes or dimensions, i.e.,
the clustering algorithm is run on all samples, at all points of a set of time indices
(POIs), at the same time.
On one hand, the multi-dimensional method has two main advantages over the
single-dimensional. First, the combination step is not required. And second, it
is capable of exploiting higher order leakage, while the first method exploits only
leakage of first order. On the other hand, we verified experimentally that key
recovery based on multi-dimensional clustering is more sensitive to noisy samples,
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because a very noisy sample at a given POI can directly negatively influence the
value of the output key candidate. Note that for the first group of attacks the
noisy sample effect is contained, i.e., only the key candidate at that POI is affected.
Therefore, outlier detection and handling are mandatory in the multi-dimensional
method to achieve satisfactory results.
First key-recovery step (“KR for CLA” in Figure 6.2). After points of interest
have been found by CLA, key recovery is run on the “LA traceset” using the POIs
from the CLA trace. The outcome is a list of recovered candidate keys for those
traces (“LA traceset w/ recv.bits”).
POI optimization step (POI-OPT in Figure 6.2). The “LA traceset w/ recv.bits”
is used as input for the points of interest selection optimization step. This step
refines the POIs found from CLA by applying a t-test with two groups, the first
group containing the traces whose corresponding candidate key bit is zero and the
second group corresponds to the traces where the candidate key bit is one. The
points with the largest t-statistics are considered the refined POIs.
Final key recovery step (“KR final” in Figure 6.2). Finally, given the refined
list of POIs (i.e., the peaks on “t-test trace”), key recovery is applied sequentially
to each trace in the target traceset. For each trace, the key recovery outputs a
(possibly incorrect) key/scalar, over which the probabilistic key error correction
algorithm in Section 6.7 is applied. If the correct scalar is found, it is returned
and the full key recovery process stops. Otherwise, the key recovery is applied to
the next trace in the target traceset and the process is repeated.10
6.5 Attack Results
We acquired 300 full Curve25519 ECSM traces for the cswap-arith, and the same
number of traces for the cswap-pointer. The traces were preprocessed, resulting
in two tracesets of 76,500 ECSM iteration traces each, that are used in all experi-
ments described in this section. Each iteration trace used for the analysis contains
8,000 8-bit samples for cswap-arith. For cswap-pointer, as the time interval where
leakage happens is narrower (cf. Section 6.2.1), we trimmed the traces to 1,000
samples for efficiency.11
In the evaluation experiments, the recovered scalars are the output of the last
10We note that the steps POI-OPT and key recovery can be repeated. Due to the high increase
in computational time required to run them more than once, as well as the fact that the results
using a single iteration were already feasible for a successful attack, we chose not to further
investigate whether that could improve the results.
11We knew where and by how much to trim because we knew from the source code and binary
the approximate location of the cswap in the iteration traces.
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KR step, but before error correction. The reported success rates are, unless oth-
erwise noted, the maximum success rates, i.e., if the success rate or percentage
of correctly recovered bits for the target traces is SR1, . . . , SRnt (where nt is
the number of traces in the target traceset), then the reported success rate is
max{SR1, . . . , SRnt}. We use the maximum success rates because, as explained
in Section 6.4, our full HCA key recovery attack framework is probabilistic and
recovers the correct scalar for at least one of the target traces with a given prob-
ability of success, the success rate of the attack. By taking the max success rate
(SR∗) in an attack evaluation experiment as the success rate, we guarantee (except
with a negligible chance) that if the full key recovery attack with error correction
is applied to a set of target traces, the recovered key for at least one of them will
have a ratio of at least SR∗ of correctly recovered bits. Therefore, the errors can
be successfully corrected by the error correction algorithm in Section 6.7.
6.5.1 Initial attack evaluation experiment
To evaluate the effect of different distinguishers for CLA and statistical combina-
tors for HCA-KR, we fixed the clustering algorithm (KM, FKM or EM) and ran
a full key recovery attack varying the value of such parameters. The evaluation
results are shown in Table 6.1.12
In this experiment we used: 100 traces for CLA; 100 traces and 20 POIs
for “KR for CLA” and “KR final”. We experimented with different numbers of
traces for these operations, but from those we tried, 100 was the minimum number
of traces that resulted in good enough attack success rates; we did not see any
improvement when more traces were used. POI-OPT is enabled. We used Tukey
test and replace by median as outlier detection and handling methods, respectively.
Intrinsic clustering quality evaluation is disabled.
According to Table 6.1, the cswap-pointer implementation has a very strong
leakage dependent on the cswap bit, in two cases reaching a success rate of 100%,
i.e., all scalar bits were correctly recovered. Despite having obtained 100% success
rate for two combinations of algorithms KM/SOST/MD and FKM/SOST/MD for
the cswap-pointer implementation, similar success rate results for such combina-
tions of algorithms on the cswap-arith implementation do not hold. In fact they
were very low for that implementation, with success rates below 60%.
The results obtained in Table 6.1 do not indicate a single combination of param-
eters where the success rates are high enough (≥ 97%) for both implementations
simultaneously, so as to enable a successful recovery of the correct scalar in feasible
time even when error correction (Section 6.7) is applied.
Besides, in a practical non-profiled or single-trace attack scenario, where the
attacker do not know details about the implementation targeted, she should fix/-
12MJ, LL and MD stand for majority rule, log-likelihood and multi-dimensional, respectively.
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Table 6.1: Key recovery max success rate (%) for cswap-arith and cswap-pointer, for all
combinations of CLA distinguishers (SOSD, MIA and SOST) and HCA sta-
tistical combination methods. The best results for each combination method
are highlighted.
cswap-arith cswap-pointer
MJ LL MD MJ LL MD
KM
SOSD 92.15 94.11 58.03 97.25 60.78 96.47
MIA 60.78 57.64 58.82 96.47 95.68 57.25
SOST 94.11 92.15 57.64 99.60 96.07 100.00
FKM
SOSD 87.84 57.25 58.43 57.64 58.82 98.82
MIA 60.78 84.31 59.60 99.60 99.21 56.86
SOST 67.45 59.21 58.03 59.60 98.82 100.00
EM
SOSD 60.00 61.56 60.39 97.64 57.64 57.64
MIA 60.39 68.23 60.39 99.21 95.29 99.60
SOST 64.31 61.96 57.64 97.64 95.29 57.64
choose beforehand the values of all parameters for the full key recovery13 and run
“KR final” for every trace in the target traceset. The motive is the long computa-
tion time required to run a full key recovery, where the most expensive step, error
correction, can take hours to complete on a common desktop machine.
6.6 Evaluation of the Attack Parameters
For the aforementioned reasons, we test our attack with more combinations of
parameters values. The values of those parameters that gave the best results are
presented in the next Section 6.6.1.
We compute the average of the success rates in Table 6.1 grouped by pa-
rameters clustering algorithm, CLA distinguisher or HCA statistical combinator
(Table 6.2). KM, SOST and MJ give the best results, on average. Thus in the
next experiments we fix those parameters to these values and explore the effect of
other parameters 14.
Points of interest optimization is an essential step in the key recovery process
(Figure 6.3), without which the leakage assessment trace (CLA trace) is usually
not accurate enough for the KR final step to produce a successful key recovery.
For example, the HCA-KR success rates for the attack with KM+SOST+MJ with
13Among them: number of traces for CLA, “KR for CLA” and “KR final” steps, clustering
algorithms, distinguishers and statistical combination methods.
14In this section, the values of the parameters used in an experiment are the best ones (i.e.,
they resulted in the biggest success rate) found in the previous experiment, excluding those
parameters that are being evaluated in the experiment in question.
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Table 6.2: Averages of the HCA-KR success rates (%) in Table 6.1 grouped by param-
eter.
(a) Clustering algorithm.
KM FKM EM
81.39 73.46 72.91
(b) CLA distinguisher.
SOSD MIA SOST
72.91 76.12 78.73
(c) Combination method.
MJ LL MD
80.69 77.45 69.63
POI-OPT are 94.11% and 99.60%, while without POI-OPT the results drop to
60.39% and 58.82%, resp. for cswap-arith and cswap-pointer.
The effect of number of traces used for leakage assessment (the CLA step) in
the success rate is shown in Table 6.3, for a few different values of this parameter
and for both implementations. As can be seen, the difference in the success rate
is small among them, and 100 traces for CLA gives the best result.
Table 6.3: Effect of the number of traces on CLA using max success rate (%).
50 100 200 300
arith 92.34 94.11 93.04 92.78
pointer 98.27 99.60 98.83 96.25
We evaluated the attack without outlier detection and with the methods dis-
tance from mean and Tukey test applied. When outlier detection is applied, we
replace the outliers values by the median of the other data points. Table 6.4 shows
the average success rate against the cswap-arith implementation. We can see that,
on average, outlier detection slightly improves success rate.
Table 6.4: Effect of outlier detection and handling for cswap-arith using average success
rate (%).
Replaced by median
No outlier detector 72.34
Distance from mean 73.80
Tukey test 72.86
The number of points of interest selected from the CLA trace determines the
amount of signal (secret-dependent leakage) and noise that will be used in the 1st
HCA-KR step (i.e., the first step in POI-OPT) and the 2nd/final HCA-KR step.15
Table 6.5 shows the results of our evaluation on how these parameters affect the
attack success rate for the cswap-arith traceset. As can be seen, the success rate
plummets from above 80% to 60% if fewer than 10, or more than 20, POIs for
the 1st HCA-KR step are used, with a peak of 96.07% for 20 POIs. For the 2nd
HCA-KR step, the best results were obtained with 100 POIs.
15I.e., how many POIs to use from the POI-OPT t-test trace to use in the attack phase.
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Table 6.5: Effect of the number of POIs used in the first and second HCA-KR step.
Results are listed for cswap-arith using max success rate (%).
num. POIs on 1st/2nd step 20 50 100 200 300
5 63.13 59.60 57.25 56.89 56.86
10 91.76 93.72 93.72 89.80 87.45
20 94.11 95.29 96.07 89.01 84.31
50 60.39 59.60 60.39 60.78 60.78
100 61.56 62.35 61.56 61.96 60.39
Table 6.6 shows the effect of the number of iterations for the Davies-Bouldin
clustering intrinsic quality evaluation, when applied only in the CLA step for the
cswap-arith traceset. The success rate improves slightly if two iterations are used,
but then starts to drop afterwards, reaching 90.19% for 10 iterations.
Table 6.6: Effect of the number of iterations of Davies-Bouldin clustering intrinsic qual-
ity evaluation applied in the CLA step. Results are listed for cswap-arith
using max success rate (%).
Num. of iterations 1 2 5 10
Max success rate (%) 96.07 97.64 95.68 90.19
6.6.1 Final results
Figure 6.5 illustrates, for cswap-arith, the approximated side-channel leakage as-
sessed right after the CLA and POI-OPT steps when compared with a known-key
analysis (KKA) trace (see Section 6.4.1 for details). The leakage assessment trace
after POI-OPT shows peaks that match or are very close to those in the KKA
trace.
Figure 6.6 shows the success rate evolution as the number of POIs used by the
final HCA-KR step increases, for both cswap implementations. For both imple-
mentations, the number of traces used are 100 for CLA is 100, “KR for CLA” and
“KR final”, the same as in the other experiments. For cswap-arith, the success
rate is 97.64% for 100 POIs. The success rate for cswap-pointer is above 90% if the
number POIs used is in [7, 38]. In particular, it is 99.60% for 38 POIs. Thus, for
cswap-pointer a small number of POIs is sufficient to achieve a very high success
rate. The curves in Figure 6.6 have quite different shapes. The cswap-pointer
curve shape means that leaks in narrow time intervals, so it is sensitive to the
number of POIs used. In this case, using a lot of POIs means adding noise to the
analysis, which decreases the success rate. On the contrary, the cswap-arith curve
means that it leaks on a wider time interval, so more POIs can be added without
dramatically affecting success rate.
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Figure 6.5: Leakage assessment for cswap-arith (top-bottom): KKA, CLA, and POI-
OPT.
Figure 6.6: Success rate versus number of POIs for cswap-arith and cswap-pointer.
Considering these success rate values and taking into account the fact that only
251 bits out of the 255 bits of the scalar are unknown (the first bit is always 1 and
the last three are fixed to 1002), there are at most 6 and 2 errors in the recovered
scalar for cswap-arith and cswap-pointer, respectively.
6.7 Error Correction
Due to noise and other aspects interfering with the side-channel analysis (mis-
alignment for example), the scalar derived by the attack contains errors. A naive
brute-force would check all possibilities of 6 and 2 errors in the 251 bits, for each
of the 100 recovered scalars. This totals to 100 · (2516 ) ≈ 244.9 operations for
cswap-arith and 100 · (2512 ) ≈ 221.6 for cswap-pointer. As we can see, the required
computation effort is quite feasible, especially for the cswap-pointer case.
Note that confidence probabilities coming from clustering can be used to detect
errors, as shown in [88,154,156]. We applied the approach from [154], but unfortu-
nately this method occured unreliable: some errors occured with high confidence
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probabilities. We suspect that it was caused by strong noise pulses present in our
traces. Therefore, we concentrate on improving the naive brute-force.
Efficient error correction based on precomputations
The above naive brute-force can be further by using a modified algorithm from [141].
In [141] the authors use template attack confidence scores to detect errors. Unfor-
tunately, as mentioned above, we cannot use confidence probabilities and therefore,
we need to modify the approach in [141], as described below.
First let us assume that the number of errors is at maximum 6 (like for cswap-
arith). Now let us divide the scalar in half and assume the errors locations are
uniformly distributed across it. Let us denote R = [k]P , where R is the resulting
point, k the scalar to be recovered, and P is the input point. Then, clearly
R = [k]P = [a · 2|k|/2 + b]P = [a]([2|k|/2]P ) + [b]P , where a is the most significant
half of k and b is the least significant one16. If we denote [2|k|/2]P by H, then the
above equation reduces to R− [b]P = [a]H.
Consider all different possible guesses for a assuming that there are at most
4 errors in a: that is
(|k|/2
4
)
guesses. Following [141], for each guess, we compute
[a]H and store all pairs (a, [a]H). We then sort all pairs based on the value of [a]H
and store them in an ordered table. We make a guess for b assuming it contains
at most 4 errors (again
(|k|/2
4
)
guesses) and compute z = R − [b]P . If our guess
for b is correct, then z is present in the second column of some row in the table –
the first column is the corresponding a. If z is present then we have determined
the scalar. Otherwise, we make a new, different guess for b and continue. The
complexity of this attack totals to
(126
4
) · 2 · 100 ≈ 231 operations, because there
are 251 unknown bits. The required memory is
(126
4
) · 100 ≈ 230 points.
Above we assumed that the errors are uniformly distributed. Now we show
how to drop this assumption. We create a in the following way: we randomly
choose a set A of indices in k such that |A| = |k|/2 and we set the corresponding
bits to zero. Then we create b by setting the remaining indices of the original k to
zero (the set of indices is denoted as B). Now R = [a]P + [b]P holds and if we set
H = P then R − [b]P = [a]H. The attack can be performed as before assuming
that when we guess a and b, we limit the indices to A and B, respectively.
We now compute the probability that the attack from Section 6.7 works cor-
rectly, namely, that the 6 errors are corrected. Without loss of generality let us
first assume that positions of the 6 errors position are fixed, because the partition
to a and b is random. Therefore, the following situations are possible:
• all errors are in a or in b: 2 possibilities;
• one error is in a or b: 12 possibilities;
16|k| denotes the length of the base 2 representation of the scalar k.
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• two errors are in a or b: 30 possibilities;
• three errors are in both a and b: 20 possibilities.
In the first two cases the numbers of errors in a is 0, 1, 5, or 6. Therefore, the
probability that out of 6 errors, 2, 3, or 4 of them are not in a equals:
1 + 6 + 6 + 1
2 + 12 + 30 + 20 =
14
64 .
Let us estimate the probability that the attack works. The probability that
out of 6 errors, 2, 3, or 4 of them are not in a equals: 14/64. Thus, to minimize the
error to approximately e.g., 0.0005, it is enough to repeat the algorithm 5 times.
Then the overall complexity of the attack would be 236.
6.8 Countermeasures and Future Work
In this chapter we described horizontal clustering attacks against two Curve25519
Montgomery Ladder ECSM implementations from the µNaCl library. We also
showed how to extend the RSA horizontal clustering framework from [154]. Fur-
thermore, we generalized the method from [141] to tolerate a certain number of
incorrectly recovered scalar bits without relying on normal exhaustive search.
Now we briefly discuss possible countermeasures against our attack. First let
us recall that the following countermeasures do not work against our attack: point
re-randomization, scalar blinding and splitting.
The countermeasure of [145] splits scalar into two parts and to randomly in-
terleave two scalar multiplications. We believe that our attack might still be
mounted if four clusters are used to recognize which bit is processed and during
which ECSM. The idea behind the memory-address countermeasure [96] is to store
sensitive variables at addresses that share the same Hamming weight. Although
this would decrease the effectiveness of the attack, the addresses leakage may still
be identified by clustering. This countermeasure can be improved by randomizing
not only the addresses but also the memory accesses [97–99].
The countermeasure of [89] protects against localized EM template attacks on
Montgomery ladder ECSM by randomly swapping the ladder registers at the end
of a ladder iteration. This countermeasure is uniform in its operation sequence
what makes our attack infeasible in principle. In addition, several randomization-
based protection techniques for the Montgomery ladder are presented in [119].
Similar to [89], these techniques generate operation sequences independent from
the scalar and thus, our attack might be ineffective against them.
We consider evaluating and improving our attacks with respect to the two
latter countermeasures as future work. We also regard attacking other ECC im-
plementations improving our attacks with PCA as future developments.
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Finally, we consider an investigation on how varying noise levels affect a hori-
zontal clustering attack as a practical future work.
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Chapter 7
Leakage Detection in
Evaluations
In this chapter we apply leakage detection methods to two novel implementations
of cryptosystems: ECC and AES.
First we present an implementation of the recent complete addition formulae
for prime order elliptic curves of Renes, Costello and Batina [163] on an FPGA
platform. We implement three different versions: an unprotected architecture,
an architecture protected through coordinate randomization and an architecture
with both coordinate randomization and scalar splitting in place. Subsequently,
we evaluate the side-channel resistance through timing analysis and test vector
leakage assessment (TVLA). The results show that applying an increasing level
of countermeasures leads to an increasing resistance against side-channel attacks.
This is the first work looking into side-channel security issues of hardware imple-
mentations of the complete formulae.
Second we introduce a novel AES structure capable of improving the robustness
against power analysis attacks while allowing for a very compact structure with a
potentially negligible area and performance impact. The proposed design is based
on a low entropy masking scheme, where half of the time the true value and half of
the time the complemented value are used to mask the power consumption varia-
tion. Subsequently, we evaluate the side-channel resistance of the implementation
through TVLA and classical correlation power analysis (CPA). The evaluation
shows that the proposed design significantly improves the side-channel resistance
in comparison to an unprotected AES.
The first part of the chapter is based on “Completing the Complete ECC
Formulae with Countermeasures” [48] that has been published in “’Journal of Low
Power Electronics and Applications” in 2017. The second part is based on “SCA-
121
Chapter 7. Leakage Detection in Evaluations
Resistance for AES: How Cheap Can We Go?” [41] that has been presented at the
10th International Conference on Cryptology (AFRICACRYPT 2018).
7.1 Evaluating complete ECC formulae with
countermeasures
Constrained public-key cryptography is usually based on Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy (ECC) [114,131] because of the relatively low resource and power consumption
requirements. Since in the Internet of things scenario, potential attackers are able
to be in the vicinity of the embedded devices, SCA attacks become a realistic
threat. The first step in making an implementation side-channel resistant is to
protect it against Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks [116]. This can be done
by making the execution time and the instantaneous power consumption of the
operations independent of the processed data and executed instructions. In the
case of ECC, this strategy should be applied e.g. to the point multiplication al-
gorithm, the point addition and point doubling algorithms and the operations in
the underlying finite field. More powerful than SPA are side-channel attacks that
use statistics to process many measurements and exploit the correlation between
(secret) data and physical leakages. This kind of side-channel attacks are usu-
ally referred to as Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [116]. An effective way of
protecting ECC implementations against DPA attacks at the algorithmic level, is
to apply randomization countermeasures. Examples are scalar blinding and point
blinding, that randomize the point representation and the key bits evaluation [53].
As the point operations are different in principle, there exist different formulae
to compute an addition of two different points or a doubling of one point. This
has led to insecure implementations as the two operations feature different power
consumption patterns. Recently, there have been efforts to use a single set of
formulae to compute both, point addition and doubling [25]. Although this slows
down the implementation, it is an important first step in making the implemen-
tation side-channel resistant. The formulae derived in [25] are only applicable to
a special type of curves, i.e. so-called Edwards curves. Nevertheless, the idea
has enabled the balancing of point operations in an intrinsic manner, i.e. without
adding dummy operations [16].
In this section, we evaluate the power analysis resistance of a completely bal-
anced ECC implementation, based on recent advances in the development of com-
plete addition formulae for all prime order Weierstrass curves by Renes et al [163].
In a second step, we protect the implementation using point randomization tech-
niques and in a third step, we use random scalar splitting. The architecture is
implemented on a SAKURA-GII board containing a Spartan-6 FPGA. This is the
first work that addresses the side-channel security of unprotected and protected
122
7.1. Evaluating complete ECC formulae with
countermeasures
hardware implementations of the complete formulas by Renes et al.
This section is structured as follows. In Subsection 7.1.1, we give background
information on the three implementation versions and the type of power analysis
attacks we perform. Subsection 7.1.2 gives an overview of related work on pro-
tected ECC implementations. In Subsection 7.1.3, the experimental setup is de-
scribed. The side-channel analysis is presented in Subsection 7.1.4. Subsequently,
Subsection 7.1.5 presents and discusses the measurement results.
7.1.1 Background information
Here we give some relevant background information on elliptic curves over a prime
field and we recall the complete formulas of Renes et al. [163]. In addition, we
discuss some issues in side-channel analysis that are ECC-specific.
Formulas
Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p, i. e. q = pn for some n, and assume that
p 6= 2, 3. Typically, the curves used in security applications are defined over Fp,
so for n = 1, but the formulas for the elliptic curve addition/doubling work for
any n. For arbitrary a, b ∈ Fq, an elliptic curve E over Fq is defined as the set
of solutions (x, y) to the curve equation E : y2 = x3 + ax + b with an additional
point O, called the point at infinity. Those points (x, y) form a group, with O as
its identity element. One has to make sure that a and b are chosen to meet the
security requirements as defined by ECC standards.
Elliptic curve cryptography [114, 131] relies on the difficulty of the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). This means that given two points
P,Q on an elliptic curve, it is hard to find a scalar k ∈ Z such that Q = kP ,
if it exists. Therefore, the main component of curve based cryptosystems is the
scalar multiplication operation (k, P ) 7→ kP . Namely, all ECC protocols are typ-
ically based on a few scalar multiplications, i.e. the computations of kP where
k is a scalar and P is a known point. The computation of kP is performed via
repeated point additions (P +Q) and doublings (P +P=2P). Both operations can
be performed by the use of the same sequence of instructions [163] that consist
of several finite field operations, i.e. modular multiplications, additions and in-
versions. The exact counts of field operations depend on the choice of curves and
coordinates, see [26]. Modular multiplications are much more expensive than ad-
ditions in terms of time, area and memory, but the most expensive are inversions.
One way to avoid inversions is to work with projective coordinates. In this case,
we choose a different point representation, i.e. we represent points with projective
coordinates.
123
Chapter 7. Leakage Detection in Evaluations
An equivalence relation ∼ on F3q is defined by letting (x0, x1, x2) ∼ (y0, y1, y2)
if and only if there exists λ ∈ F∗q such that (x0, x1, x2) = (λy0, λy1, λy2).
Then the projective plane over Fq, denoted P2(Fq), is defined by F3q \ {(0, 0, 0)}
modulo the equivalence relation ∼. We write (x0 : x1 : x2) to emphasize that the
tuple belongs to P2(Fq) as opposed to F3q. Now we can define E(Fq) to be the set of
solutions (X : Y : Z) ∈ P2(Fq) to the curve equation E : Y 2 = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3.
Note that we can easily map between the two representations by (x, y) 7→ (x : y :
1), O 7→ (0 : 1 : 0), and (X : Y : Z) 7→ (X/Z, Y/Z) (for Z 6= 0), (0 : 1 : 0) 7→ O.
Using projective coordinates there are no inversions but the number of modular
multiplications increases, which makes the design of a hardware multiplier crucial
for efficient implementations. The work of Renes et al. [163] presents addition
formulas (to realize the group law) for curves in short Weierstrass form embedded
in the projective plane. They compute the sum of two points P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
and Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z2) as P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3), where
X3 = (X1Y2 +X2Y1)(Y1Y2 − a(X1Z2 +X2Z1)− 3bZ1Z2)−
(Y1Z2 + Y2Z1)(aX1X2 + 3b(X1Z2 +X2Z1)− a2Z1Z2),
Y3 = (3X1X2 + aZ1Z2)(aX1X2 + 3b(X1Z2 +X2Z1)− a2Z1Z2)+
(Y1Y2 + a(X1Z2 +X2Z1) + 3bZ1Z2)(Y1Y2 − a(X1Z2 +X2Z1)− 3bZ1Z2),
Z3 = (Y1Z2 + Y2Z1)(Y1Y2 + a(X1Z2 +X2Z1) + 3bZ1Z2)+
(X1Y2 +X2Y1)(3X1X2 + aZ1Z2). (7.1)
Side-channel analysis and countermeasures
In many ECC applications that compute kP , k is a secret key. This implies that
this operation has to be protected against all attacks. In particular many side-
channel attacks [13,116] and countermeasures [53] have been proposed. To ensure
protection against SPA attacks it is important to use regular scalar multiplication
algorithms, e. g. Montgomery ladder [109] or Double-And-Add-Always [53], execut-
ing both an addition and a doubling operation per scalar bit. On the other hand,
the regularity is also important for the group operation, so addition and doubling
should preferably be executed via an identical sequence of field operations. This
suggests a clear preference for the complete formulas. Our first implementation is
based on these formulas.
Countermeasures. In order to protect the implementation against DPA at-
tacks, we use projective coordinate randomization in our second implementation.
This countermeasure exploits the fact that the Z-coordinate can be chosen ran-
domly [53]. This comes down to choosing a different Z-coordinate for each point
multiplication during the conversion of the input point P to projective coordinates.
124
7.1. Evaluating complete ECC formulae with
countermeasures
In a third implementation, we implement further protection mechanisms against
DPA attacks by adding randomized scalar splitting. In this countermeasure, the
scalar multiplication kP is randomly split into two scalar multiplications, namely
rP and (k − r)P , with r a random number.
Test Vector Leakage Assessment Methodology. We evaluate the SPA and
DPA leakage of our hardware architecture by running the test vector leakage as-
sessment methodology (TVLA) [76, 100, 179]; we follow and extend the TVLA
approach for ECC from [142]. TVLA is a testing methodology for side-channel
resistance validation that is based on the following rationale: side-channel attacks
such as SPA and DPA exploit the presence of information about any sensitive
intermediates within the traces collected from a device. The approach uses sta-
tistical hypothesis testing to detect if one of a number of sensitive intermediates
significantly influences the measurement data.
TVLA consists of two phases. The measurement phase is based on the collec-
tion of side-channel traces when standardized test vectors are provided as input
to the algorithm being tested, and establishes requirements for power measure-
ment equipment and setup, data collection, signal alignment and pre-processing.
The analysis phase is based on Welch’s t-test, which can detect different types
of leakages and allows the analyst to identify points in time that deserve further
investigation.
The TVLA methodology has so far been applied to AES [76], RSA [100, 179],
and ECC [142, 179]. Subsequently, research has been performed on how to set
a threshold for the Welch’s t-test used in TVLA in [60] and [153]. We use the
approach from [153] in this chapter.
7.1.2 Related work
ECC hardware implementations
There are numerous works published on hardware implementations of ECC focus-
ing on various platforms, fields, curves and bases. Even if we narrow our choice to
elliptic curves over prime fields only, there are numerous papers in the literature
that could be mentioned. To avoid being exhaustive on the topic, we focus on more
recent hardware implementations of ECC over prime fields. For those interested
more generally in the topic, a recent survey is done by Marzouqi et al. [126].
Hardware implementations allow for different trade-offs of resources (in terms
of silicon area, configurable look-up tables, embedded mathematical and memory
blocks), operational speed (in terms of latency or throughput) and power or en-
ergy consumption. In this work, we concentrate on a low-resource implementation.
Some publications that also use the same approach are by Roy et al. [166], Pöpper
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et al. [158] and Vliegen et al. [180], where the last one is the basis of this work. All
these implementations use the same approach of having a very small datapath on
which the algorithmic operations are executed in a sequential way. Because of the
very restricted amount of resources, the number of cycles can increase quadrati-
cally in time for certain multiplication algorithms. Since all ECC operations are
constructed on top of field arithmetic, the latency of an ECC point multiplication
easily grows. To compensate this loss in time, resource-constrained architectures
are usually carefully optimized to try to do all operations in the least amount of
cycles. For example, Roy et al. [166] optimize the reduction for NIST curves, while
Vliegen et al. [180] optimize for Montgomery multiplication.
On the other side of the spectrum, there is the work of Alrimeih and Rakhma-
tov [2] and Guillermin [78], which focus on a higher speed by utilizing a large
amount of resources. This trade-off between area and time resources, can only be
optimized with an application scenario in mind. Some applications, like servers,
will need high throughput, while entrance authorization and vehicle communica-
tion need low latency. In IoT use cases, very cheap and low power devices are
required.
A different field arithmetic implementation is presented by Guillermin [78] and
Esmaeildoust et al. [70], based on the Residue-Number-System (RNS). Usually
implementations represent the values in one basis, thus requiring a multiplier of
the same size of the basis or iterating several steps in a smaller multiplier. RNS-
based implementations work with different small bases. Therefore, one can split
the one multiplication into several smaller and faster multiplications and combine
all results afterwards. Because of working in a parallel way, RNS implementations
require a lot of resources, but also have very good timing results.
Research based on different types of curves is performed by Sasdrich and
Güneysu [167], Baldwin et al. [10] and Järvinen et al. [102]. These implemen-
tations are not based on standard Weierstrass curves, but on curves with more
efficient and faster arithmetic. Unfortunately, some applications do not allow the
use of those new curves. Nevertheless, given the high efficiency, this scenario is
expected to change.
In terms of adding side-channel protection, there is the work of Ghosh et al. [75]
and Pöpper et al. [158]. These solutions add both simple and differential power
analysis protection. They show that even though most ECC implementations
tend to focus on scalar multiplication only, side-channel protection needs to be
evaluated on a higher level for real-life applications.
7.1.3 Experimental setup
This section first elaborates on the hardware architecture which is calculating the
point operations. Subsequently, the setup to perform the actual measurements is
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discussed.
Hardware architecture
The hardware architecture is a standalone 32-bit elliptic curve processor as pre-
sented in [180]. A block diagram of this processor is depicted in Fig. 7.1 and
consists of the typical components: an instruction memory, a data memory, a
modular arithmetic and logic unit (ALU), and a control unit. The curve on which
the processor operates is configurable trough the initialization of the data memory
and is set to the NIST standardized P-256 curve.
instruction
memory
data
memory
control unit
ALU
Figure 7.1: Block diagram of the elliptic curve processor
The ALU has two internal operations: a modular addition/subtraction (MAS),
and a Montgomery multiplier (MM) that executes A×B×R−1. The architectures
of the MAS and MM are shown in Fig. 7.2. A conversion to Montgomery form
(and back) is required: A = a × R, with A the Montgomery form of a. As
originally publish by Montgomery [132], the Montgomery multiplication requires
a final subtraction. This can be avoided at the cost of an additional word in the
datapath, as presented by Walter in [181]. Therefore the data memory has a width
of 256 + w bits, which, for a 32-bit processor, rounds up to a width of 288 bits.
Both the instruction and the data memory use the internal Block RAM (BRAM)
of the FPGA. They are initialized with the configuration of the FPGA. The pro-
cessor first initializes all internal registers in the control unit with values from the
data memory. Then it starts the execution of the core operations which are:
1. conversion of the coordinates of the point to Montgomery form and to ho-
mogeneous coordinates: P (x, y)→ Q(QX,QY,QZ);
2. initialization of S: 2Q→ S(SX,SY, SZ);
3. execution of the Montgomery ladder [133], performing a scalar multiplication
of a hard coded scalar with P ;
4. calculation of the modular inverse of QZ−1;
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Figure 7.2: The architectures of the MAS (left) and MM (right) operations
5. conversion of Q back to affine coordinates and undoing the Montgomery form
Q(QX,QY,QZ)→ scalarP (x, y).
The modular inverse is calculated by using Fermat’s little theorem, which
states: mp ≡ m mod p when gcd(m, p) = 1. Because p is a prime number
the latter condition is met. The modular inverse can hence be computed with
m−1 ≡ mp−2 mod p. This exponentiation is achieved by a square-and-multiply
operation, using the modular multiplication unit in the ALU.
The ECP component is wrapped into a top-level component that provides an
interface for the measurement setup, see the subsection below. Table 7.1 summa-
rizes the required resources on a Xilinx Spartan-6 LX75 FPGA. This table reports
both the occupied resources for the standalone ECP and for the wrapped ECP.
Table 7.1: The FPGA resource usage of the experimental setup
FPGA resource ECP only full
Number of slice registers 2274 2892
Number of slice LUTs 2421 2752
Number of RAMB16 9 9
Number of DSP48A1 7 7
Adding countermeasures to the ECP component does not have an impact on
the resource occupation, because these modifications only touch the content of the
instruction memory in BRAM. The reported number of 9 BRAMs in Table 7.1
breaks down into 8 BRAMs for the data memory and 1 BRAM for the instruction
memory. For all versions of the ECP, the instructions fit into 1 BRAM.
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Measurement setup
The power measurement setup, shown in Figure 7.3, consists of a oscilloscope, an
FPGA board and a commodity PC. The devices are arranged in such a way that
the PC can coordinate and store all power measurements/traces.
Oscilloscope
FPGA
PC
IP / Ethernet
USB
Trigger Power
Figure 7.3: The measurement setup
The oscilloscope in our experiment is the Teledyne Lecroy Waverunner 610Zi.
It was configured with 108 samples/s and at most 32×106 samples. This is enough
in terms of sample rate and sample size, since the cryptographic core is running
at 6 MHz and takes about 300 ms to complete one point multiplication. Also,
the oscilloscope has TCP/IP support for both controlling and downloading the
measurements, which helps to automatize the entire process.
The FPGA board in Figure 7.3 is the SAKURA-GII board [80]. The board
has 2 FPGAs, one USB/serial controller and 2 separate power regulators. For
our setup, one FPGA was configured to act as an interface [80] between the serial
inputs and the other FPGA that contains the ECC core. Although the ECC
core can handle a larger clock frequency, we let it operate at 6 MHz clock, given
the 48 MHz frequency of the USB/serial communication. The separation of the
two FPGAs, with different power regulators, lowers the amount of noise in the
measurements introduced by the USB communication.
The traces were acquired with the following procedure. First, the PC configures
the oscilloscope in terms of the number of channels, the trigger event and the num-
ber of samples. Then, the elliptic curve parameters are sent via USB to the FPGA
board SAKURA-GII. After verifying the correct reception of the parameters, the
PC signalizes the FPGA to start. When the FPGA receives the start signal, it
automatically sends a trigger signal to the oscilloscope. After finishing both the
power acquisition and the FPGA computation, the PC verifies if the computed
value matches the correct output and downloads the power measurements from
the oscilloscope. This entire process is repeated until all measurements have been
done. Subsequently, the acquired traces are analyzed using Riscure’s Inspector
software package1.
1http://www.riscure.com/
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7.1.4 Side-Channel Analysis
Application of the TVLA Methodology to ECC
We apply the TVLA methodology [100,179] to our implementation using the afore-
mentioned measurement setup, following the approach from [142] 2. Specifically,
we select a set of test vectors to be used for the power measurement phase, which
cover normal and special cases for the chosen implementation, as shown in Ta-
ble 7.2. Table 7.3 shows categories of special values used in Sets 4 and 5. We use
a notation that is similar to [142].
Set # Properties Rationale
1 constant k, constant P This is the baseline. The tests compare
power consumption from the other sets
against it.
2 constant k, varying P The goal is to detect systematic rela-
tionships between the power consump-
tion and the P value.
3 varying k, constant P The goal is to detect systematic rela-
tionships between the power consump-
tion and the k value.
4 constant k, special P Edge cases of the algorithms used.
5 special k, constant P Edge cases of the algorithms used.
Table 7.2: Sets of test vectors for TVLA leakage analysis, where k is the secret scalar
and P is the point.
Leakage Analysis
The leakage analysis of our implementation adapts the approach from [142] and
is conducted in the following way. Let {DS1, . . . DS5} be the set of power traces
corresponding to the selected test vectors. The full test consists of running the
(pairwise) tests described in [100,179] for each of the following pairs of data sets:
{(DS1, DS2), . . . (DS1, DS5)}. If any of the previous tests fail, then the top-level
test fails and the implementation is deemed to have FAILED; otherwise, it is
deemed to have PASSED the tests.
Traditionally, in [100, 142, 179] the TVLA confidence threshold was set to
C = 4.5. However, we compute the confidence threshold, per each experiment, as
decribed in more recent work [60]. The threshold computed in such way is more
2In [142], the authors apply the TVLA methodology to evaluate an implementation of ECDH-
Curve25519.
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Set # Category # Properties
4 1x x ∈ {0, 1024}.
4 1y y ∈ {0, 1024}.
4 2x x ∈ {pp256 − 1024, . . . pp256 − 1}.
4 2y y ∈ {pp256 − 1024, . . . pp256 − 1}.
5 3 k ∈ {0, 1024}.
5 4 k ∈ {l − 1024, . . . l − 1}.
4 5x x has a low Hamming Weight (≤ 25).
4 5y y has a low Hamming Weight (≤ 25).
4 6x x has a high Hamming Weight (≥ 230).
4 6y y has a high Hamming Weight (≥ 230).
Table 7.3: Categories of special values for k, x, and y, where x and y are coordinates
of the input point, k is the scalar and l is the subgroup order.
accurate and is usually slightly greater than 4.5; for more details on the compu-
tation of the threshold, see the next subsection. This approach ensures that false
positives are avoided in the leakage asssesment.
We assume that T = |DS1| = |DS2| = |DS3|, where T denotes the number
of measurements in a single test set. Furthermore, we set |DS4| = 8T (because
DS4 corresponds to 8 categories) and |DS5| = 2T (because DS5 corresponds to 2
categories).
Results Analysis
Timing analysis of the implementation (with and without coordinate randomiza-
tion) was performed based on the power measurements. We have analyzed 200
measurements with different private keys. The results show that the implementa-
tions with and without coordinate randomization are constant time, with respect
to the private key.
If the private key is randomized, then the execution time only differs if some
most significant bits of the scalar are zeros; this is as expected, since the multipli-
cation iterations are not performed for the most significant zero bits.
The TVLA leakage analysis methodology was applied to our implementation
in three different settings:
• with no countermeasures applied;
• with point randomization;
• with point randomization and scalar randomization.
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Unprotected Implementation. First we test the implementation without any
countermeasure implemented. For this test, we assume that T = 200. We only
performed the tests for DS1, DS2, DS3, because it was sufficient to detect a sig-
nificant leakage; we chose T relatively low since we expected to find a significant
leakage.
Figure 7.4 shows the t-statistics for a small range of sample indices (time
instants), for one run of Welch’s t-test for group A2 (SA,1, SA,2) of vectors selected
from DS1 and DS2, and the same test run over a random grouping R2 (SR,1, SR,2).
Groups Aj and Rj are a partition of test vector sets DSi and DSj
• SA,i = DSi, SA,j = DSj ,
• SR,i = randomly selected subset of DSi ∪DSj of size T , and
SR,j = (DSi ∪DSj) \ SR,i.
For Figure 7.4 only the following setting is considered: i = 1 and j = 2.
We compute a t-statistics trace using the following formula:
|µSA,i − µSA,j |√
σ2
SA,i
NSA,i
+
σ2
SA,j
NSA,j
, (7.2)
where µx, σx, and Nx denote respectively: the average of all the traces, the stan-
dard deviation, and the number of traces in the partition x.
The TVLA confidence threshold is computed using the following formula, per
each sample in the trace:
C = CDF−1t (1− (1− (1− 0.00001)1/n)/2), df), (7.3)
where CDF−1t is the inverse of CDF of t-distribution, n is number of samples in
a trace, and df is a degree of freedom:
df = ((σ
2
A)/NA + (σ2B)/NB)2
((σ2A)/NA)2/(NA − 1) + ((σ2B)/NB)2/(NB − 1)
. (7.4)
For more details we refer the reader to [153] and [60].
We compute the threshold value C for the experiment from Figure 7.4: it is
approximately C ≈ 7.8 for all the samples.
The t-statistics for the group A2 is way above 7.8 — it even reaches 400. The
t-statistics for the group R2 is below rarely reaches 4.1. Note that we do not need
to consider negative t-values because we compute the absolute value of t-statistics.
The above results show that the implementation is vulnerable to DPA, as
expected, since no countermeasure against DPA is employed.
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Figure 7.4: T -statistics versus sample index for comparing DS1 and DS2, for two in-
dependent groups of traces for group A2 (top) and group R2 (bottom).
Implementation protected with coordinate randomization. Second, we
test the implementation with the coordinate randomization enabled. This coun-
termeasure is implemented in the following way: instead of initializing Z to 1,
we initialize Z randomly; then we update X and Y by multiplying it by the new
random Z.
We perform the TVLA analysis similarly like for the unprotected implemen-
tation, but we set T = 1000 and we perform the tests for all DS1, . . . DS5. Note
that one can argue that T = 1000 is a relatively low number of traces for t-test.
However, we need to acquire the whole execution of the scalar multiplication (i.e.,
32 000 000 samples) for 13T = 13 000 traces; this acquisition results in a trace set
of approximately 300 gigabytes. Therefore, for the sake of efficiency, we decided
not to acquire larger trace sets.
We compute the threshold value C similarly like for the unprotected imple-
mentation. For all the t-test experiments the threshold is C ≈ 7.4 for all the
samples.
The results of the TVLA analysis are as follows:
• the t-statistics values for the groups A3 and A5 (both categories) are way
above 7.4, as presented in Figure 7.5; the values reach 30.0 for A3, 9.0 for
A5 and category 3, and 17.0 for A5 and category 4;
• the t-statistics for the group A2 and the group A4 are almost always less
than 7.4 and they rarely reach 4.5.
Based on the results presented above, we conclude that the implementation
protected with coordinate randomization does not leak the intermediate point
values during the scalar multiplication. However, the implementation seems to
leak the key bit values; therefore, we suspect that the implementation might be
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Figure 7.5: T -statistics versus sample index for the group A3 (top), the group A5 for
category 3 (center), and the group A5 for category 4 (bottom).
susceptible to attacks similar to address-based DPA [97] or address-based template
attacks [141].
Implementation protected with coordinate randomization and scalar
splitting. Since the coordinate randomization does not protect the scalar itself,
we consider an additional countermeasure that hides the scalar: scalar splitting [39,
52]. We consider the additive version of splitting: the scalar k is split to two values
r and k− r, where r is a random value of the size of k. Subsequently, for an input
point P , two scalar multiplications are performed: (1) [r]P and (2) [k−r]P . Then
the two resulting points are added to obtain [k]P .
Observe that for each splitting execution the random value r is chosen inde-
pendently at random from the previous random choices. As a result, all scalars
used in the first multiplication are independent of each other; the same holds also
for the second one. Therefore, since we test for first order leakage, it is sufficient
to test a single scalar multiplication [r]P using TVLA.
We perform the TVLA analysis for two groups, DS3 and DS5, acquired during
the previous analysis in the following way: we divide each group into two equal
non-intersecting sets of size T/2 = 500 and compute the t-value between the sets.
The t-statistics values for two sets from DS3 are presented in Figure 7.6; we
obtained similar results for DS5. The t-statistics are always less than 7.4 and they
rarely reach 5.
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Figure 7.6: T -statistics versus sample index two groups coming from DS3.
7.1.5 Results and discussion
As expected, the unprotected implementation is time-constant and resistant against
SPA attacks. The implementations protected with coordinate randomization and
scalar splitting are resistant against first order attacks, like SPA and DPA. Only ap-
plying the coordinate randomization as a countermeasure, however, is not enough
to protect the implementation.
Observe that our analysis is aimed solely at detecting first order leakage.
We have not evaluated the implementation against higher order attacks, like
cross-correlation [188]3, horizontal cross-correlation [83], single trace template at-
tacks [141], and horizontal cluster attacks [154]. We leave evaluating the imple-
mentation against these attacks as future work.
7.2 Evaluating SCA resistance of an AES design
based on low entropy masking
As already mentioned before, one of the most powerful physical attacks against
cryptosystems, like AES, is power analysis [116]. Countermeasures against such
attacks, were already mentioned in the seminal work of Kocher et at. [116]. Power
analysis attacks infer the secret key exploiting the dependence between the power
consumed by a device and the secret data being processed. To avoid these attacks
it is thus necessary to remove the dependence between the secret data and the
power consumed during the computation.
Countermeasures are usually classified using the approach followed for achiev-
ing the protection. The first approach consists in breaking the link between the
actual data that is processed by the device and the data on which the computa-
tion is performed. It is usually called masking, originally proposed by Messerges
et al. [129] exploiting the principle of secret sharing [39]. It often consists of ran-
domizing the secret data by adding a random value to them. The value has to be
removed at the end of the computation to obtain the correct result. The second
approach consist in breaking the link between the data computed by the device
3Observe that the scalar splitting should mitigate the cross-correlation attack.
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and the power consumed by the computations. It is called hiding, and generally
consists in the “hiding” of the power consumed by the computation of secret data
within the power trace. One way to achieve hiding is by flattening the power con-
sumption of a device: if all the computation consume the same amount of power,
the power consumed will not be dependent on the secret data any more. Hiding is
typically implemented using logic styles more robust against Side-Channel Attacks
(SCA) such as SABL [177], WDDL [178], or MCML [161].
Both approaches have some issues, for instance the early propagation effect [176],
which affect the security of the overall implementation. Additionally, their over-
head in terms of area, performance, complexity of design and power/energy con-
sumption can be too high for low cost and battery operated devices. As a result,
often, designers have to trade performance and area utilization with resistance
against power analysis attacks.
In this section, we propose a compact implementation of the AES algorithm,
targeting reconfigurable devices, capable of reaching high throughputs while at the
same time improving the robustness against power analysis attacks.
To achieve this result, we consider the use of low entropy masking schemes [144].
The main idea is to use two representations for each value, such that every value
has the same average power consumption. In this case we consider the true and
the complemented representation of each value. Moreover, we ensure that, on
average, the usage of the true and complemented representations follow a uniform
distribution. In this way, we mask the power consumption variation, reducing
the information that an attacker can obtain, while collecting the several power
traces needed to successful complete the attack. The representation of the value
is controlled by XORing it with the appropriate mask value, randomly selected
and updated at each cycle. While low entropy masking schemes, as the one herein
considered, do not fully protect against SCA, the simplicity of this approach allows
for a compact and high performance AES design. Experimental results suggest a
significantly higher resistance against first order CPA at a potentially negligible
area and performance cost, demonstrating the potential of the proposed approach.
This section is organized as follows: Subsection 7.2.1 summarizes the state of
the art AES designs and countermeasures implemented using reconfigurable hard-
ware. Subsection 7.2.2 presents the proposed approach and details the resulting
AES structure. Finally, Subsection 7.2.3 reports performance and area figures as
well as the security analysis carried out using a SAKURA-G as the test platform.
7.2.1 Countermeasures Against Power Analysis Attacks
Both approaches, masking and hiding, were proposed and explored for software
and hardware, concentrating in the second case on both ASIC and reconfigurable
devices. FPGAs have been initially used for prototyping and for low volume
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production, as they allow to limit the non recurring engineering costs. However,
state of the art FPGAs have reached a size that is sufficient to fit in a complex
System-on-chip, making them also an attractive platform for large scale consumer
electronics. For this reason, we focus on countermeasures applied to reconfigurable
logic. In the remaining part of this section, we concentrate on previous research
efforts proposing countermeasures to power analysis attacks suitable for FPGAs.
Initial works proposing hiding for FPGAs attempted to adapt to reconfigurable
hardware concepts previously proposed for ASIC. One example of this is dual rail
precharge, proposed for ASIC [178]. It consists of gates where the computation is
carried out in two phases: a precharge, where a refreshing wave is produced, and
an evaluation, where both a true and a complemented value of the same operation
are computed. This approach should, in theory, result in an identical amount
of transitions (thus also in the same power consumption) regardless of the data
processed. One of the first works proposing dual rail for FPGAs is the one of Yu
and Schaumont [193]. The authors showed how to implement WDDL and how to
improve its security on FPGA. Higher security was achieved by duplicating the
placed and routed WDDL netlist. However, the area overhead is significant and
the logic style itself suffers from the so called early propagation effect [176].
A recent improvement on hiding was reported by Wild et al. [186]. The au-
thors propose GliFreD, a technique aiming at solving the early propagation issue,
while avoiding glitches and mitigating imbalanced routing as well. The approach
was evaluated protecting an implementation of the AES S-box as proposed by
Canright [37]. The security evaluation shows a reduction in the perceived infor-
mation. However, the area overhead is significantly larger: the protected S-box
occupies approximately 30 times more slices, 2 times more LUTs, and 100 times
more flip-flops.
Several masking countermeasures (and a combination of them) were explored
by Güneysu and Moradi [79]. The authors demonstrated, how noise generation,
clock randomization, and memory scrambling can defeat first order differential
power analysis. They reported results on protecting an implementation of the AES
algorithm based on a T-box approach. They further showed that by combining
several countermeasures one can further increase the resistance to side-channel
attacks. However, the area required by the protected version is approximately
2300 LUTs and 1100 Registers larger than the unprotected core. Similarly, the
throughput is reduced by a factor 3.77. Despite these improvements in regard to
the remaining state of the art, the cost of this protection is still excessively high
for meeting the constraints of several applications.
The memory scrambling proposed in that work was further improved by Sas-
drich et al. [169]. The authors propose to update the mask only before each
encryption (keeping the same mask during the whole encryption process). To
avoid information leakage caused by two values consecutively stored in a register
137
Chapter 7. Leakage Detection in Evaluations
with the same mask, each S-box is surrounded by two registers to interleave the
computation of real data with the computation of dummy values. Reported results
show a significant improvement compared to the previously proposed scrambling
approach of Güneysu and Moradi. However, the area overhead is still significant
and the security of the proposed approach, when using RAM, is reduced due to in-
ternal architecture of the distributed blocks. The design is much more secure when
it is implemented using BRAMs, however the area overhead and the limitation of
using a single mask per encryption still persist.
Regazzoni et al. [162] proposed to exploit the larger size of state of the art
Xilinx FPGAs, which nicely fit look up tables of 8 bit inputs, for implementing a
compact AES accelerator. To do so, the authors adapted to reconfigurable devices
a masking scheme largely based on 4 and 8 bit tables, originally designed to be
placed in the memory of micro-controllers [150]. Despite the higher throughput,
area overhead was still considerably high (depending on the size of the datapath,
it was reported to be approximately two to three times the size of the unprotected
reference designs).
The concept of low entropy masking, herein considered when limiting the
amount of possible masks, was introduced by Nassar et al. [143]. The authors
present a study on the use of low entropy masking, i.e using a limited subset of pos-
sible mask values. In their proposed approach, each S-box performs the byte sub-
stitution using a specific fixed predefined mask. The randomness of this approach
is in the choice of each S-box at the beginning of the round computation. These
masks (m[i]) are then used in a chaining scheme where mout[i] = min[i+1 mod16].
The authors also evaluate the impact of using a small subset of masks in their so-
lution in terms of leakage, particularly high order leakage. The limited number
of masks allows to obtain a more compact structure, at a cost of lower protec-
tion [191]. However, the performance (34% slower) and area impact (48% more
LUTs) of this solution is still significant [144].
Overall, from the security point of view, the designs proposed so far suggest
resistance up to at least first order attacks. However, they suffer from high area
overhead as well as from relatively limited performance.
7.2.2 Proposed Low Entropy Masking
In this section we firstly describe the proposed approach, followed by the descrip-
tion of the resulting AES structure. The implemented AES structure is based on
the unprotected T-box AES implementation, with a datapath of 128 bits, pre-
sented in [42], computing a 128 data block each 10 clock cycles.
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Power Consumption Hiding with Low Entropy Masking
The proposed approach strives at obfuscating the relation between the key depen-
dent data and the power consumption with a low area and performance impact.
Rather than using dedicated logic, such as dual rail logic, which continuously hides
the key dependent power consumption, we mask the key dependent power con-
sumption by using a low entropy masking scheme to influence the average power
consumption value.
This is done by randomly using the value or its complement, i.e. the value 1
can be represented by ’1’ if not-complemented or by ’0’ if complemented. Simi-
larly, the value ’0’ can be ’0’ (not-complemented) or ’1’ (complemented). Selection
between complemented and not-complemented is done randomly, following a uni-
form distribution of the random values. Ensuring that the complement of the
value is used 50% of the time, the average power consumption will be the same
for both 1 and 0 binary values. Herein, a more pragmatical approach is used by
applying the complement or non-complement at the byte level. To implement this,
low entropy masking is used [143]. In particular, a set of two masks are used such
that the masks are the complement of each other. In this design we consider the
simplest masks, namely “11111111” and “00000000”. With these two mask values,
the hiding is performed by:
Si ⊕M i = Si ⊕ 11111111 = S¯i, (7.5)
if the mask status is ’1’ or:
Si ⊕M i = Si ⊕ 00000000 = Si, (7.6)
if the mask status is ’0’. Si represent byte i of the state and M i the mask used on
that byte. In practice, this correspond to the complemented or non-complemented
value of the value itself. Once more, for the masking to work properly M i =
11111111, 50% of the time in a random manner.
Unlike the approach proposed in [144] where each S-box implements a spe-
cific mask and, since the S-boxes are addressed by the masked data, two barrel
shifters are required, the proposed approach has almost no overhead other than
the memory needed to store the masked values.
With this solution all S-boxes must be able to perform the computation for
the values affected by any of the used masks. In this particular case, the input is
the value or its complement, depending on the mask status (Min). Independent of
the input mask, the generated output will have a different, random, mask status
(Mout). Note that each byte of the AES 16 byte state has its own random mask
status. In this approach, each S-box receives a different random value, thus the
output of each S-box is masked independently.
139
Chapter 7. Leakage Detection in Evaluations
In this design, a T-box based implementation is considered. Given this ap-
proach and the two considered masks, each T-box must be able to receive the
complemented or non-complemented input value and generate a complemented or
non-complemented output value, according to the input and output mask status.
For this, two random bits are used for each byte of the round value (M iin and
M iout). Considering S and T (S) as the unmasked input and output values, respec-
tively, each T-box needs to be able to compute T (S), T (S¯), T¯ (S), and T¯ (S¯), as
illustrated in Figure 7.7. When implemented with lookup tables, this leads to a 4
times larger lookup table.
Figure 7.7: Protected AES main loop.
To assure the correct mask status of the obtained results, one needs to compute
the resulting mask status. This is very simple to compute, since the resulting values
are either complemented or not complemented.
In regard to the remaining operations performed to compute the AES algo-
rithm, no additional care needs to be taken, since these operations consist of
linear operations, namely shifts and XOR operations that do not change the mask
status.
The resulting mask status is given by the XOR of the mask status of all the
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involved values, as exemplified by the following:
S′0 ⊕M0in = T (S0)⊕M0out ⊕ · · · ⊕ T (S15)⊕M15out. (7.7)
Given the linearity of the XOR operation, the value of the state (S) and the mask
(M) can be computed separately as:
S′0 = T (S0)⊕ T (S5)⊕ T (S10)⊕ T (S15); (7.8)
M0in = M0out ⊕M5out ⊕M10out ⊕M15out, (7.9)
where T (S) represents the computation of the T-box operation over one byte of
the state S.
In this way, there are no issues related to the “mask correction" as this is built
into our scheme intrinsically. Figure 7.7 depicts the resulting round structure
given the proposed masking approach, using a dual port lookup table for the T-
box implementation. With this approach 16 random values per round are needed
in order to define the mask status (M iout) of the output of each T-box.
The above description only considers the masking during the round compu-
tation. However, the first key addition (performed for each input block before
the round computation itself) also needs to be protected. To protect the first key
addition with the input data, the same masking approach is deployed, where each
input byte is masked (by taking its complement or not), computing:
S′ = Datain ⊕Min ⊕Key0; (7.10)
where Datain represents the 16 bytes of the input block, Key0 represents the first
16 bytes of the expanded key, and Min represents the 16 random bits of the first
mask status. The resulting structure for this operation is shown at the top of
Figure 7.8.
Regarding the conclusion of the block cipher process, the AES algorithm has
the particularity that in the last round the MixColumn operation is not computed.
The result is obtained directly through the S-box. Three main solutions are used
to deal with this property. The first is to perform the MixColumn on a separate
logic block, not using T-boxes, and bypassing this operation in the last round
using a multiplexer. This solution tends to result in more complex and costly
structures, particularly on FPGAs. The second solution takes into account that
for encryption the output of the T-box is:
T (S) = 1× SBOX(S)|| 1× SBOX(S)|| 2× SBOX(S)|| 3× SBOX(S), (7.11)
where || corresponds to the concatenation of bytes and SBOX(S) corresponds to
the S-box operation over one byte of the state S. Thus, the needed S-box opera-
tion (SBOX(S)) can be obtained directly from T (S). However, when performing
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Figure 7.8: Protected AES structure.
the inverse MixColumn operation, in the decryption, the value S−1BOX(S) is not
outputted. As such, an additional entry in the lookup table is needed in order to
provide the computation of S−1BOX(S) for the decryption, requiring more memory
space. The third solution recombines the 4 bytes outputted from the T-box to gen-
erate the S-box output [42]. This is possible since the XOR of the multiplication
coefficients of the MixColumn operation results in 1. In the case of encryption:
1⊕ 1⊕ 2⊕ 3 = 1, (7.12)
while in the case of decryption:
9⊕Bh ⊕Dh ⊕ Eh = 1. (7.13)
Thus, by XORing the 4 bytes of the T-box, both for encryption and decryption, the
MixColumn operation is annulled. This option avoids the use of additional memory
or a more complex data path to compute the S-box operation separately. However,
it requires the use of additional XOR operations to compute (7.12) and (7.13).
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This last approach is the one herein considered. As such, the output of T-box i
is affected by the Mask M iout. Thus, the output of the S-box can be computed by:
S(Si) = T1(Si)⊕M iout ⊕ T2(Si)⊕M iout ⊕ T3(Si)⊕M iout ⊕ T4(Si)⊕M iout, (7.14)
where T1, T2, T3, and T4 correspond to the first, second, third, and forth bytes
outputted by the T-box, as detailed in (7.12) and (7.13). However, by performing
this operation over these 4 bytes (all affected by the same mask) results in the
output no longer being affected by the mask. Following this last operation, the
final output value (Sout) would be obtained by XORing the S-box output with the
last round key. However, has shown in (7.14), this computation would no longer
be protected by the mask.
To solve this, the last key addition and the recombination of the T-box output
must be performed together in such a way that the mask is only removed at the
end, ensuring that the final key addition is performed with a masked value. This
can be accomplished by:
(tmpi ⊕M iout) = (T2(Si)⊕M iout)⊕ (T3(Si)⊕M iout)⊕ (T4(Si)⊕M iout); (7.15)
Souti = (tmpi ⊕M iout)⊕ (T1(Si)⊕M iout)⊕Keylast, (7.16)
where Keylast corresponds to the last round key. Note that for this approach to
work properly, 3 (or more) input XOR operators must be available.
The resulting structure for the computation of each of the output bytes (Souti)
of the state is depicted at the bottom left side of Figure 7.8. With this approach
the mask value is automatically removed, without the need to know the status of
the mask (Mout), resulting in a relatively compact structure to remove the mask
and to perform the last round computation.
FPGA based implementation details
While the proposed structure is technology agnostic, the developed prototype con-
sidered in the following section was implemented on an FPGA based technology,
in particular the Xilinx SPARTAN-6 technology. The more recent Xilinx FPGAs
support 6 input LookUp Tables (LUT) and embedded RAM Blocks (BRAMs)
ranging from 18 to 36 kbits of capacity.
As depicted at the bottom of Figure 7.7, the key addition and MixColumn
operation is computed by XORing 5 values, resulting in the next state value (S′).
This entire operation can be mapped into a single LUT (per bit). Identically, the
final round key addition and unmask operation (5 input XOR), depicted at the
bottom left side of Figure 7.8, can also be entirely mapped into a single LUT (per
bit), thus assuring that no intermediate unmasked values exists during the key
addition.
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The T-box lookup operation is mapped into a BRAM. Considering only en-
cryption or decryption, the unmasked operation corresponds to an 8 bit input with
a 32 bit output operation. Given this, the total memory requirement (per T-box)
is:
28 × 32 = 8 kbits. (7.17)
As such, in the proposed approach each T-box needs to compute 4 different
combinations of complemented or non-complemented values (as illustrated in Fig-
ure 7.7). A total amount of memory of 32 kbits per T-box is needed. This T-box
can be mapped into a single 36 kbit BRAM (on VIRTEX 5 to 7 devices) or into
two 18 kbit BRAMs on SPARTAN 6 devices. When supporting both encryption
and decryption, twice as much memory is needed, i.e 64 kbits.
Since the same mask is used for all T-boxes and the fact that the BRAMs are
dual ported, each group of BRAMs is able to compute two T-boxes, one on each
port of the BRAM.
Note that, when mapping one T-box into multiple BRAMs, care should be
taken in order to assure that, for example, T (S) and T¯ (S) do not go into one
BRAM and that T (S¯) and T¯ (S¯) to another BRAM, since this might result in
additional leakage. One should place all combinations into a single BRAM, having
each BRAM output fewer bits of the output result.
7.2.3 Experimental Results and Evaluation
In order to properly evaluate the proposed approach, the resulting structure was
implemented on a SAKURA-G platform [80], with a Xilinx SPARTAN-6 LX75
FPGA. The implementation results were obtained using the Xilinx ISE Design
Suite (v14.5) with the design described using VHDL. The presented implementa-
tion results were obtained after P&R using the default parameters of the tool.
For the required random values, two 16-bit Linear Feedback Shift Registers
(LFSR) are herein used during the SCA evaluation to generate the pseudo random
values, two for each byte. These LFSR are implemented using the polynomials
x16 + x14 + x13 + x11 + x1 and x16 + x15 + x13 + x4 + x1, initialized with the
hexadecimal values (A376)h and (7A1B)h, respectively. The state of each LFSR is
used to set the status of the Min mask for the first key addition and for the round
masks Mout. Note that, in a real world implementation, true random number
generators should be used. The results obtained are based on the LFSR specified
above. For the leakage evaluation, the amplified output of the SAKURA-G board,
which is connected to a shunt resistor which in turn connected in serial to the
target FPGA.The power traces are obtained using a LeCroy WaveRunner 610Zi
oscilloscope set at 1 GS/s using the full bandwidth of the scope.
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Side-Channel Analysis Evaluation
As the implementation proposed in this work only claims security against first
order side-channel attacks that exploit the Hamming weight of the SBox output,
we have chosen to analyze the acquired traces through TVLA with chosen input
method [21] aimed at exploiting the SBox Hamming weight model (so-called HW
model). The first group for TVLA contains traces for which all SBox outputs
in round 5 are set to have Hamming weight equal to 0, 1, or 2; the second group
contains traces without any limitations on the SBox outputs. We acquired 200 000
traces for the unprotected implementation (for which the PRNG is turned off) and
200 000 traces for the protected one (for which the PRNG is turned on).
We compute t-values and the TVLA threshold in the same way as in Sec-
tion 7.1.4. The TVLA threshold for both, the unprotected and protected AES
traces, is approximately the same: C = 5.817.
Figure 7.9 presents a comparison of t-values for the unprotected and protected
AES implementations for the rounds from 3 to 7; the maximum t-values values
are marked. We do not present the results for other rounds since they do not show
leakage (because we fix the SBox hamming weight only in round 5). We can observe
leakage, namely a peak above the C threshold, for both the unprotected and
protected implementations; however, the peak for the unprotected implementation
is 25 times greater than for the protected one 1. Therefore, we can notice a
significant security improvement in the protected case.
We have also performed a fixed vs. random TVLA analysis [76], but we have
achieved very similar results: the peak for the unprotected implementation is
approximately 30 times greater than for the protected one.
Subsequently, to further analyze the security of our solution we conducted
a second experiment. We have chosen to analyze traces through classical DPA
aimed at exploiting the HW model. Additionally, for sake of completeness, we aim
at exploiting another common model: the SBox input-output Hamming distance
model (i.e., a Hamming weight of the xor of the SBox output and the SBox input);
we call the second model, the HD model. For this analysis 100 000 traces were
collected for the unprotected implementation. We have collected 27 million traces
for the protected implementation. Figure 7.10 presents the results of the side
channel analysis aimed at recovering all 16 bytes of the key.
As it is visible in the top plot of Figure 7.10, when the random generator is
turned off (LFSRs initialized with all zeros), the key entropy is reduced to less
than 15 bits with 100 000 traces; only 2 out of 16 bytes do not reach the full
convergence. Furthermore, the entropy is reduced to less than 23 bits, which can
be efficiently brute-forced, already with 40 000 traces. We only present the results
1We can notice that the strongest leakage for the unprotected implementation happens slightly
later than for the protected one, but we do not have an explanation of this situation.
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Figure 7.9: t-values for the unprotected (top) and protected (bottom) AES implemen-
tations for the rounds from 3 to 7.
for the HW model as the attack using HD does not yield successful results.
When the random generator is active, we cannot reduce the search key space
with 27 million traces, as visible in the key convergence plots in Figure 7.10. In
both models the remaining key entropy is approximately 127 bits. Therefore, we
conclude that it seem to not be possible to mount a classical first order CPA with
the collected 27 million traces. This also confirms that the leakage detected using
TVLA for the protected implementation is most likely caused by the real device
leakage model being non-linear (for example, some SBox output bits might be
leaking in combination). We note that it might be possible to exploit this leakage
using more complex side-channel attacks, like, linear regression analysis [61], tem-
plate attacks [40], or attacks on low entropy masking schemes [191]; we leave that
as future work.
We perform the evaluation using Riscure’s Inspector software package 2.
7.2.4 Implementation Results Analysis
In order to evaluate the impact of the proposed solution, in terms of area cost
and performance, the resulting structure is herein compared with the equivalent
2http://www.riscure.com/
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Figure 7.10: Key convergence for the unprotected AES implementation for the HW
model (top), key convergence of the protected AES implementation for
the HW model (middle) and the HD model (bottom).
unprotected AES structure, proposed in [42], and with the most relevant solution
in the state of the art. To better compare with the state of the art, the proposed
structure was also implemented on a Xilinx VIRTEX-5. The obtained results are
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Table 7.4: DPA resistant AES implementations
Device Enc/ Logic Freq. Throughput Efficiency
Dec LUT BRAMs [MHz] [Mbps] [Mbps/LUT]
[111]
XC3S500 n.a. 48883 0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
[79] SAKURA-G Enc 28884 16 147 35.4 0.01
[168]
SAKURA-G Enc 1284 8 148 68.6 0.05
Ours SAKURA-G Enc 525 16 148 1894 3.6
Ours SAKURA-G Both 603 32 110 1400 2.3
[42] SAKURA-G Both 586 8 136 1740 3
[162]
XC5vlx50 Enc 1429 0 100 290 0.2
[162]
XC5vlx50 Enc 4772 0 100 1163 0.2
[42] XC5vlx30 Enc 518 8 210 2688 5.2
Ours XC5vlx50 Enc 547 8 187 2393 4.3
Ours XC5vlx50 Both 548 16 157 1843 3.4
depicted in Table 7.4.
The implementation results on a SPARTAN-6 suggest that the proposed struc-
ture requires a total of 603 LUTs and 55 Registers and 32 BRAMs, and is able
to run at 110MHz. Considering as an efficiency metric the achievable throughput
per used LUTs, and achieving an encryption/decryption throughput of 1.4 Gbps,
a efficiency of 2.3 throughput per LUT is achieved by the proposed solution.
When compared with the unprotected version of the AES structure [42], re-
quiring 586 LUTs and achieving a throughput of 1.7 Gbps, the proposed protected
solution requires 3% more LUTs, 37 more Registers and 2 to 4 times the number
of BRAMs, depending if decryption is also supported. The extra LUTs and Regis-
ters are mainly due to the two 16-bit LFSR used to generate the Pseudo Random
values. The actual cost of the proposed solution is basically in the needed extra
BRAMs, since the SPARTAN BRAMs are relatively smaller and in the achiev-
able throughput, being 20% slower. The throughput degradation is mostly due to
the more complex routing, given the higher BRAM usage, since the datapath is
basically the same.
This impact results on an efficiency degradation of 1.23 times. When consid-
ering an implementation supporting only encryption, requiring 16 BRAMs (twice
the original number of BRAMs), a throughput of 1.9 Gbps is achieved.
When targeting a VIRTEX-5 device, supporting larger BRAMs, and only per-
forming encryption, the resulting structure only requires 8 BRAMs, the same as in
3Only Slice values are presented. The depicted value considers that 1 slice has 4 LUTs
available.
4The value listed is for the AES core only. It does not include the mask generation structure.
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the unprotected implementation. In this particular case, it can be stated that the
proposed solution does not impose any additional BRAM cost. Performance-wise
the implementation supporting only encryption allows to reduce the number of
needed BRAMs and consequently a simpler routing can be achieved, resulting on
a throughput of 2.4 Gbps, 10% slower than the non protected reference design.
When compared with the solution proposed in [168], only supporting encryp-
tion, the solution herein proposed requires less than half the number of LUTs and
is able to achieve a 27 times higher throughput. The solution proposed in [168]
requires 8 BRAMs, considering a 64-bit datapath. If the solution proposed in [168]
implements a 128-bit datapath, it will also require 16 BRAMs, one for each SBOX.
This is due to the fact that one of the dual ports of each BRAM needs to be re-
served for the mask update. In this case it requires the same amount of BRAMs
as for the solution herein proposed. Note that the results presented in [168] only
consider the cost of the AES core, without the mask generation hardware, which
substantially contributes to higher area costs.
In [162], a structure considering a more traditional approach to masking is pro-
posed, for a 32 and 128 bit datapath. The authors implemented a masked design
for the AES algorithm, which is heavily based on 4 and 8 bit look-up-tables, tar-
geting the existing LUTs on the state of the art Xilinx FGPAs. With this approach
no BRAMs are required. The obtained results [162] suggest a cost of 4772 LUTs
and 904 Registers, achieving a throughout of 1.2 Gbps. When compared with their
reference design [162], this solution imposes a cost of 3 times the amount of LUTs
and achieves a throughput 2.5 times slower. When comparing the solution herein
proposed with this one [162], the proposed solution requires 8 times fewer LUTs
and achieves 2 times the throughput. However, the solution proposed in [162] does
not require BRAMs so a direct comparison cannot be made. Notwithstanding, the
structure herein proposed for encryption can have a almost no area cost and a 10%
performance degradation on a VIRTEX-5, in regard to the reference design, while
the structure in [162] imposes a area increase between 2 to 3 time, in regard to
the reference design.
While Altera Stratix-II values were not obtained to compare with the struc-
ture presented in [144], proposing the low entropy masking scheme, it is possible
to evaluate the overhead imposed by each approach. The results presented for the
encryption structure presented in [144] suggest a overhead cost of 48% and 40%
more LUTs and memory blocks, respectively, with a performance degradation of
34%. While the resulting structure supporting encryption on a VIRTEX-5 has a
negligible area and performance impact.
Overall, when compared with the existing state of the art, the proposed solu-
tion suggests an efficiency improvement above 6 times with throughputs above 2
Gbps. Depending on the device and encryption support, the resulting structure
can have a negligible cost increase and a minimum performance degradation.
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To allow for further and independent evaluation, the implemented AES core is
available at: http://sips.inesc-id.pt/$\sim$rjfc/cores/AES$_$DPA2018.
7.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented two applications of leakage detection methods to two
implementations of: ECC and AES.
For the ECC implementation we have shown using TVLA that that only the
implementation with all countermeasures enabled is resistant against first-order
attacks. Further improvements include the integration of countermeasures against
higher-order attacks.
For the AES implementation: we propose a low entropy masking schemes,
which is expected to be not fully protecting against SCA. On the positive side, the
simplicity of the approach enables an extreme compactness, reaching an almost
negligible area cost, and very high performance. Experimental results suggest
a significantly higher resistance against first order CPA (suggesting not to be
possible to mount a classical first order CPA with 27 million traces) at a potentially
negligible area and performance cost. Further work includes evaluation using more
complex side-channel attacks, like, linear regression analysis, template attacks, or
other attacks on low entropy masking schemes [191].
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We conclude this thesis by summarizing the results and impact of our research.
In addition, we also list future research directions inspired from this work.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
The main research goal of this thesis was to improve attacking and evaluating
public-key cryptographic implementations protected with side-channel counter-
measures. We believe that this task has been duly executed by proposing new
attack techniques, discussing relevant countermeasures, and evaluating the side-
channel resistance of various cryptographic designs.
The main results of this thesis are as follows:
• We introduced Online Template Attacks (OTA), a powerful template attack
technique that can be applied to most exponentiation and scalar multiplica-
tion algorithms. The impact of the attack is ascertained by the German Fed-
eral Office for Information Security (BSI) through including OTA in “ECC-
guide: Minimal Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel attack resistance
of Elliptic Curve Implementations” [71]. Therefore, we recommend imple-
menting countermeasures against OTA, such as coordinate randomization,
in secure ECC or RSA applications.
• We presented a contribution with direct application to security evaluations:
an efficient single-trace template attack against an ECC implementation pro-
tected with several countermeasures, including coordinate re-randomization
and scalar blinding. The attack targets a conditional move (cmov) – a fre-
quently used operation in scalar-multiplication and exponentiation imple-
mentations. We demonstrated that this attack is practically applicable by
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targeting a protected version of the popular µNaCl library. Furthermore, all
publicly available ECC AVR implementations at the time of publishing, are
in principle vulnerable to this attack to the best of our knowledge.
• We directly contributed to improving security evaluations by proposing a
side-channel horizontal attack framework based on a semi-parametric ap-
proach. This method combines unsupervised learning, maximum likelihood
estimation, and template attacks in order to recover an RSA exponent. To
improve the success rate in attacking implementations protected with both
message blinding and exponent blinding, this framework uses multiple traces
for the selection of points of interest (POIs) to reduce the noise while tar-
geting single traces to recover randomized exponents. This is the first un-
supervised attack that employs multiple traces for the POIs selection. Due
to the fact that this technique is of being unsupervised a direct practical
application of this framework is in the scenario of side-channel ICC EMVCo
smart card evaluation [69].
• Subsequently, we extend the above framework with multi-dimensional clus-
tering to attack two protected ECC implementations of the Montgomery
Ladder on Curve25519 available in the µNaCl library. In addition, to the
regularity countermeasure provided by the µNaCl library, we protected the
implementation with point re-randomization and scalar randomization. The
practical results show that even strongly protected ECC implementations
are vulnerable to this attack. A small number of scalar bits are not correctly
recovered, but a subsequent smart brute-force attack can identify and correct
them efficiently.
• We contributed to the maturity of evaluation approaches by applying leakage
detection methods such as TVLA to two novel, at the time of publishing,
implementations of ECC and AES. The ECC evaluation is the first work
looking into side-channel security issues of hardware implementations of the
complete ECC formulae; the results confirm that applying an increasing level
of countermeasures leads to an improved side-channel resistance. The second
work is an evaluation of an AES hardware implementation that provides
protection against power analysis attacks while allowing for a very compact
structure with a potentially negligible efficiency impact. The evaluation,
using TVLA and CPA, shows that the proposed design significantly improves
side-channel resistance.
We practically evaluated all the above attacks to demonstrate their contributions.
We summarize all implementations attacked in this thesis in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1: Implementations attacked experimentally in this thesis.
Chapter Implementation & Target Attack Details
Chapter 3: Ed25519 scalar multiplication protected
with regularity and scalar randomization
(running on 8-bit ATmega163) that uses:
Online Template At-
tack (power)
Section 3.4.2 - 256-bit Projective Input
Section 3.4.3 - 255-bit Projective Input
Section 3.4.4 - Affine Coordinates
Chapter 4: µNaCl scalar multiplication protected with
regularity, coordinate re-randomization,
and scalar blinding (running on 8-bit AT-
mega328P) that uses:
Template Attack tar-
geting single traces
(power) + Error Cor-
rection
Section 4.4 - Arithmetic cswaps
Section 4.5 - Pointer cswaps
Chapter 5: RSA square-and-multiply exponentiation
protected with message and exponent
blinding (running on 32-bit STM32F4)
Horizontal Clustering
Attack (EM)
Chapter 6:
both attacks
are described
in Section 6.5
µNaCl scalar multiplication protected with
regularity, coordinate re-randomization,
and scalar blinding (running on 32-bit
STM32F4) that uses:
Horizontal Clustering
Attack (EM) + Error
Correction
- Arithmetic cswaps
- Pointer cswaps
Chapter 7:
all three eval-
uations are
presented in
Section 7.1.4
Scalar multiplication based on complete
addition formulae [163] for the p256 curve
on an FPGA (running on Xilinx Spartan-6
LX75) protected with:
TVLA evaluation
(power)
- regularity
- + coordinate randomization
- + scalar randomization
both evalua-
tions are pre-
sented in Sec-
Low entropy masking-based AES imple-
mentation on an FPGA (running on Xilinx
Spartan-6 LX75) with the countermeasure:
Evaluation: TVLA +
CPA (power)
tion 7.2.3 - turned off
- turned on
8.2 Further Directions
There are several ways of extending the work presented in this thesis.
The OTA presented in Chapter 3 can be further extended to work with other
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distinguishers then the ones presented in [63, 152]. For example, it would be
interesting to employ deep learning techniques, in a similar way as it was done for
DPA in [35]. It would be also desirable (and challenging) to employ OTA against
other implementations, even when protected with coordinate randomization.
The template attack from Chapter 4 can be extended to target an implementa-
tion protected even with more countermeasures; in particular, we would consider
address randomization and the countermeasure against localized EM template at-
tacks [89]. Using deep learning [35] as a distinguisher might be an interesting
future direction.
As a future work for Chapter 5, we considered extending the framework to
ECC and to investigate recovering error bits faster than by using “brute-force”,
for example, by approaches from [20, 86]. These two future work directions are
explored in Chapters 4 and 6. An unexplored interesting direction is applying our
framework in the frequency or wavelet domain.
Chapter 6 can be extended in a similar way to Chapter 4 to target implementa-
tions protected with address randomization or the aforementioned countermeasure
from [89]. Moreover, we consider attacking other popular ECC implementations as
future work. Another possible development is to improve the attack with Principal
Component Analysis [104].
Additionally, work from Chapters 5 and 6 can be expanded to investigate the
following practical question: “how do horizontal clustering attacks perform in
varying signal-to-noise scenarios and when moving implementations from software
to hardware (or to a combination thereof)?”.
Future work for evaluations performed in Chapter 7 includes using other leak-
age detection methods, like χ2-test [134], and more complex side-channel attacks,
like linear regression analysis, template attacks, or other attacks on low entropy
masking schemes [191].
8.3 Discussion
We hope that we have convinced the readers of this thesis that there exist vari-
ous sophisticated side-channel attacks, which could threaten the security of even
heavily protected implementations. As a result, it is impossible to protect an
implementation against all possible side-channel attacks. However, in practice
stacking on top of each other a significant number of wisely chosen SCA counter-
measures should make even sophisticated attacks infeasible as confirmed by the
Common Criteria (CC) evaluations1.
In theory a developer might want implement all possible countermeasures
against SCA, but then the resulting implementation would be too slow and too
1https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
154
8.3. Discussion
expensive for all practical purposes. Therefore, budget and hardware limitations
(in terms of speed and memory, for example) encourage the developers to limit
usage of the SCA countermeasures. The solution to the above problem, employed
usually in for example CC evaluations, is as follows: first a developer considers
necessary countermeasures during the design. Then, the SCA resilience of the re-
sulting implementation is evaluated. If the evaluation shows exploitable leakage,
then either the countermeasures are implemented improperly or additional ones
should be added. Subsequently, the improved implementation should be evaluated
again and the process should be continued until the implementation does not show
exploitable leakage.
The above process should be constantly improved by considering novel and
emerging attack techniques in order for the evaluation process to stay adequate
and up-to-date.
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Summary
Nowadays the designers of cryptographic devices not only need to focus on the
functional aspects, like efficiency, but also need to ensure that information that
leaks through side-channels2 during the execution of cryptographic operations can-
not be exploited by an attacker to recover the secret key. If not sufficiently pro-
tected, implementations of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems, are
vulnerable to so-called Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. For example, for
a common public-key approach such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), the
majority of the SCA attacks target scalar multiplication in an elliptic curve over
a finite field.
There are various types of SCA attacks: Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differ-
ential Power Analysis (DPA), and Horizontal Attacks (HA). SPA targets a single
side-channel trace or a few traces and draws conclusions over the secret key based
on visual inspection. DPA uses statistical methods, such as difference of means,
to extract information from multiple traces. HA is a more advanced type of SPA
in that it exploits the leakage from different points of the same trace, usually by
employing advanced statistical or machine learning techniques. In recent years
the trend of SCA attacks on public key cryptography seems to be shifting more
towards HA as well-known randomization-based countermeasures (e.g., exponent
and scalar blinding) protect against SPA and DPA attacks.
This thesis investigates side-channel security of cryptographic implementations
protected using various countermeasures. We focus on hardware and software im-
plementations of public-key cryptography, in particular ECC and Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA). We also analyze a protected hardware implementation of a com-
monly used symmetric block cipher – Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. We first present a powerful
attack technique, called Online Template Attacks (OTA), with applicability to
various ECC scalar multiplication algorithms3. OTA leans towards the horizontal
2Common side channels include time, temperature, power consumption, and electromagnetic
emanations.
3In principle OTA can be also applied to various RSA modular exponentiation algorithms.
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type of attacks, since it needs only one trace from the device under attack to
recover the private key. This means that some common countermeasures, such
as scalar randomization, are ineffective against this attack. We demonstrate the
practicality of OTA and all our attacks presented in this thesis with the help of
experimental results on publicly available targets.
Second we present a single-trace template attack against an ECC implementa-
tion protected using several countermeasures, including coordinate re-randomization
and scalar randomization. The attack directly targets a conditional move (cmov),
a frequently used operation in scalar-multiplication implementations.
Third we propose a side-channel attack framework that combines unsupervised
horizontal clustering, maximum likelihood estimation, and template attacks to
recover a private RSA key. To improve the success rate when attacking protected
implementations, the framework uses multiple traces for the selection of points of
interest (POIs) to reduce the noise level. However, when recovering randomized
exponents only single traces are targeted. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first unsupervised attack that uses multiple traces for the POIs selection.
Subsequently, we extend the aforementioned framework to ECC and multi-
dimensional clustering. We successfully execute horizontal clustering attacks on
two implementations of the Montgomery Ladder on Curve25519 that are protected
using regularity, point re-randomization, and scalar randomization.
Finally, we apply and adjust leakage detection methods, mainly TVLA, to two
implementations of cryptosystems: ECC and AES. Here, first we evaluate side-
channel resistance of a protected implementation of the recent complete addition
formulae for prime order elliptic curves on an FPGA platform. The results confirm
that applying an increasing level of countermeasures leads to an improved side-
channel resistance. Second we evaluate a hardware AES implementation based
on low entropy masking, that provides protection against power analysis while
allowing for a very compact structure. The evaluation, using TVLA and CPA,
shows that the proposed design significantly improves the side-channel resistance.
Our main research goal is to improve attacking and evaluating protected cryp-
tographic implementations and we believe that we execute this task duly by
proposing the aforementioned attacks and discussing relevant countermeasures.
Furthermore, we hope that we have convinced the readers of this thesis that there
exist various sophisticated side-channel attacks, which could threaten the security
of even heavily protected implementations. As a result, it is practically impossible
to protect an implementation against all possible side-channel attacks. However,
in practice stacking on top of each other a significant number of wisely chosen SCA
countermeasures should make even sophisticated attacks infeasible as confirmed
by the Common Criteria (CC) evaluations4.
4https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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Tegenwoordig moeten ontwerpers van cryptografische apparaten zich naast de
functionele aspecten, zoals efficiëntie, ook bezig houden met informatie die kan
lekken via zogeheten ‘Side-Channels’ 5 tijdens de uitvoering van cryptografische
bewerkingen. Als zij dit niet doen, kan deze informatie mogelijk worden misbruikt
door een aanvaller om de geheime sleutel te achterhalen. Als de implementaties
niet voldoende zijn beveiligd, kunnen zowel symmetrische als asymmetrische cryp-
tosystemen het doelwit worden van zogenaamde Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)
aanvallen. In de gebruikelijke asymmetrische cryptografie implementaties, zoals
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), zijn het merendeel van de SCA-aanvallen ge-
baseerd op zwakheden in de scalaire vermenigvuldiging in een elliptische kromme
over een eindig lichaam.
Er zijn meerdere soorten SCA-aanvallen: Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Diffe-
rential Power Analysis (DPA) en Horizontal Attacks (HA). SPA heeft als doelwit
één (of enkele) meting(en) en probeert de geheime sleutel te achterhalen door mid-
del van visuele analyse. DPA gebruikt statistische methoden, zoals verschil van
gemiddelen, om informatie uit meerdere metingen af te leiden. HA is een meer ge-
avanceerde versie van SPA, omdat het de lekkage van verschillende tijdsmomenten
uit eenzelfde meting gebruikt door middel van geavanceerde statistiek of machine
learning. In de afgelopen jaren lijkt de trend van SCA-aanvallen op asymmetrische
cryptografie zich in toenemende mate in de richting van HA te begeven, aange-
zien de gebruikelijke, op willekeur gebaseerde ‘countermeasures’ (bijv. ‘exponent
blinding’ en ‘scalair blinding’), beveiligen tegen SPA- en DPA-aanvallen.
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt ‘Side-Channel’ weerstand van cryptografische im-
plementaties beveiligd met behulp van verschillende ‘countermeasures’. We richten
ons op hardware- en software-implementaties van asymmetrische cryptografie, in
het bijzonder ECC en Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA). We analyseren ook een be-
veiligde hardware-implementatie van een veelvoorkomende symmetrisch blokver-
cijfering - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
5Veel voorkomende ‘Side-Channels’ zijn tijd, temperatuur, energieverbruik en elektromagne-
tische straling.
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De belangrijkste bijdragen van dit proefschrift zijn als volgt. We presenteren
ten eerste een sterke aanvalstechniek, genaamd Online Template Attacks (OTA),
welke toepasbaar is op de verscheidene scalaire vermenigvuldigingsalgoritmen van
ECC 6. OTA valt onder de noemer van HA, omdat hier slechts één meting nodig is
van het aan te vallen apparaat om de geheime sleutel te achterhalen. Dit betekent
dat een aantal van de veelvoorkomende ‘countermeasures’, zoals ‘scalair randomi-
zation’, niet effectief zijn tegen deze aanval. We demonstreren de toepasbaarheid
van OTA en alle andere aanvallen gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift met behulp
van experimentele resultaten op publiekelijk beschikbare doelwitten. Ten tweede
presenteren we een ‘template attack’ op een ECC-implementatie die is beveiligd
met behulp van onder andere ‘coordinate re-randomization’ en ‘scalar randomi-
zation’, welke slechts één meeting nodig heeft. De aanval richt zich rechtstreeks
op een voorwaardelijke operatie (cmov), een veel gebruikte operatie in scalaire
vermenigvuldingsimplementaties.
Ten derde introduceren we een framework voor SCA-aanvallen dat ‘unsupervi-
sed horizontal clustering’, ‘maximum likelihood estimation’, en ‘template attacks’
combineert om een geheime RSA-sleutel te achterhalen. Om het succespercentage
te verbeteren bij het aanvallen van beveiligde implementaties, gebruikt het frame-
work meerdere metingen voor de selectie van ‘points of interest’ (POI’s), om het
ruisniveau te verminderen. Bij het daadwerkelijke achterhalen van de willekeu-
rig gegeneerde exponenten worden echter alleen afzonderlijke metingen gebruikt.
Voor zover ons bekend, is dit de eerste ‘unsupervised’ aanval die meerdere metin-
gen gebruikt voor de selectie van POI’s.
Vervolgens breiden we het bovengenoemde framework uit naar ECC en ‘multi-
dimensional clustering’. We voeren met succes op ‘horizontal clustering’ gebaseerde
aanvallen uit op twee implementaties van de ‘Montgomery Ladder’ op Curve25519
die zijn beveiligd met ‘regularity’, ‘point re-randomization’ en ‘scalar randomiza-
tion’.
Ten slotte passen we lekkagedetectiemethoden, voornamelijk TVLA, toe op
twee cryptografische implementaties: ECC en AES. Om dit te doen bepalen we
eerst de ‘Side-Channel’ weerstand van een beveiligde implementatie van de recent
gepubliceerde volledige optelformules voor elliptische curves van een priem orde op
een FPGA-platform. De resultaten bevestigen dat het toepassen van een toene-
mend aantal ‘countermeasures’ leidt tot een verbeterde ‘Side-Channel’ weerstand.
Ten tweede bekijken we een in hardware geïmplementeerde AES welke gebruik
maakt van ‘low entropy masking’. Dit biedt beveiliging tegen op energieverbruik
gebaseerde SCA, en maakt een zeer compacte structuur mogelijk. De evaluatie,
welke is uitgevoerd met behulp van TVLA en CPA, toont aan dat het voorgestelde
ontwerp de ‘Side-Channel’ weerstand aanzienlijk verbetert.
6In principe kan OTA ook worden toegepast op verschillende RSA.
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Ons voornaamste onderzoeksdoel is het verbeteren van aanvallen op en het
evalueren van beveiligde cryptografische implementaties door de bovengenoemde
aanvallen voor te stellen en relevante ‘countermeasures’ te bespreken. We zijn
van mening dat we deze taak naar behoren uitgevoerd hebben. Verder hopen
we de lezers van dit proefschrift ervan overtuigd zijn geraakt dat er verschillende
geavanceerde SCA-aanvallen bestaan die de veiligheid van zelfs zwaar beveiligde
implementaties in gevaar kunnen brengen. Hierdoor is het onmogelijk om een im-
plementatie te beveiligen tegen alle mogelijke SCA-aanvallen. Het combineren van
een significant aantal zorgvuldig gekozen ‘countermeasures’ kan echter in de prak-
tijk zelfs zeer doordachte aanvallen onhaalbaar maken, zoals bevestigd in Common
Criteria (CC) 7 evaluaties.
7https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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Streszczenie
W dzisiejszych czasach projektanci urządzeń kryptograficznych muszą nie tylko
skupiać się na aspektach funkcjonalnych, takich jak wydajność, ale także muszą
zapewnić, aby informacje wyciekające przez kanały boczne8 (ang. „side channels”)
podczas wykonywania operacji kryptograficznych nie mogły zostać wykorzystane
przez hakera próbującego uzyskać tajny klucz kryptograficzny. Jeśli implementa-
cje systemów kryptograficznych (zarówno symetrycznych, jak i asymetrycznych)
nie są wystarczająco chronione, to są one podatne na ataki zwane analizą kana-
łów bocznych (ang. „Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)”). Na przykład w przypadku
popularnej kryptografii opartej na kluczu publicznym, tzn. kryptografii krzywych
eliptycznych (ang. „Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)”), większość ataków SCA
analizuje mnożenie skalarne na krzywej eliptycznej nad skończonym polem.
Istnieją różne rodzaje ataków SCA: prosta analiza mocy (ang. „Simple Po-
wer Analysis (SPA)”), analiza różnicy mocy (ang. „Differential Power Analysis
(DPA)”) i ataki poziome (ang. „Horizontal Attacks (HA)”). SPA analizuje poje-
dynczy ślad bocznego kanału (lub kilka śladów) i wyciąga wnioski na temat tajnego
klucza na podstawie tych prostych oględzin. DPA używa metod statystycznych,
takich jak różnica średnich, aby wyodrębnić informacje z dużej ilości śladów. HA
jest bardziej zaawansowanym typem SPA, ponieważ wykorzystuje wyciek z róż-
nych punktów tego samego śladu, zazwyczaj przez zastosowanie zaawansowanych
technik statystycznych lub uczenia maszynowego. W ostatnich latach trend ata-
ków SCA na kryptografię klucza publicznego wydaje się przesuwać w kierunku HA,
ponieważ dobrze znane środki zaradcze oparte na randomizacji (np. randomizacja
wykładnika i skalaru) chronią przed atakami SPA i DPA.
Ta praca bada bezpieczeństwo implementacji kryptograficznych chronionych
różnymi środkami zaradczymi z punktu widzenia SCA. Koncentrujemy się na
implementacjach sprzętowych i softwarowych kryptografii klucza publicznego, w
szczególności ECC i Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA). Analizujemy również chro-
nioną implementację sprzętową powszechnie stosowanego symetrycznego szyfru
8Popularne kanały boczne obejmują czas, temperaturę, zużycie energii i emanacje elektroma-
gnetyczne.
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blokowego – Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Główne wątki tej pracy są następujące. Po pierwsze, przedstawiamy potężną
technikę ataku, zwaną Online Template Attacks (OTA), z możliwością zastosowa-
nia do różnych algorytmów mnożenia skalarnego krzywych eliptycznych 9. OTA
opiera się na poziomych typach ataków, ponieważ do odzyskania klucza prywat-
nego potrzebny jest tylko jeden ślad z atakowanego urządzenia. Oznacza to, że
niektóre wspólne środki zaradcze, takie jak randomizacja skalarna, są nieskuteczne
wobec tego ataku. Wykazujemy praktyczność OTA i wszystkich naszych ataków
przedstawionych w tej pracy za pomocą wyników eksperymentalnych używając
publicznie dostępnych urządzeń.
Po drugie, przedstawiamy atak z pojedynczym śladem na implementację ECC
chronioną za pomocą kilku środków zaradczych, w tym re-randomizację współ-
rzędnych i randomizację skalarną. Atak dotyczy bezpośrednio operacji conditional
move (cmov), która jest często używana w implementacjach mnożenia skalarnego.
Po trzecie, proponujemy metodę atakowania kanału bocznego, która łączy nie-
nadzorowane klastrowanie poziome, szacowanie maksymalnego prawdopodobień-
stwa i template attacks w celu odzyskania prywatnego klucza RSA. Aby popra-
wić wskaźnik powodzenia podczas atakowania chronionych implementacji, należy
wykorzystać wiele ścieżek do wyboru interesujących momentów w śladzie (ang.
„Points of Interest (POI)”) aby zmniejsz poziomu hałasu, co zgodnie z naszą naj-
lepszą wiedzą jest to pierwszym takim nienadzorowany atakiem. Jednak podczas
odzyskiwania chronionych wykładników analizowane są tylko pojedyncze ślady.
Następnie aplikujemy wyżej wspomnianą metodę do kryptografii krzywych
eliptycznych przez zastosowanie wielowymiarowego klastrowania. Z powodzeniem
przeprowadzamy horyzontalne ataki klastrowe na dwie implementacje drabiny
Montgomery’ego na Curve25519, które są chronione za pomocą regularności, re-
randomizacji punktowej i randomizacji skalarnej.
Ostatecznie dostosowujemy metody wykrywania wycieków, głównie Test Vec-
tor Leakage Assesment (TVLA), do dwóch implementacji krypto systemów: ECC
i AES. Najpierw sprawdzamy oporność kanału bocznego chronionej implementa-
cji najnowszych kompletnych formuł dla ECC na platformie FPGA. Wyniki po-
twierdzają, że zastosowanie rosnącego poziomu środków zaradczych prowadzi do
poprawy oporu kanału bocznego. Następnie oceniamy sprzętową implementację
AES opartą na maskowaniu niską entropią, która zapewnia ochronę przed SCA,
jednocześnie pozwalając na bardzo wydajną implementację. Użycie TVLA i DPA
pokazuje, że proponowana konstrukcja znacząco poprawia opór kanału bocznego.
Naszym głównym celem badawczym była poprawa ataku i oceny chronionych
implementacji kryptograficznych. Proponując wyżej wspomniane ataki i omawia-
jąc odpowiednie środki zaradcze uważamy, że wykonaliśmy to zadanie należycie.
9Zasadniczo OTA można również zastosować do różnych algorytmów potęgowania używanych
w RSA.
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Ponadto mamy nadzieję, że przekonaliśmy czytelników tej pracy o istnieniu róż-
nych zaawansowanych ataków używających kanałów bocznych, które mogą zagro-
zić bezpieczeństwu nawet mocno chronionych implementacji. W rezultacie prak-
tycznie niemożliwe jest zabezpieczenie implementacji przed wszystkimi możliwymi
atakami używającymi kanałów bocznych. Jednak w praktyce użycie znacznej
liczby mądrze wybranych środków zaradczych SCA powinno sprawić, że nawet
wyrafinowane ataki będą nieosiągalne, co potwierdzają ewaluacje Common Crite-
ria (CC)10.
10https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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